What exactly is so threatening about this?
Every Reformed minister loves preaching from Romans and Galatians. Presenting the Mosaic law as teaching a works principle really helps in explaining Paul’s doctrine of justification: what sin is all about, why people can’t rely on their own law-keeping, how faith is radically different from works, how Christ fulfilled the terms of the law so that we may be justified. That’s the gospel as I see it, but you can’t explain the gospel without understanding the law. Or take all of those Old Testament passages that call for Israel’s obedience and promise blessing and threaten curse in the land depending on their response. For example, the beginning of Deuteronomy 4, which tells Israel to follow the law so that they may live and take possession of the land. Or Deuteronomy 28, which recounts all sorts of earthly blessings in the land if the Israelites are careful to obey and all sorts of earthly curses if they aren’t. I don’t want a congregation to think that God was holding out a works-based way of salvation here, and I also can’t tell the congregation that this is the same way that God deals with the New Testament church when he calls her to obedience, for there’s nothing equivalent in the New Testament, no promise of earthly blessing for the church today if we meet a standard of obedience. Saying either of those things might by simple, but of course they’d be misleading, and damaging for the church to hear. (The Law is Not of Faith, 5)
Could it be that this view seems to allow Christians to think that law-keeping does not contribute to their salvation? Well, if the law requires “personal, perfect, and perpetual conformity and obedience thereunto, in the frame and disposition of the whole man, soul and body, and in performance of all those duties of holiness and righteousness which he owes to God and man: promising life upon the fulfilling, and threatening death upon the breach of it,” who is up to that challenge? Don’t be bashful.
Old Life 
David R., and your problem is you can’t read or write because you have quoted (really?!?) plenty of Reformed theologians who say just the opposite of your “clear” contention. Do you need Lithium?
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“But if we consider the Law strictly, so it contains the sum of the Covenant of Works, which God did therefore reveal, because it was even wholly obliterated, and blotted out of the mind of man; and therefore it was speculum primitivae hominis justitiae, &c. a glass of the primitive righteousness of man. And unto all men out of Christ in an unregenerate state, it remains as a Covenant of Works, binding them to personal and perfect obedience, if they hope to attain life. (1) The Moral Law is the same to the sinner out of Christ that it was unto Christ our Surety; for what it was to the Surety, that it was to the sinner; for he did put his name into our bond; only in us it was necessary, in him voluntary. But Gal. 4.4. the Law was unto Christ a Covenant of Works; therefore to every sinner out of Christ it remains so. (2) That which teaches us Justification and life by doing, that is a Covenant of Works; but so does the Law strictly taken; and it is therefore opposed unto the Gospel; there is the righteousness of the Law, and the righteousness of the Gospel. (3) The Curse under which all unregenerate men are, is the curse of the Moral Law, but that is the curse of the Covenant of Works; therefore the Moral Law is a covenant of Works. (4) Therefore the Apostle makes it a distinct Covenant, from the Covenant of Grace. The Law thus taken strictly as a copy of the Covenant that God made with Adam, and containing the sum of the Covenant of Works, and being delivered in the form of this Covenant, this Covenant has the Lord made subservient and subordinate unto the Covenant of Grace, as Hagar to Sarah.” – William Strong in Discourse of the Two Covenants
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Here is my refutation: The claim that “a works principle is inconsistent with the Mosaic covenant” ignores the many, many Reformed sources that treat with the Mosaic covenant as having an outward administration according to the Covenant of Works.
To be precise, your thesis as stated fails to distinguish between substance and accidents. If it were true that a works principle were in fact incompatible with a works principle, period, then there could be no works principle, period, not even in the accidents.
I’m not sure what you’re saying since you seem to have some typos. But no, I’m not ignoring the distinction between substance and accidents. The administration (accidents) has to do with the mode by which the substance (promises/conditions) is communicated. In terms of the CoG, this is covered (as you know) in WCF 7.5-6.
The law is always administered together with the gospel (CoG), but it is not either of the substance or of the administration of the CoG (though the types concealed under the ceremonies were).
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DR: But no, I’m not ignoring the distinction between substance and accidents.
I figured you probably were not mentally doing so, but your thesis omits that distinction entirely. Would you mind rephrasing your thesis so that it is clear what you understand the relation of the works principle to be in the MC? Is it entirely absent, acting as accident, or other?
Typos … scanning … ah, yes, right. That para should read:
If it were true that a works principle were in fact incompatible with a grace principle, period, then there could be no works principle, period, not even in the accidents.
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Would you mind rephrasing your thesis so that it is clear what you understand the relation of the works principle to be in the MC? Is it entirely absent, acting as accident, or other?
I hope this helps (though it is somewhat redundant):
1. There is (by definition) no works principle in existence apart from the existence of a covenant of works (or legal covenant) between two parties (which we agree the MC was not).
2. In the economy of redemption, the (moral) law is administered as a rule of righteousness (not as a CoW), and as such, it has (at least) these uses: (1) antecedently, as a pedagogue, and (2) consequently, as a rule of life.
3. Antecedently, the moral law subserves the covenant of grace as a pedagogue, convincing elect but unregenerate sinners of their sin and misery and driving them to Christ. It does this, however, not by bringing them under a works principle, but rather by revealing the demands and sanctions of the broken CoW, that is, the works principle that they are already under, and thus liable to the threatened curse.
4. What distinguished the MC revelation of law from that of the NC is not that the former brought the church under a works principle whereas the latter does not. It is rather that in the former, the law’s demand and threat were very conspicuously and emphatically revealed, by contrast with the gospel remaining relatively hidden; whereas in conjunction with the latter, by virtue of the Messiah’s advent, the gospel is openly revealed and proclaimed and the church is thus released from the typical observances and constant threat of temporal curse. (Not to mention that the obligation to obey the moral law under the NC is strengthened, WCF 19.5. D.G., you have your allergy pills handy?)
5. This is the correct category for the material you cited from Fisher’s Catechism (though obviously the terrifying audio/visual phenomena, voice of God, threats, etc. were unique to Sinai). This is also the category for Turretin’s external economy. It is also what is explained in WLC 93-96.
6. The law (as law, i.e., apart from the typological significance of the ceremonies) is not of the substance of the CoG (obviously) nor of its administration (since law cannot administer grace). Though it is true that the law is always administered with the gospel and the CoG; the law (as law) does not itself administer the gospel nor CoG (I think you agree?).
7. Therefore, my thesis stands as is (w/o needing rephrasing) since it concerns only the CoG and its administration, not the law that was administered along with it.
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David R., at least I am not as you are allergic to Paul who you continue to ignore. Curious.
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David R., to be clear, the law, works, and the curse are not of the substance of the MC because the MC is an administration of the CoG? Presumably, also, since there was no actual curse in the MC, but the only actual curse was in the Adamic Covenant, there is no one cursed under the MC, but only under the AC. It also seems that Christ did not bear the non-existent curse of the MC for us, but only that of the AC.
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This is vey helpful and we are very close in many ways. Responses:
(1) Agreed, I think. I would say that the CoW is the legal, natural, “of works” covenant, and that the legal economy reflects its demands. That seems mappable to your (1) … until we get to (7)?
(2) Yes.
(3) Right. There is not at Sinai an additional demand of works, but rather a repetition of what was already true. “Death reigned from Adam until Moses”
(4) This one is squishy. On the one hand, I agree following from (3) that the church was not placed under a new covenant of works. On the other hand, I would say that all of Israel was placed under a legal economy. Here you might consider Turretin 12.7.37-38: Who was made afraid by the rigor of the law?
(5) Right. And to extend, this is the proper category for Berkhof’s “positive reminder of the strict demands of the covenant of works.” And for Hodge’s “In this view the parties were God and the people of Israel; the promise was national security and prosperity; the condition was the obedience of the people as a nation to the Mosaic law; and the mediator was Moses. In this aspect it was a legal covenant. It said. “Do this and live.” Secondly, it contained, as does also the New Testament, a renewed proclamation of the original covenant of works.”
What all of these have in common, over against Ramsey and Dennison, is a positive affirmation that under the legal economy or aspect or layer or thingy, the Israelites were required (not necessarily successfully) to first obey antecedently to receiving the blessings, and that this requirement was of works.
That is, in the legal economy and only in the legal economy, there was a legal requirement: obey to obtain. The meaning of the term “legal” is really clear in Turretin 8.3.4-5, by the way, which makes the term “legal economy” much easier to understand.
6. The law (as law, i.e., apart from the typological significance of the ceremonies) is not of the substance of the CoG (obviously) nor of its administration (since law cannot administer grace).
You would seem to be arguing, then, one of two things, neither of which I think you actually believe.
(6a) “The law is therefore not a part of the Mosaic Covenant, which is an administration of the CoG.”
Since the law is neither of the substance nor the administration, would it not follow that it is no part of an administration of the CoG?
And yet it is self-evident that the Law is the prominent feature of the Mosaic Covenant!!
So that’s not right. So we try
(6b) “The Mosaic Covenant is actually two covenants at once: The CoG given to post-fall Adam and then Abraham, to which is appended the CoW given to pre-fall Adam.”
But this would actually be a subservient covenant view! Two different covenants, different stipulations (same promise), one subserving the other.
And I feel very, very confident that you’re not trying to say that.
So I actually need to disagree with (6). The Law is a part of the administration of the CoG in the Mosaic Covenant. Not that the law administers grace! But rather, that it administers law for the admitted pedagogical purpose.
In other words, I take “administration” and “economy” and “mode of dispensation” to be synonyms. Here, Turretin 12.12.5, 17, 19. Especially 17, in which Turretin argues that the sub-cov view is actually just a confused substance/mode of economy view.
(7) So here then I would think (6) points the way to the problem and solution. To restate: If it’s really true that works-principle and grace-principle cannot coexist in the Mosaic, then there can be no legal cloak. By contrast, if it’s really true that works and grace can coexist, serving different functions (the law condemning, grace giving life), then the thesis is vacated. I am sure that Turretin affirms the latter and not the former. See his discussion of the ceremonial law 11.24.8-9 where the ceremonial law serves different functions with respect to the moral law and to the people and to grace, or sec 11.24.11 where the ceremonial law has a double relation, one legal and one grace.
If a works principle (syn.: legal) is neither a part of the MC nor its administration, then the ceremonial law is left hanging in mid-air.
Or put another way, your point (3) militates against (6).
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This is vey helpful and we are very close in many ways.
Good. I too feel like we’re getting somewhere….
Responses:
(1) Agreed, I think. I would say that the CoW is the legal, natural, “of works” covenant, and that the legal economy reflects its demands. That seems mappable to your (1) … until we get to (7)?
If we agree about this one, the rest should be cake.
(4) This one is squishy. On the one hand, I agree following from (3) that the church was not placed under a new covenant of works. On the other hand, I would say that all of Israel was placed under a legal economy. Here you might consider Turretin 12.7.37-38: Who was made afraid by the rigor of the law?
I’m not sure what you are opposing here. I agree that “all of Israel was placed under a legal economy,” but I don’t know why you think I’m saying otherwise.
David R: 6. The law (as law, i.e., apart from the typological significance of the ceremonies) is not of the substance of the CoG (obviously) nor of its administration (since law cannot administer grace).
You would seem to be arguing, then, one of two things, neither of which I think you actually believe.
(6a) “The law is therefore not a part of the Mosaic Covenant, which is an administration of the CoG.”
I wouldn’t put it this way because “not a part of” is ambiguous. The law does not administer grace, but in its pedagogical use, it subserves the administration of grace (see my #3, which you agree with).
Since the law is neither of the substance nor the administration, would it not follow that it is no part of an administration of the CoG?
Yes and/or no (depending on what that ambiguous “no part of” means)….
And yet it is self-evident that the Law is the prominent feature of the Mosaic Covenant!!
So that’s not right. So we try
(6b) “The Mosaic Covenant is actually two covenants at once: The CoG given to post-fall Adam and then Abraham, to which is appended the CoW given to pre-fall Adam.”
But this would actually be a subservient covenant view! Two different covenants, different stipulations (same promise), one subserving the other.
And I feel very, very confident that you’re not trying to say that.
We really need to work this one out, as this is key. Try this by way of clarification:
(6c) The moral law, in its antecedent pedagogical use (i.e., wrt the unregenerate), though it subserves the CoG, is not of the substance of the CoG (obviously), nor of its administration (since law cannot administer grace). But consequently (i.e., following faith and repentance), it serves as a rule of life for believers (third use), and is in this way taken in under the CoG.
WLC 32 again:
So I actually need to disagree with (6). The Law is a part of the administration of the CoG in the Mosaic Covenant. Not that the law administers grace! But rather, that it administers law for the admitted pedagogical purpose.
Again, to say that the law “is a part of” the administration of the CoG seems to me ambiguous. (But see above.)
In other words, I take “administration” and “economy” and “mode of dispensation” to be synonyms. Here, Turretin 12.12.5, 17, 19. Especially 17, in which Turretin argues that the sub-cov view is actually just a confused substance/mode of economy view.
I agree with this, but the question in each particular usage of the term is whether the specific “economy” is of grace, as in the “internal economy,” or of law, as in the “external economy.”
(7) So here then I would think (6) points the way to the problem and solution. To restate: If it’sreally true that works-principle and grace-principle cannot coexist in the Mosaic, then there can be no legal cloak.
I’ll be interested in your response to my “(6c),” above.
By contrast, if it’s really true that works and grace can coexist, serving different functions (the law condemning, grace giving life), then the thesis is vacated. I am sure that Turretin affirms the latter and not the former. See his discussion of the ceremonial law 11.24.8-9 where the ceremonial law serves different functions with respect to the moral law and to the people and to grace, or sec 11.24.11 where the ceremonial law has a double relation, one legal and one grace.
Again, law and gospel are administered together, but the one does not administer the other (as I know you agree).
If a works principle (syn.: legal) is neither a part of the MC nor its administration, then the ceremonial law is left hanging in mid-air.
I am not sure what you’re saying here. The ceremonial law, as law, i.e., as it functions in the external economy, does not administer grace. But in terms of its typological significance, i.e., as it functions in the internal economy, it does administer grace.
Or put another way, your point (3) militates against (6).
Hopefully you now see that it does not.
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Good interchange.
—
I should say that I am comfortable with the basic architecture that you’re working from (Turretin’s), but I continue to push at this point for two reasons:
(1) The way in which you articulate that architecture is misleading — not that you are trying to mislead others, but that you have been misled to believe that Kline is on a radically different page from yourself. And it all comes back to this proposition that is being used unqualifiedly: “A works principle is inconsistent with the Mosaic covenant.” When viewed from a certain angle, that proposition is absolutely true. But from other angles, including the one that is being used to bash Kline, it is false. When viewed from the Turretin angle, the works principle lies alongside the grace principle, each performing its separate function, the works principle subserving that of grace. They are not “incompatible”, but “antithetical.”
Propositions that can be either true or false, depending, are generally not good theology unless there is no other alternative.
(2) The prize has nothing to do with Kline. He has gone on to glory, and whatever mistakes he had in his theology have long been corrected. The anti-repubs have no concern on his behalf. Rather, what is at stake for them is to defend and rehabilitate the Murray thesis, which goes all the way back to Ball:
And of course, having read Turretin, you see that this is incompatible with Turretin’s characterization of the cloak as “legal” — meaning: dependent on an antecedent condition of obedience, over against the covenant of grace in which obedience is a posterior condition.
There are rocks ahead for you on the anti-repub ship. You will not be able to continue to keep Law and Gospel distinct.
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DR: I agree that “all of Israel was placed under a legal economy,” but I don’t know why you think I’m saying otherwise.
Well, because you say that
* Believers in Israel were not under the Covenant of Works.
* The legal economy was the CoW, subserving the CoG.
Whence it should follow that believers in Israel were not under the legal economy.
DR: (6c) The moral law, in its antecedent pedagogical use (i.e., wrt the unregenerate), though it subserves the CoG, is not of the substance of the CoG (obviously), nor of its administration (since law cannot administer grace).
You still have two distinct covenants, though, one subserving the other.
Take the first commandment. Is it contained within the Mosaic Covenant? Yes. Is it of the substance of the CoG? According to you, no. So is the Mosaic Covenant one in substance with the CoG? It logically cannot be.
In fact, most of the Mosaic Covenant is legal sanction, which according to you is not of the substance of the CoG, but must be referred in its legality to the CoW and functioning pedagogically.
So it is impossible for you to self-consistently affirm that “the MC was the CoG, period.”
But consequently (i.e., following faith and repentance), it serves as a rule of life for believers (third use), and is in this way taken in under the CoG
Sure. But notice the careful distinction: The third use of the law adds grace alongside the law (specifically, Christ’s merits imputed and infused), giving the law a new function. The third use of the law does not turn the law into grace. The Mosaic Covenant’s legal cloak doesn’t “become gracious” by grace. It continues to be law — but with the requirement fulfilled by Christ.
So now you can see how inept the reasoning of Dennison et al is:
Law? Gospel? Who can tell the difference? For Dennison, obedience to the commands becomes a means of grace, the antecedent condition on which life is granted. It doesn’t count as “merit” for Dennison, as it would have for Turretin, because Dennison defines merit in a strict sense.
Turretin is much better (sorry, Dennison): The requirements of the law were antecedent requirements, therefore meritorious in the sense of pact and part of the legal economy. I don’t remember the exact cite at the moment, but I quoted it above somewhere.
As such, the legal requirements applied to all. He’s very definite about the legal requirements applying even to believers.
But life came on a different condition: faith. Only faith is antecedent to receiving life, and obedience is a “condition” only in the consequent sense.
So Turretin and Dennison are much, much further apart than Turretin and even genuine sub-covenantals.
This is huge, and it’s at the heart of what’s at stake in our entire discussion. It is what drives me to keep talking after all this time.
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(1) The way in which you articulate that architecture is misleading — not that you are trying to mislead others, but that you have been misled to believe that Kline is on a radically different page from yourself.
You already know I disagree, so I won’t comment further.
And it all comes back to this proposition that is being used unqualifiedly: “A works principle is inconsistent with the Mosaic covenant.” When viewed from a certain angle, that proposition is absolutely true.
Good.
But from other angles, including the one that is being used to bash Kline, it is false. When viewed from the Turretin angle, the works principle lies alongside the grace principle, each performing its separate function, the works principle subserving that of grace. They are not “incompatible”, but “antithetical.”
I’m not clear on how it is false from other angles (but you knew that).
(2) The prize has nothing to do with Kline. He has gone on to glory, and whatever mistakes he had in his theology have long been corrected. The anti-repubs have no concern on his behalf. Rather, what is at stake for them is to defend and rehabilitate the Murray thesis, which goes all the way back to Ball:
I disagree. First of all those few sentences from Murray should not be controversial in Reformed circles. He is saying in those few sentences nothing essentially different than what Calvin, Turretin, Berkhof, et. al. also say, i.e., what necessarily is the case if the MC is an administration of the CoG. Gordon’s difference with Murray (and also with Calvin, Turretin, Berkhof, et. al.) is a difference over the essential nature of the MC.
And of course, having read Turretin, you see that this is incompatible with Turretin’s characterization of the cloak as “legal” — meaning: dependent on an antecedent condition of obedience, over against the covenant of grace in which obedience is a posterior condition.
I have no idea what you’re arguing here. Turretin is entirely compatible with that Murray quote because they both agree concerning the essence of the MC.
There are rocks ahead for you on the anti-repub ship. You will not be able to continue to keep Law and Gospel distinct.
On the contrary, I am anti-repub in the interests of keeping law and gospel distinct. As I’ve said, I think Kline muddied the L-G distinction (by importing works and merit into the CoG). Calvin, Turretin, et. al. get it right.
DR: I agree that “all of Israel was placed under a legal economy,” but I don’t know why you think I’m saying otherwise.
Well, because you say that
* Believers in Israel were not under the Covenant of Works.
* The legal economy was the CoW, subserving the CoG.
Whence it should follow that believers in Israel were not under the legal economy.
Believers in Israel were certainly not under the CoW. But where did I ever refer to the legal economy as “the CoW”? Maybe we can dispel some confusion by dealing with the question of what precisely it means to say that believers in Israel were under the legal economy. For example, does it mean that …
1. they were under a very conspicuous and continual proclamation of the law, by contrast with a relatively sparse scattering of gospel promises and a veil of ceremonies hiding the gospel substance? Yes.
2. they were witnesses (if they were present at Sinai) to the display of God’s avenging wrath in the thunder, lightning, audible divine voice, threats, etc.? Of course.
3. they were under the law as a covenant of works? No, not in any sense.
4. they were under the law as a pedagogue? Yes and no. Yes, in the redemptive-historical sense of #1. But no, wrt the ordinary sense of that terminology (i.e., the use of the law to the unregenerate).
5. they were obligated to obedience to the ceremonial and civil law (in addition to the moral)? Of course.
6. they were subject to the temporal curse on account of national apostasy? Of course.
Can you think of anything else? Those are most of the ways I can think of that believers in Israel were under the legal economy (and what that does and doesn’t mean).
You still have two distinct covenants, though, one subserving the other.
Take the first commandment. Is it contained within the Mosaic Covenant? Yes. Is it of the substance of the CoG? According to you, no. So is the Mosaic Covenant one in substance with the CoG? It logically cannot be.
That is terribly confusing. In what sense is the moral law “contained within the Mosaic covenant”? As a covenant of works? No. As a pedagogue and as a rule of life? Yes, which is precisely the same sense that the moral law is “contained within” the new covenant.
DR: But consequently (i.e., following faith and repentance), it serves as a rule of life for believers (third use), and is in this way taken in under the CoG
The third use of the law does not turn the law into grace. The Mosaic Covenant’s legal cloak doesn’t “become gracious” by grace. It continues to be law — but with the requirement fulfilled by Christ.
Of course, but why would you think I disagree?
So now you can see how inept the reasoning of Dennison et al is …
That may or may not be. I am not well versed in Dennison, et. al.
Turretin is much better (sorry, Dennison): The requirements of the law were antecedent requirements, therefore meritorious in the sense of pact and part of the legal economy. I don’t remember the exact cite at the moment, but I quoted it above somewhere.
As such, the legal requirements applied to all. He’s very definite about the legal requirements applying even to believers.
Okay, but in what sense? (See above list.)
So Turretin and Dennison are much, much further apart than Turretin and even genuine sub-covenantals.
Could be, but I doubt it. (Btw, I really don’t see much distance between Bolton, a self-described “modest” proponent of the subservient covenant, and Turretin.)
This is huge, and it’s at the heart of what’s at stake in our entire discussion. It is what drives me to keep talking after all this time.
If the issue for you is the law-gospel distinction, then I’m 100% with you on that score. I will stand with you and anyone else here when it comes to defending the law-gospel distinction against nomism. If someone wants to argue that Murray muddied the L-G distinction, then fine, I won’t necessarily argue. If someone wants to argue that Kline returned us to “classic covenant theology,” well, in some ways he was helpful to that end, but in other crucial ways (i.e., those under discussion), not so much. If Kline was right, then Calvin, Turretin, et. al. confused law and gospel. Imo we should seek to genuinely recover classic covenant theology and agree to reject whatever departures from it, whether issuing from the house of Murray, Kline or you-name-it. Can I get an amen?
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John Murray: In reality, there is nothing that is principally different in the necessity of keeping the covenant and of obedience to God’s voice, which proceeds from the Mosaic covenant, from that which is involved from the Abrahamic
DR: I disagree [that Turretin is incompatible with the above]. First of all those few sentences from Murray should not be controversial in Reformed circles. He is saying in those few sentences nothing essentially different than what Calvin, Turretin, Berkhof, et. al. also say, i.e., what necessarily is the case if the MC is an administration of the CoG. … Turretin is entirely compatible with that Murray quote because they both agree concerning the essence of the MC.
Definitely not. Yes, they both agree, at least on the surface, concerning the essence of the MC.
No, they do not agree concerning the nature and function of the accidents, and in particular on the necessity of obedience. They have a very different understanding of how the “legal cloak” functions. I will address that in detail below.
JRC: Take the first commandment. Is it contained within the Mosaic Covenant? Yes. Is it of the substance of the CoG? According to you, no. So is the Mosaic Covenant one in substance with the CoG? It logically cannot be.
DR: That is terribly confusing. In what sense is the moral law “contained within the Mosaic covenant”? As a covenant of works? No. As a pedagogue and as a rule of life? Yes, which is precisely the same sense that the moral law is “contained within” the new covenant.
Back up. The downside of scholastic distinctions is that they sometimes obfuscate the obvious.
The moral law is contained within the Mosaic Covenant in the plain sense that Exodus 20 is a subset of the document called the Mosaic Covenant.
The moral law is in the Mosaic Covenant.
Now we can ask, how does it function within the MC? You suggest, as a pedagogue leading unbelievers to Christ, and as a rule of life for believers. I agree with both of those. It has a third function, per Turretin, and that is to hold the entire nation under bondage as a child. (Esp 12.7.37-38). That bondage functions according to a legal principle, which for Turretin means, according to works in the sense that he uses that term, which is “according to an antecedent condition.”
It is this function that Berkhof, Vos, and Hodge are describing as “national.”
It is also this function, and only this function, that Kline is talking about as the “upper level.”
In every other function of the law, both hypothetically requiring obedience for justification (fulfilled by Christ) and also evangelical obedience (fulfilled by the believer in Christ, or perhaps the Spirit of Christ in the believer), the principle is “according to a posterior condition” or “a condition that is also a promise” (12.2.28 – 12.3.2). All five are united in affirming this.
The odd man out here is Murray, who cannot abide talk of believers being under bondage, hence insists that the law for believers administered only grace. Here is the tell: In reality, there is nothing that is principally different in the necessity of keeping the covenant and of obedience to God’s voice, which proceeds from the Mosaic covenant, from that which is involved from the Abrahamic
For Turretin, the necessity is different. Abraham’s necessity was one of posterior condition; the Mosaic legal economy had a necessity that was antecedent.
But let’s circle back to that point after we have clearly established Turretin’s structure, because I’m pre-sensing some agitation about the whole nation being under a works-principle.
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Turretin’s Structure of the Covenants
FT considers all covenants between God and man to be acts of condescension because God and man are not peers (8.3.1). The covenants are two-sided: a promise on God’s part, a condition on man’s part (8.3.3).
In particular, there is a “two-fold covenant”, or more simply, two covenants.
The first is characterized as “natural, legal, of works.” The second is “gracious, evangelical, of faith.” (8.3.4) The CoW is natural in that it takes man as perfect and unfallen and relies on “his integrity and powers” (8.3.5). It is “legal” because the condition is one of observation of the law. It is “of works” because it “depended on his works or proper obedience.”
The law in the covenant of works necessarily binds the one receiving it to “punishment denounced through the same” (8.3.7) but indemnity to the one obeying. For Turretin, the nature and sanction of the law of the CoW, particularly the promise of life on condition of obedience, is expressed in these passages: Lev 18.5, Dt 27.26, Ezx 20.11, Matt 19.17, and Gal 3.12.
The obedience required was required to have these characteristics: sincere, universal, perfect, perpetual. (8.3.13).
It is important to observe what “law” and “legal” mean for Turretin. “Legal” means “upon condition of observing the law.” Now that raises the question for the attentive reader: is it an antecedent or posterior condition, or sometimes one and sometimes the other?
Certainly in the covenant of works with Adam, the condition is anterior, which is reflected in the term “of works.” Put simply:
In order to obtain life, Adam had to obey.
But now arises the question: does the covenant of works in fact require “merit”? For Turretin, strict merit of condignity is impossible even for man in his natural state (he agrees with Ursinus on this). Therefore, we say that there was merit according to the pact.
— 8.3.16-17.
We pause here to notice the term as Turretin has defined it.
merit means acquiring the promise by fulfilling the condition, or what I have repeatedly referred to as acquiring on the ground of the condition.
Finally, we observe that for Turretin, the condition and promise contained in the CoW was repeated in the law of Moses as the means by which Christ merited eternal life for us (8.6.4-5). He says,
Second, [the fact that eternal life was promised to Adam] is confirmed by this — Christ acquired the eternal and celestial life which he bestows upon us in no other way than that (being made under the law) he fulfilled the righteousness of the law for us (Rom 8:4, Gal 4:5). This could not have been done unless the law had promised heavenly life to the obedient. For as he rendered to God the Father no other obedience than what the law demanded, so by fulfilling the law, he acquired no other life than what was promised by the law. — 8.6.5.
There is much more in FT concerning the CoW, but this is sufficient to the purpose. We notice already that
Theorem 1: Turretin was a republicationist in the sense that he affirmed a hypothetical CoW principle in the Law: If one obeyed the Law, one’s (sincere, universal, perfect, perpetual) obedience life according to pact.
This theorem can be made stronger, but it is a starting point that I believe we agree to. I would imagine that you probably agree to everything above.
[Disclaimer: I recognize that these are not theorems proper in that they are not deductively proven.]
Now, the covenant of grace likewise has promise and stipulations. But the reason that the CoG is gracious is that God fulfills the stipulations (12.1.9, 11).
— 12.1.11
Can I get an amen?
The promise is remission of sins and salvation to man gratuitously on account of Christ (12.2.5), and the stipulations are faith and obedience. (8.2.5).
And here he repeats the contrast: First, a legal covenant (or one of works), which is characterized by the phrases “do this and live” and “cursed is he who continueth not.” Second, an evangelical covenant of faith, entered into with the elect (12.2.3).
Thus the two covenants. The one is natural, legal, of works. In it, Adam merits life. The other is gracious, evangelical, of faith. In it, life is merited for us by Christ.
The first is legal because it requires obedience antecedently: Obey in order to live.
The second is evangelical because obedience is not only required posteriorly but also given by promise: Obey because you live.
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Turretin’s Understanding and Language of Merit
We have already seen that for FT, man is never assigned merit of condignity from God (8.6.10), but rather according to gratuitous pact (8.7.16-17). In several places, Turretin makes clear what it means to fulfill a condition meritoriously. The most direct is 12.3.2:
Condition is used either antecedently and a priori, for that which has the force of a meritorious and impulsive cause to obtain the benefits of the covenant (the performance of which gives man a right to the reward); or concomitantly and consequently a posteriori, for that which has the relation of means and disposition in the subject, required in the covenanted
This flows directly into the contrast between Law and Gospel:
Although the covenant of grace be conditional, the promises of the law and the gospel are not therefore to be confounded. There always remains a manifold difference: (1) in the matter, because the legal condition is an entire and perfect obedience to the law (Rom 10:5), but the evangelical is faith (Rom 10:9; Jn 3:16) — not perfect and free from all blemish, but living and sincere (1 Tim 1:5, Jam 2:14); (2) in origin, because the legal condition should be natural, flowing from the strength belonging to nature, but the evangelical is supernatural, depending upon grace. The former is only commanded, but not given or promised; but the latter is both commanded and promised and also given (Jer 31:33…). (3) In the end, the legal condition has the relation of a meritorious cause (at least congruously and improperly) of the promised thing (namely, of life) — “Do this and live.” Thus life is granted to him because he has done and on account of his own obedience; but the evangelical condition cannot properly be called the cause of salvation, much less merit, because it si the pure gift (charisma) of God (Rom 6:23). It may only be called an instrument by which the thing promised is apprehended (Acts 26:18, Rom 5:17) and without which it cannot be obtained (Heb 11:6) — 12.3.6.
We notice here the terms that are used as synonyms: A legal condition is one that requires obedience a priori and therefore requires merit.
As to works, they were required in the first [CoW] as an antecedent condition by way of a cause for acquiring life; but in the second, they are only the subsequent condition as the fruit and effect of the life already acquired. — 12.4.7.
FT sees this demand for a priori obedience clearly in the Mosaic Law (12.3.8) in terms of its pedagogical usage. Hence, the Mosaic Law demands merit. No-one earns it (save Jesus), but the Mosaic Law demands it.
Thus merit in Turretin. The meaning is “earning by fulfilling an a priori condition”; the qualification is “according to pact”; and the adjective that signals that merit is required is “legal.”
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Moral and Ceremonial Law
In Chapters 11 and 12, FT embarks on the difficult and still-debated topic of the Law and its relationship to the CoG.
Of note is that FT identifies the moral law (the Decalogue) as being the same for substance, but different in mode of delivery from the natural law (tablets v conscience). Interestingly, he says that the moral law applies only to those called by the word, while the natural applies to all. Shades of van Drunen. (11.1.12). He then argues that the moral law, being in substance the natural law [hence from God’s nature], is not abrogated, while the judicial and ceremonial, being of positive right [according to God’s voluntary will], are abrogated (11.2.9ff).
After a discussion of the Decalogue, he now considers what is its use, and he divides here. Absolutely, the law is a rule of obedience (11.22.2). But relatively, according to the states of man, it has three uses (11.22.7ff):
(1) For the innocent Adam and Christ, as the contract of the CoW.
(2) For those under sin, for conviction, restraint, and condemnation.
(3) For the elect, conviction and pedagogy prior to conversion; a rule of life thereafter.
Here we pause to consider a question: Does “rule of life” mean “a rule to direct my life” or “a rule that gives life”? This question is important because it is sometimes taught that obedience is a way to obtain life. For Turretin, however, the phrase “rule of life” seems always to mean “a rule that directs our lives.” And so it is here (11.22.11).
All of these uses pertain to the moral law.
Next: Is the moral law abrogated? Yes: ‘We’ (believers? all? unclear in this sentence) are no longer under the law to obtain justification from it, for we cannot. Yes: believers are no longer under the curse of the moral law. And now he introduces a new idea:
Third, the question does not concern restraint and rigor (which was the case under the Old Testament) because we are no longer under that servile training and dispensation in which the spirit of bondage exercised its power. Rather, we are under the gospel economy… (11.23.2)
In other words, the freedom of believers from the curse of the moral law is unrelated to the restraint and rigor that obtained in the OT. This idea is developed later in ch 12.
But is the moral law abrogated? No: We are still under its direction and observance (11.23.2ff), and in particular to the law of nature (11.23.15).
Now as he considers the other aspects of the law, the civil and ceremonial, he makes this helpful observation:
— 11.24.2.
This vindicates the idea that we should distinguish between the individual and the nation when considering the law. The individual deals with the moral law, as pedagogue when unjustified, as rule of life when justified. The “third use of the law” is likewise referred here and applies to individuals only.
Meanwhile, when considering the nation, we should look to ceremonial (cult) and civil (national) law for our understanding.
FT considers the ceremonial law to have various uses according to its various relations. (1) It subserved the moral law by showing guilt (11.24.8). (2) It served as a national marker to separate Israel from the Gentiles (3) It served to the church to show misery, Christ’s remedy, and our debt of gratitude. Or in other words, “what he is by nature, what he has received by grace; and what he owes by obedience” (11.24.9), which latter I take to be “third use.”
But was the ceremonial law “legal”, demanding obedience? Or was it “gracious”, holding forth Christ?
It was both (11.24.11). It was legal, referring to the CoW; it was gracious, referring to Christ. And, says FT, these two relations are “so connected that whoever wishes rightly to understand the nature of the OT economy and the use of the ceremonial law, ought always to join them together; nor can they be wrested asunder except at a heavy expense of the truth.” (11.24.12).
Pause for a moment and consider how different this is from the David R dictum that the Mosaic Covenant can only administer grace.
For Turretin, the ceremonial law has grace and law lying side-by-side, each performing its own function. In this way, grace is ultimately administered. The law continues to demand, in relation to the CoW; and yet not being the CoW.
So what was demanded and what was offered in the ceremonial law? What was offered was not justification or sanctification per se “since it was concerned only with a carnal commandment and things earthly and corporeal ‘which could not make the conscience perfect’ (Heb 9:9). It reached no further than to the ‘purifying of the flesh’ (v. 13)” (11.24.18).
What was demanded was a sacrifice. What was given in response to the sacrifice was a “typical and ceremonial expiation by which the impurity of the flesh was taken away” (11.24.19).
Now pause again and consider Turretin’s categories.
The externally guilty or unclean person (whether believer or not) had an antecedent condition of offering a sacrifice. If he did, he received typical and ceremonial expiation. This function of the Law was in relation to the CoW (inasmuch as it demanded antecedently and did not provide the sacrifice itself, that being demanded of the sacrificer). It was also in relation to the CoG (inasmuch as it typified grace).
Turretin: Therefore a twofold effect of that law must be attended to: the taking away of carnal impurity … [and] the signifying and sealing of the grace and all the benefits to be obtained from the Mediator (11.24.19).
Now what do we (does Turretin) call an antecedent condition upon fulfillment of which a reward is given? Merit. The ceremonial law required of all Israelites, believer and non-believer (11.25.1) to merit typical expiation. It was not justificatory merit, which of course no-one could attain. It was external, typical, church-wide merit that was required of the church. Such was the “rigor” of the legal economy under the ceremonial law.
That is what typological merit is all about. And it was right there in the Law, which is why FT noticed that fact and spent so much time calling portion of the law a “legal economy.” The word legal means that merit is required.
And in the eternal sense, merit cannot be attained, so that the true sacrifice had to be provided; all of the conditions had to be given by promise; and the end is infallible.
But in the temporal, typical sense, the sacrifice was not provided. The condition was not given by promise (usually); and the end was quite fallible.
And to be crystal clear, these two lie side-by-side, not commingled, in the ceremonial law. Offering up the animal did not, of itself, provide any eternal forgiveness of sins. Failing to offer the animal did not withhold any eternal forgiveness of sins. Being justified did not excuse one from the requirement to sacrifice. Being unjustified did not reduce in any way the outward expiation provided by the sacrifice.
Hence we have established:
Theorem 2: Turretin was a republicationist in the sense of Thm 1 AND in the sense that he held that the ceremonial law republished in pictorial form the demands of the CoW.
This function of the ceremonial law was a typical use, tied as a type and shadow to the grace offered. The end of this republication was, for unbelievers, pedagogical; for believers, to remind of misery, remedy, and obedience out of gratitude.
I’m zonked. What’s left on the table is the “legal economy” in contrast to and subserving the covenant of grace. Hopefully I can get there tomorrow.
And then I’ll really need to quit for a while.
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Jeff, if I stand close to you in glory, will you give me a crown?
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Thanks, Jeff.
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David R.,
Are you leaving the public library workstation to shower at least occasionally? The people at the neighboring workstations would thank you if you did.
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Turretin and the Judicial Law
Turretin has less to say about the judicial law, considering it under the question Whether the Judicial Law has been abrogated.
We recall that while the moral law was applicable to individuals and the ceremonial, to the church under age, the judicial law had reference to Israel as a theocracy (11.24.2).
He considers that the question of abrogation is a matter of hitting a middle ground (11.26.2) between entire annulment (Antibaptists, Antinomians) and entire retention (Carlstadt, Castellio). To hit that middle ground cleanly, he distinguishes ends.
The end of the judicial law to distinguish Jews from Gentiles and to be a type of the kingdom of God is abrogated because there is no longer a distinction between Jew and Gentile (11.26.3). Further, they *ought not* be observed any longer (11.26.6)
As to good order, there is no abrogation with regard to those things found in the natural law, hence moral law, hence Decalogue (11.26.3). But those laws that are of positive right, referring only to the Jewish state (e.g.: primogeniture) are no longer to be observed (11.26.7).
Later, Turretin reasons from the fact that the judicial law distinguished Jew from Gentile to the conclusion that the covenant of grace is not universally dispensed, over against the Arminians (12.6.11).
The question we would want answered, of course, is whether the judicial law operated on a works-principle or a grace-principle. Turretin addresses this only obliquely, yet definitely.
— 12.7.37 – 39.
Here Turretin is clearly wrapping together both ceremonial (cleansing) and judicial (punishment) as operating under a works-principle, as seen in these ways:
* Outward external forgiveness is given in contradistinction to actual forgiveness.
* It is given on the condition of sacrifice. Turretin does not say “a priori condition”, but he emphatically and repeatedly calls this the “legal economy”, signaling a works-principle.
* The condition of obedience is not given as well as promised. Individuals and the nation to forfeit blessing or to incur punishment by acts of disobedience, thus failing to meet the condition. In the grace-principle (for Turretin), what is required is also promised and given.
* And most importantly, the immunity from temporal punishments was granted without relation either to repentance or faith. This makes entirely clear that for Turretin, both ceremonial and judicial laws with respect to temporal things were operating under a works-principle.
Hence we say
Theorem 3: Turretin was a republicationist in the sense of the previous two theorems AND because he believed that temporal blessings and punishments under the judicial law operated according to a works-principle.
Now, we need to carefully distinguish. For NOT ALL temporal blessings and punishments fell under the category of “what was required by law”, and thus not all temporal blessings and punishments in the Old Testament were according to works.
Chief among these was the promise to Abraham and his seed that they would inherit the land of Canaan, which was given to Abraham by faith. BUT in what sense?
* The promise to Abraham and descendants that was by grace through faith was the eschatological promise to inherit the world (Rom 4), and it was to the elect only, who are the only ones under grace.
That promise is given under the conditions of faith and evangelical obedience, but even the conditions themselves are promised and given, so that it cannot fail.
* The promise to the nation of Israel that they would inherit Canaan and retain it was on the a priori condition of obedience, which was itself not promised (in contradistinction to the New Covenant, Jer 31) nor given (as evidenced by the failure of the theocracy). This promise was a type only, and had to pass away, so that the antitype above could come in its fullness.
From this vantage point, then, Kline’s essential architecture is seen to be identical to Turretin’s, EXCEPT possibly his language about the covenants.
Objection: But a works-principle requires entire obedience to the whole law. This was not required. Hence, the ceremonial and judicial laws must have been operating according to a grace principle.
Answer: It is not a question whether, with regard to justification and inheritance of eternal life, that entire obedience to the entire moral law is required. This is granted.
Nor is it a question of whether some temporal blessings and even disciplines come to individuals within the covenant of grace. This is granted also, David being an example of both.
It is rather a question of whether the external, temporal functioning of ceremonial and judicial laws was according to grace or according to works.
On the one hand, some (DR, e.g.) argue that perfect, from the heart obedience was not required by the ceremonial and judicial laws; hence, they operated according a grace principle.
Over against this is the preponderance of evidence given above and which will not be repeated here. The fact that the theocracy failed is absolute proof that the condition was not given and was therefore not by grace.
We must conclude, then, that the premise of the objection is faulty in a manner that is unclear. It may be that it is best to say imperfect obedience was required; or it may be best to say that perfect obedience was required, but imperfect was accepted. But the premise that imperfect obedience was accepted; therefore grace is clearly wrong.
For the conclusion is inescapable: The ceremonial and judicial laws were legal and demanding of works in relation to the outward elements.
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@Jeff
Gather up everything on your MC discussion from this thread, the “Flattening” thread, the “Is Everything Grace” thread, and the “Kilts” thread and send it along to Estelle as he prepares.
Good stuff…
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Turretin’s Legal Economy
It is impossible to hit everything here. In brief, Turretin views the from the Fall onward to be a single covenant of grace resting on the pact between Father and Son (12.2). The duties required in the covenant are faith and repentance, but what makes this covenant peculiarly gracious is that the conditions themselves depend upon the grace of God and pass over into promises. This is the reason why it cannot be made void as the first covenant (which was founded upon man’s strength). (12.2.29).
We notice here that infallibility is connected to grace, while fallibility is connected to nature.
This idea is developed in 12.3 further, which I’ve already cited at length.
The CoW is then contrasted with the CoG in multiple ways (12.4): authorship (God as Lord, God as Redeemer); parties (no mediator, mediator); foundation (obedience of Adam, obedience of Christ); promise (life, salvation AND life); condition (obedience, faith); end (declaration of justice, manifestation of mercy); order (first works, then grace); extent (universal, elect); and effects (various).
Of interest to both Patrick Ramsey and Mark Jones is the discussion of faith and works in each covenant:
Nor can it be objected here that faith was required also in the first covenant and works are not excluded in the second (as was said before). They stand in a far different relation. For in the first covenant, faith was required as a work and a part of the inherent righteousness to which life was promised. But in the second, it is demanded — not as a work on account of which life is given, but as a mere instrument apprehending the righteousness of Christ (on account of which alone salvation is granted to us). In the one, faith was a theological virtue from the strength of nature, terminating on God, the Creator; in the other, faith is an evangelical condition after the manner of supernatural grace, terminating on God, the Redeemer. As to works, they were required in the first as an antecedent condition by way of a cause for acquiring life; but in the second, they are only the subsequent condition as the fruit and effect of the life already acquired. In the first, they ought to precede the act of justification; in the second, they follow it. — 12.4.6.
Of the greatest interest to us is how Turretin affirms that the Mosaic economy is the covenant of grace in substance, yet under a legal cloak.
He first affirms that the Old Testament covenant is the covenant of grace. This is in contradiction to the Pelgians and their heirs: Remonstrants (not including Arminius himself), Socinians, Anabaptists. These taught that the Old Covenant had reference to external earthly goods only, and the promises of the gospel, to the extent seen, were for believers in the future New Covenant (12.5).
Over against this, FT argues that Christ was not only predicted but also promised to the fathers and by his grace they were saved under the Old Testament no less than we are saved under the New… (12.5.6). The OT fathers were given the same promise under the same condition (12.5.14-15). This is not to deny that the administration was different under the Law, but that the law was given to prepare as a schoolmaster: The moral convicting of sin and stimulating to seek expiation; the judicial constituting the polity of Israel; the ceremonial foreshadowing the Messiah (12.5.22). And here FT heralds his coming argument:
For the Law and the Prophets with the promulgation of the law always had the promises of grace, but they treat only of the legal and prophetic ministry in opposition to the evangelical, especially as to clearness of manifestation (12.5.26)
Turretin is extending familiar themes: law and gospel lie side-by-side, with the law serving the gospel.
He makes this structure more explicit:
The old covenant is taken in two ways, either for the covenant of works or the legal covenant strictly understood, made with our first parents before their fall and afterwards renewed in the desert; or for the second covenant of grace made with our first parents after the fall and confirmed in the Mosaic economy. (12.5.33)
We notice several points here:
(1) FT allows two ways of speaking about the old covenant. One is as the covenant of grace, the other as a renewed covenant of works. This is very different from flat assertions that the MC is the covenant of grace, period.
(2) Here in the discussion of the economy, he makes clear that the language of “legal covenant” is deliberately synonymous with “covenant of works”, thus reminding us that “legal” has reference to works and merit.
After considering the question of universality (No! — 12.6), he now asks the question we’ve all been wondering: “Why did God will to dispense the single covenant of grace in different ways? In how many ways? What was its economy?” (12.7)
For FT, the fundamental break happens with the advent of Christ. Prior to Christ, all is type and shadow; after Christ is the reality, arguing from Heb 1.2 (12.7.1). Within that old economy are three distinct stages: Adam to Abraham, in which the gospel was seen in the Gen 3.17 promise (12.7.11 – 17); Abraham to Moses, in which promises of both temporal and eternal blessings were made, and the conditions of faith and obedience are set forth (12.7.18 – 23).
And now the most difficult, the age from Moses to Abraham, in which “the appearance of things was far different.” During this age, “the law was promulgated.” (12.7.24 – 25).
We pause to consider the weight of this statement. “The law” is already explicated in chapter 11 as being coextensive with the moral, natural law as well the legal and ceremonial laws, whose function we have already seen.
Thus, from the forgoing, we understand that during this period, a works-principle was promulgated. But in what sense? That will be the burden of the rest of Turretin’s discussion.
And hence we can clearly gather what is to be determined about a question here agitated by some — whether the Decalogue promulgated on Mount Sinai contained nothing except the covenant of grace and its pure stipulation. For since from what has already been said, it is evident that the manner of this lawgiving was terrific, smiting with fear their consciences and by the severity of its threatenings removing them from the sight of God, everyone sees that this was not the manner or the genius of the covenant of grace (which exhibits God to us as appeased and recalls sinners to itself by the sweetness of its promises). Besides, the law (contained in the Decalogue) is of natural right, founded on the justice of God; while the covenant of grace is of positive and free right, founded on his good pleasure and mercy. The latter sets for a surety, promises remission of sins and salvation in his satisfaction; not only demands but also effects obedience. But in the Decalogue, no mention either of a surety or promise of salvation to be given to sinners occurs; but a bare promise of life to those doing and a threatening of death to transgressors. Hence the law of works (comprised in the Decalogue) is everywhere contradistinguished by Paul from the law of faith and the promise of grace (Rom 3.27, Gal 3.17-18) for as the law is not of faith (Gal 3.12), so neither is faith of the law. So great is the contrariety between these two means that they are wholly incompatible with each other. This we do not say, as if we wished either to deny that the covenant of grace had then been made with the Israelites … or as if we supposed the Decalogue had nothing in common with the covenant of grace and was nothing else than the covenant of works itself, renewed for the purpose of recalling the people to it, that they might seek life from it. (12.7.28-29).
We observe the following: That to state that the MC was nothing more than a covenant of grace is a mistaken “agitation.” For the law does not give what it demands.
Instead, rather, the Decalogue belonged to the covenant of grace; yea, in a measure flowed from it inasmuch as it was promulgated from the counsel of God that it might serve him — both antecedently as a schoolmaster, by convincing of sin … and consequently as a rule, prescribing the measure of obedience and holiness demanded by God in the covenant of grace… (12.7.30)
Here we see both first use and third use of the moral law. But notice how the law is not of itself gracious at any time, for it never provides what it demands. The law serves the covenant of grace by being legal. In the case of non-believers, it is legal unto conviction. In the case of believers, it is legal unto requirement, and grace supplies that requirement.
… Meanwhile it pleased God to administer the covenant of grace in this period under a rigid legal economy … A twofold relation ought always [emph add] to obtain: the one legal, more severe, through which by a new promulgation of the law and of the covenant of works, with an intolerable yoke of ceremonies, he wished to set forth what men owed and what was to be expected by them on account of duty unperformed. In this respect, the law is called the letter that kills…The other relation was evangelical, sweeter, inasmuch as “the law was a schoolmaster unto Christ” (Gal 3.24) and contained “a shadow of things to come.” (Heb 10.1) (12.7.31).
We notice here that the legal economy did not consist only of the Decalogue, but also of the ceremonial. We suspect also the judicial, which suspicion is confirmed in 12.7.32.
This is important in our third-use discussion because the outward uses of the ceremonial and judicial law were equally applicable to believer and non-believer alike — that is, they were not amenable to the “third use of the Law.” I don’t say this with reference to the sacramental nature of the sacrifices, but with reference to the ceremonial cleansing.
To what end was the economy? It was external, with reference to the coming Messiah, and bondage, and rigor and severity, and external [the text says “eternal”, which is probably a typo] purity.
For our purposes: Who was under bondage and rigor? Was it unbelievers only? No, it was all of Israel: …the ancient church was in subjection to the law, the pact of slaves (Gal 4.24-25), which, with respect to those who salvation by the law) was absolute and total; but to those who beheld Christ in it, only relative … those, however, who accepted it in faith were indeed slaves in body, but not in soul (12.7.36). It created fear in all (12.7.37) and required obedience through compulsion (12.7.38).
Under all of this were signified the same spiritual promises of the New Testament: remission of sins and justification, adoption, sanctification, the gift of the Spirit – all of which were possessed in some degree in the OT, but in fullness in the NT (12.7.45).
How can we summarize all of this? I would sloganize: The legal economy was legal.
Meaning: That the legal economy operated by a works-principle. In the case of the moral law, by an absolute demand for obedience, not to the end of justification but of despair of self-righteousness. In the case of the judicial and ceremonial law, a demand for obedience upon which a priori condition, external purity was offered, and physical punishments for failure, without regard to the justified status of the recipient.
But now we come to an important question: Is this merely saying then that the legal economy was a separate covenant with separate promises and conditions?
No. For the legal economy served a purpose: To lead to Christ. It did not serve its own end, but that of leading to Christ (12.8.4-5). Hence:
Those of our party (such as Rollock, Piscator, Trelcatius and others) who make two covenants diverse in substance, take the old covenant strictly, not only separating the promise of grace form it, but opposing the one to the other. In this sense Paul seems to take it frequently (as 2 Cor 3; Gal 4), so that the old covenant is the covenant of works and the new the covenant of the gospel and of faith. On the other hand, they who maintain only one (as Calvin, Martyr, Ursinus) take the word covenant more broadly, as embracing also the promise of grace (although somewhat obscurely) (12.8.6).
This is in distinction from the Lutherans, who denied (and continue to deny, confessionally, AFAIK) that the Old Testament is a legal covenant, period. (12.8.7 – 11), which Turretin refutes by distinguishing between the opposition of Old and New over against the opposition of law and gospel: The difference between the law and gospel is absolute (12.8.17), while the difference between Old and New is only accidental and not substantial (12.8.18).
He then rehearses these accidental differences, including: As to freedom because under the Old Testament the spirit of bondage unto fear prevailed (Rom 8.15). For although the fathers were sons of God and under that name masters and heirs, still they did not differ from servants (as to the external disposition). As infants and minors, they were held under the severe and rigid schooling of the law (as under tutors and governors b whom they were drive to duty through fear of punishment and by threatenings and stripes, rather than by promises and the virtue of love, Gal 4.1-2)…But in the New Testament, it is a time of freedom (12.8.23).
Moving past questions that are resolved for us (whether the OT fathers had sins expiated), FT returns again to the question of a third, subservient covenant (12.12). He discusses Cameron. He refutes Cameron on the grounds that there are only two covenants distinct in species: one of works, one of grace. The scriptures speak of no other (12.12.7) nor can there be any other modes than “Do this and live” or “believe and be saved” (12.12.8), with no middle road in which there is a covenant neither of works nor of faith.
Let’s pause and consider this point: We have seen already that there is a works-principle in the judicial and ceremonial laws that pertains to external punishment and purity. How then can this be?
Only by one principle: The judicial and ceremonial laws do not constitute a separate covenant, but only accidental features of the one covenant.
So what would Turretin say of sub-covs? He says that the subservient covenant view is simply speaking of the true view in mistaken terms: To say that this covenant subserved the covenant of grace is really to say that it was not a covenant, but only a dispensation. (12.12.17).
How different this is from tone and conclusions that we hear today…
But back to Turretin, why does this matter? Because if we speak only of the Mosaic covenant in its strict sense, then we elevate the legal condition to full covenant status. It cannot sustain that relation because the legal condition (says Turretin) requires imperfect obedience, which is neither CoW nor CoG (12.12.22). Likewise, the promise of the land of Canaan was not primary and principal, but only secondary and less principal…only a diversity of dispensation may be inferred which even the other differences between the Old and New Testaments here adduced concerning the spirit of bondage (12.12.24).
In other words, orthodoxy requires understanding that the land promises and sanctions were only types, which is the only kind of promise and sanction that is suitable to a condition of imperfect obedience.
Thus Turretin. To recap:
* The legal economy is legal. It operates according to a works principle.
* The legal economy did not deliver any spiritual benefits in exchange for works, but external benefits typifying spiritual benefits.
* Underneath, the legal economy held images of spiritual benefits which were received by believers by their faith (and *not* works).
* The legal economy subserved the covenant of grace in its various parts: The moral law, holding forth the hypothetical promise of justification for perfect obedience (which offer was given to Christ only), the judicial giving the polity of the nation and separating it from the Gentiles, and the ceremonial, which offered external purity as an image of purity of heart.
* The legal economy was not a distinct covenant, but only a form over the covenant of grace.
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I cannot and will not attempt to vindicate Kline here of all charges (not an expert, Kent). But I do observe a couple of ways in which anti-repub arguments differ from Turretin either in contradiction to his teaching or else in spirit and emphasis.
* The AR charge that Kline redefines merit by allowing for a “typological works principle of imperfect obedience” falls flat. Merit for Turretin is meeting an a priori condition, period. Turretin affirms that imperfect obedience was allowed under the Law (12.12.22), and this fact proves that the Law was not a distinct covenant.
* Likewise, Kline’s “two level” Mosaic covenant is in no way a subservient covenant view (I can’t speak of Gordon here — I am somewhat baffled by his construction).
* The AR argument fails because it elevates the land sanctions out of the level of type and up to the level of blessings as might be received by believers. In other words, it fails to give typology its due weight.
* Finally, and importantly, those ARs who argue that blessings and disciplines under the Mosaic were identical to those under the New, fail to reckon with the rigor of the legal economy. In that failure, they back-handedly return believers to that legal economy, under the name “grace.”
Selah.
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@Jeff, thanks again…
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Jeff,
* The AR charge that Kline redefines merit by allowing for a “typological works principle of imperfect obedience” falls flat. Merit for Turretin is meeting an a priori condition, period. Turretin affirms that imperfect obedience was allowed under the Law (12.12.22), and this fact proves that the Law was not a distinct covenant.
I have a lot to say regarding your last few posts, but for now, just an observation regarding that first sentence of 12.12.22: “The specific difference of a covenant cannot make a diversity of condition, expressed by the law and the gospel–of the former imperfect obedience; of the latter in faith.”
If you read the rest of that paragraph, as well as the surrounding context, you will see that this has to be a garbled translation. (I wish I could read Latin, maybe someone can help.) Everywhere else in that context he speaks of the law demanding perfect obedience, and this view was affirmed by both the orthodox and the subservient covenant group. Thus, I am sure that sentence should be saying something to the effect that “A diversity of condition, expressed by the law and the gospel–of the former perfect obedience, of the latter faith, does not prove a specifically [i.e., substantially] different covenant.”
Read that section and the context again and see if you don’t agree.
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Jeff, save some crowns for the rest of us.
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David, I think you’re right.
Here’s the Latin
Discrimen specificum Foederis non potest facere diversitas conditionis Lege & Evangelio expressae, illius quidem in perfecta obedientia, istius vero in fide.
I am not enough of a Latinista to certain of the translation, but it seems clear that ‘in perfect obedience’ was mangled.
Good catch. The next question then is, what does that do to the argument? Clearly I need to retract some of the above, but that’s not for this morning.
Have a good Lord’s Day.
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Jeff, thanks much for tracking that down.
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errata
sic
This is in distinction from the Lutherans, who denied (and continue to deny, confessionally, AFAIK) that the Old Testament is a legal covenant, period. (12.8.7 – 11)
recte
This is in distinction from the Lutherans, who denied (and continue to deny, confessionally, AFAIK) that the Old Testament is a gracious covenant, period. (12.8.7 – 11)
sic
So when I first read 12.12.22 as translated, I understood FT to be contrasting the legal economy, including judicial and ceremonial, with the specific moral law. That is, the first sentence was in reference to the whole legal economy; the rest in reference to the moral law. This is clearly not the case.
I believe, but am not sure without a crystal-clear translation, that he is arguing that having two covenants would not be able to account for or create (non potest facere) the diversity of conditions. But the logic of that argument is obscure, so it’s best to say that I don’t understand that sentence.
So I would strike the above and replace:
recte
Likewise:
sic
* The AR charge that Kline redefines merit by allowing for a “typological works principle of imperfect obedience” falls flat. Merit for Turretin is meeting an a priori condition, period. Turretin affirms that imperfect obedience was allowed under the Law (12.12.22), and this fact proves that the Law was not a distinct covenant.
recte
* The AR charge that Kline redefines merit by allowing for a “typological works principle of imperfect obedience” does not reckon with Turretin’s construction of the judicial and ceremonial laws. Merit for Turretin is meeting an a priori condition, period. The offender was punished under the judicial laws without regard for his justification or his faith. The offering of sacrifice was accepted for external cleansing without regard for justification or faith.
Little wonder, then, that when Israel as a nation (and federally under kings) disobeys, it is exiled — the justified and unjustified alike. When, as a nation, it repents, it is returned — the justified and the unjustified alike.
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To anticipate a coming objection, you say,
DR: Everywhere else in that context he speaks of the law demanding perfect obedience, and this view was affirmed by both the orthodox and the subservient covenant group.
Actually, he does consistently say this with regard to the moral law. He says more: that upon condition of perfect obedience, eternal life was offered.
So notice that the moral law
(1) Requires perfect obedience,
(2) Operates on “one strike, out of the garden”
(3) Gives eternal life.
Not so with the land sanctions. So clearly, they are not operating exactly as the CoW. So “grace”, right? No again.
For grace
(1) Gives what it commands,
(2) Is grounded in the merits of Christ,
(3) And has concomitant conditions, “Obey because you live” and not “obey in order to live.”
(4) Is not contingent upon conditions for success, but guarantees success by giving the conditions.
The land sanctions fail all four of those tests for national Israel.
So something has to give somewhere. If you want to take the land sanctions as “blessings for third use”, then you have to reckon with how they were in fact dispensed, to believer and unbeliever alike. No faith, no third use.
I would suggest that what gives way should be to replace your belief that “all of the law in its strict sense demanded perfect obedience” with “the moral law in its strict sense demanded perfect obedience and offered eternal life, while judicial and ceremonial in their strict senses demanded something less and offered something less.”
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Back up. The downside of scholastic distinctions is that they sometimes obfuscate the obvious.
The moral law is contained within the Mosaic Covenant in the plain sense that Exodus 20 is a subset of the document called the Mosaic Covenant.
The moral law is in the Mosaic Covenant.
That’s true, so let’s clarify further: Yes, the moral law was in the Mosaic covenant. But as you know, the parties to the CoG are not just God and sinners, but God, sinners and Christ the Mediator, and thus, the CoG can be viewed either as (1) established with Christ and the elect in Him, or (2) established with the elect in Christ. WLC 31 for example, takes the former perspective, “The covenant of grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed.” From this perspective, the covenant of grace was (for Christ) a covenant of works, and the moral law, i.e., the Decalogue (with ceremonial and civil law appended), constituted the meritorious condition to be fulfilled via His active obedience. So yes, the moral law is indeed of the substance of the covenant of grace (or more specifically, of the pactum salutis), and therefore of the substance of the Mosaic covenant. The Decalogue reveals (republishes) the righteous requirement according to which Christ would merit life and salvation for OT and NT saints alike (amen?).
Clarifying my “(6c),” this then yields:
(6c) The moral law (with ceremonial and civil law appended) in its use as a covenant of works for Christ, according to the terms of which He merited life and salvation for the elect, is of the substance of the covenant of grace (or more specifically of the pactum salutis). But the moral law in its antecedent pedagogical use (i.e., wrt the unregenerate), though itsubserves the CoG, is not of the substance of the CoG, i.e., from the perspective of its establishment with the elect (since law is antithetical to grace), nor of its administration (since law cannot administer grace). But consequently (i.e., following faith and repentance), the moral law serves as a rule of life for believers (third use), and is in this way taken in under the CoG.
Thus, the MC functioned as a covenant of works for Christ, not for Israel. I like the way Francis Roberts captures the connection between the MC, the CoW and the CoG:
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Correction: I should have said “the law functioned as a covenant of works for Christ, not for Israel.”
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DR: From this perspective, the covenant of grace was (for Christ) a covenant of works, and the moral law, i.e., the Decalogue (with ceremonial and civil law appended), constituted the meritorious condition to be fulfilled via His active obedience. So yes, the moral law is indeed of the substance of the covenant of grace (or more specifically, of the pactum salutis), and therefore of the substance of the Mosaic covenant. The Decalogue reveals (republishes) the righteous requirement according to which Christ would merit life and salvation for OT and NT saints alike (amen?).
Hm. See, we agree on the fact that Christ fulfilled the Law for us, and that this fact makes the pactum salutis possible.
But you take it in a far different direction than I. For you, this makes the moral law to become of the substance of the CoG. I would say rather that the moral law is brought under the CoG, without changing its essence as law. The law continues to demand, continues to promise life for perfect obedience, etc., but those demands are now subordinated to grace by the merits of Christ.
This seems to be where Turretin is also (12.3.6, 12.8.4), and even Roberts. Though he says digested into, incorporated with, and wholly swallowed up by, he does not say changed into the substance of.
Where does this matter?
* In understanding Galatians. When Paul says “the Law is not of faith”, he is speaking of the law as it is in its absolute nature, apart from gospel. Thus Turretin also.
* In getting our soteriology straight. If the covenant of works were to be “of the substance” of the covenant of grace, then Christ’s obedience would no longer be meritorious for us. There would need to be a secondary works-principle that he obeyed, prior to the CoW (that is now of the substance of the CoG). Ad infinitum.
* At what point in time would the change take place, in which the substance of the CoW is changed into the substance of the CoG?
So I would say, strike any thought of the moral law being of the substance of the CoG. Instead, let it be of the accidents of the Mosaic Covenant. And when grace is added to it — not mingling in substance, but lying alongside and taking the law under itself — then believers fulfill the law’s demands in Christ.
The substance of the moral law is to demand contingently, without giving what is demanded. It is of nature.
The substance of grace is to provide what is demanded. These two contraries cannot be mutated into one another, substance-wise.
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Jeff, to say that the law was of the substance of the CoG as defined in WLC 31: “The covenant of grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed,” should not be controversial, much less lead to those conclusions you say it does. It is just to say that the CoG was a CoW for Christ, who rendered satisfaction to God’s justice on our behalf, not just by suffering under the curse of the law (passive obedience), but also by obeying it perfectly (active obedience).
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David R., so if you quote Machen so approvingly, why do you assert as you have repeatedly that obedience is necessary for salvation. You seem to talking out of both sides of law’s mouth.
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For the most part, I agree with everything up to and including your “theorem 1.” However …
Now what do we (does Turretin) call an antecedent condition upon fulfillment of which a reward is given? Merit. The ceremonial law required of all Israelites, believer and non-believer (11.25.1) tomerit typical expiation. It was not justificatory merit, which of course no-one could attain. It was external, typical, church-wide merit that was required of the church. Such was the “rigor” of the legal economy under the ceremonial law.
This doesn’t follow.
1. You (apparently) forget that for Turretin, the legal condition, the fulfllment of which merits the reward (“from the pact and the liberal promise of God”), is perfect obedience to the moral law, not just external obedience to the ceremonial. You also (apparently) forget that for Turretin, the reward is eternal life, not typical expiation. Turretin is abundantly clear that, not only is proper merit out of the question for man in any state whatsoever (even the state of innocence) but that the improper sense of merit by from the pact only obtains in the case of perfect obedience (and is therefore entirely out of the question for anyone except innocent Adam). Your problem is that your formula, “an antecedent condition upon fulfillment of which a reward is given,” is insufficient to account for Turretin’s actual concept of merit.
2. Thus, Turretin never says nor implies that “the ceremonial law required of all Israelites … to merit typical expiation.” You can only draw that conclusion if you chop off essential parts of his definition of merit, and then read your own concept of it back into his exposition of the ceremonial law. It is one thing to say that Christ’s merit was typified (which is true). It is quite another to say that the Israelites merited (which is false).
Theorem 2: Turretin was a republicationist in the sense of Thm 1 AND in the sense that he held that the ceremonial law republished in pictorial form the demands of the CoW.
You seem to be mixing the legal with the pictorial (typical) here. In terms of their demand, he held that the ceremonies were legal. But in terms of what they pictured, they were gospel (i.e., CoG, not CoW). You think you even said this yourself earlier….
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That last sentence should be “I think you even said this yourself …”
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D.G.,
David R., so if you quote Machen so approvingly, why do you assert as you have repeatedly that obedience is necessary for salvation. You seem to talking out of both sides of law’s mouth.
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David R., you didn’t answer my question.
Sound familiar?
I question your powers of reading comprehension.
Sound familiar?
Where does Machen say obedience is required for salvation?
If I sin I am condemned?
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D.G., yes (sadly), ditto, and it depends…
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Well, this is forcing both of us to be picky. At some point, we’ll need to call it quits. For now:
DR: Jeff, to say that the law was of the substance of the CoG as defined in WLC 31: “The covenant of grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed,” should not be controversial, much less lead to those conclusions you say it does. It is just to say that the CoG was a CoW for Christ, who rendered satisfaction to God’s justice on our behalf…
Hm. You’re interpolating here, and I think incorrectly.
True: The covenant of grace was made with Christ as second Adam.
True: Christ rendered satisfaction on our behalf.
Dubious: The covenant of grace “was” a covenant of works for Christ.
First issue: There aren’t multiple covenants of works. There was one covenant of works and one of grace (speaking both for Turretin’s view and mine also). The moral law is of the substance of the first and not the second.
So to say “the CoG was a CoW for Christ …” is to say that the one covenant was also the other, which is certainly not so.
Aren’t you really trying to say that “The CoG required Christ to fulfill the CoW as a mediator on our behalf”? Isn’t this what Turretin is saying when he says that Nor is it absurd that in this way justification takes place by works and by faith — by the works of Christ and by our faith. And thus in sweet harmony the law and gospel meet together in this covenant (12.12.22)?
Not “the law is the gospel”, but “the law and gospel meet together.”
Not “the covenant of works is (or becomes, or was) the covenant of grace”, but “The gospel does not destroy the law, but establishes it.”
Second issue: you seem to have some implicit assumptions about what “substance” means and how it works, and I’m not sure what those assumptions are.
My cards: I am working on the assumption that substance refers to an object, particularly an object in its essence or species, according to the features that make it uniquely “what it is.” So the covenant of works (of which there is exactly one) is the CoW because it demands perfect obedience and promises life on the attainment of it, and is of nature and not grace. That is its substance.
Meanwhile, the CoG is the CoG because it requires and provides salvation and life through faith. That is its substance.
The gap between those two covenants is then the pactum salutis, which requires Christ the mediator to fulfill the CoW according to its stipulations, so that merit can be made available to us.
I would word that arrangement as “the CoW is taken under the CoG.” WLC 31 words it more Christocentrically, but with identical meaning: The “CoG was made with Christ as second Adam”, meaning that Christ had to fulfill what Adam could not, that the CoW is made to subserve the purposes of the CoG.
None of this gets us to your language, “The CoG was the CoW for Christ” or “the [moral] law was of the substance of the CoG.” Operating under my assumptions, that would require me to say that the law itself now operates graciously, by giving what it requires. My read of your words (not your intent, just the words) is that the law is now (having become at some point in time?!) of a different substance than it was. And that would of course be wrong. You would agree that Christ Himself supplies what the law requires, through imputation (justification) and the Spirit (sanctification).
Take a look at the “If the Mosaic Covenant…” thread and notice how DPR has started arguing that what the moral law requires under grace is a lesser standard of obedience. That is what a change of substance looks like. It is also what a law/gospel confusion looks like.
Question: Can you point to any place in Turretin or the WCF/WLC/WSC/3FU that directly says that “the moral law is of the substance of the CoG”? Do you have explicit teaching in mind or are you working on inference?
Question: Would you be willing to substitute the language “The CoG requires Christ to fulfill the CoW for us” in place of “The CoG was the CoW for Christ”?
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JRC:
DR:
You have a double-mistake here that is getting you wrapped around an axle. The first mistake, throughout the posts above, is that you shift smoothly back and forth between the moral law and the entire law.
It is absolutely true that Turretin says repeatedly and unequivocally that the moral law, because it is natural and contains the stipulation of the CoW, requires perfect obedience and delivers eternal life to the fulfiller. We are in complete agreement on the moral law.
Then you transfer that property of the moral law over to the entire law, and that keeps you from reading Turretin in his plain sense with respect to judicial and ceremonial.
Question: Can you point to a place where Turretin says that the judicial and/or ceremonial laws require perfect obedience and offer eternal life upon fulfillment?
I’m going to stick out my neck and bet you an eBeer that you will find no such place. Instead, you will find that the ceremonial law offers eternal life by faith to those who trust in the promises that lay under the signs, but not by obedience to the requirements.
That’s not “eternal life for obedience.”
And you will find that the ceremonial law offers external cleansing to all who sacrifice, without regard to faith or repentance.
And that’s not “eternal life for obedience.”
So that’s my bet. Find a place in Turretin where the judicial and/or ceremonial law is said to offer eternal life on the condition of perfect obedience. Prove me wrong and the eBeer is yours.
The second mistake, entangled with the first, is that you conflate Turretin’s definition of merit and his description of the merit required under the CoW. When you think of “merit” in Turretin, you think it synonymous with “the merit required by the CoW.”
By conflating those two things, you call anything that is not “merit under the CoW” to be “not merit.”
But Turretin is not operating under such a conflation. The terms “legal” and “works” are defined in 8.3.5 and expanded upon in 12.3.2. To be meritorious means that
Condition is used either antecedently and a priori for that which has the force of a meritorious condition and impulsive cause to obtain the benefits of the covenant (the performance of which gives man a right to the reward), or concomitantly… (12.3.2).
And we understand of course that he’s referring to merit pactum.
That’s what Turretin means by merit, and it is a general definition that is not tied to the CoW specifically. In the very next section, he employs that definition, NOT to explain the CoW, but to ask whether the CoG is “of works” also (12.3.3). This point requires careful attention. If “merit” were tied by definition to the CoW, then section 12.3.3 would never be written:
(And here, and in the paras that follow, he is taking oblique aim at Rome, which taught and teaches that God imputes faith for righteousness.)
If your conflation were correct, he would have to argue
* Merit is ONLY perfect obedience in exchange for life, and
* Faith does not require perfect obedience, so
* No merit in the CoG.
Instead, he argues,
* Merit means meeting an a priori condition for a reward, and
* Faith is not a priori, so
* No merit in the CoG.
Why does this incredible nitpickiness matter? Because by assuming that “merit” always means (in Turretin) the “merit required in the CoW”, you have made it hard for yourself to read Ch 12 naturally. Why in the world does Turretin repeat the word “legal” a bazillion times? It’s simple and obvious: The legal economy is legal. It requires obedience a priori. And why does he say over and again, in different ways, that the legal economy had the form of a covenant of works (12.12.25)?
How is it even possible to “have the form of a covenant of works” and not require some kind of a priori condition?!
So yes, I think my definition of “merit” is adequate because it is the one that Turretin supplies. It is distinct from his description of “merit required under the CoW.” And since we understand that the moral law — only — is coextensive with the CoW, we are not surprised that the merit required under the CoW and the promise attached to the CoW is the same for the moral law, but not necessarily the same for the judicial and ceremonial law.
And in fact, is not the same — unless you win my bet.
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DR: 2. Thus, Turretin never says nor implies that “the ceremonial law required of all Israelites … to merit typical expiation.” You can only draw that conclusion if you chop off essential parts of his definition of merit, and then read your own concept of it back into his exposition of the ceremonial law. It is one thing to say that Christ’s merit was typified (which is true). It is quite another to say that the Israelites merited (which is false).
I think you’ll have to carefully explain 12.7.39, then. What principle is in operation here?
Here comes in the immunity from temporal punishments in the court of earth which (as to sins not committed with uplifted hand) was granted through the sacrifices, which (without relation either to repentance or faith) restored men to their rank and rendered them free from all forensic punishment.
How is this the covenant of grace when it is “without relation either to repentance or faith”, which are precisely the two conditions of the covenant of grace?
…but in terms of what they pictured, [the ceremonies] were gospel
Not entirely. See 11.24.11 and 15. Of note is the repeated use of Col 2.14 to describe the ceremonial law as the “handwriting against us.” All of this is in reference to the ceremonial law in its “legal relation”. (11.24.11,14,15). The ceremonial law pictured misery in its legal relation as intolerable yoke, but relief on its gospel relation as a shadow of Christ to come.
Final thought: The one [relation] legal, more severe, through which by a new promulgation of the of the law and of the covenant of works, with an intolerable yoke of ceremonies, he wished to set forth what men owed…
Doesn’t this strongly suggest that the ceremonial law (a) operated by a legal principle in its legal relation, but (b) was distinct from the covenant of works proper?
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Dubious: The covenant of grace “was” a covenant of works for Christ.
First issue: There aren’t multiple covenants of works. There was one covenant of works and one of grace (speaking both for Turretin’s view and mine also). The moral law is of the substance of the first and not the second.
As far as I know, it’s unusual to speak in terms of two covenants of works correlating with the two Adams. For example:
Berkhof (Sys Theo):
Also Meredith Kline (Kingdom Prologue, p 109):
Second issue: you seem to have some implicit assumptions about what “substance” means and how it works, and I’m not sure what those assumptions are.
We’ve talked about this but it’s been several weeks now…. By “substance” I mean the essential components of a covenant, especially its (a) promise(s) and (b) condition(s). For example, the reward of eternal life is of the substance of both the CoW and the CoG because it is the promised reward in both cases. Whereas the condition of perfect and personal obedience is of the substance of the CoW, but not of the CoG (i.e., as distinguished from the pactum salutis). But if we view the CoG in the comprehensive sense of WLC 31 (with Christ is a party in the covenant), then we have to say that the condition of perfect and personal obedience is of its substance since it had to be fulfilled by Christ as our representative and surety.
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It is absolutely true that Turretin says repeatedly and unequivocally that the moral law, because it is natural and contains the stipulation of the CoW, requires perfect obedience and delivers eternal life to the fulfiller. We are in complete agreement on the moral law.
Then you transfer that property of the moral law over to the entire law, and that keeps you from reading Turretin in his plain sense with respect to judicial and ceremonial.
By way of clarifying your thesis, are you arguing that under the MC, Israel merited their retention of the land by their obedience to the ceremonial and judicial law alone, with no respect to the moral law whatsoever (so that whether or not they obeyed merely externally, and therefore hypocritically, made no difference to their meriting of land retention)? If this isn’t what you’re saying, would you mind clarifying?
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Question: Can you point to a place where Turretin says that the judicial and/or ceremonial laws require perfect obedience and offer eternal life upon fulfillment?
I’m going to stick out my neck and bet you an eBeer that you will find no such place. Instead, you will find that the ceremonial law offers eternal life by faith to those who trust in the promises that lay under the signs, but not by obedience to the requirements.
That’s not “eternal life for obedience.”
The law can (and should) be distinguished, but it should not be separated (i.e., not during the Mosaic period). The moral law, as a perfect rule of duty, demands obedience to whatever positive laws God may additionally command, including the ceremonial law. When God prescribes ordinances of worship (e.g., in the ceremonial law), the moral law demands that His people keep “pure and entire, all such religious worship and ordinances as God has instituted in his Word (WLC 108).
Here’s one place (oft cited by us both) where Turretin clearly says that in the external economy of legal teaching during the Mosaic period, perfect obedience to the entire law was held out as the condition for life inheritance (whether temporal or eternal):
Here is another place where he speaks of the perfection of the moral law as requiring perfect obedience wrt every duty (which of course would have to include the duty to obey the ceremonial law):
Here’s Charles Hodge (Systematic Theology) making the same point:
WLC 99:
Specifically, worship ordinances are regulated by the second commandment, and I think we would agree that the ceremonial law contained the ordinances of worship during the Mosaic period. Thus, perfect obedience to the second commandment would have necessarily entailed perfect obedience to the ceremonial law. See Ursinus on the second commandment:
Will you be emailing that beer soon?
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No beer for you, yet. In every single one of the five quotes, the writer is speaking either of the moral law, or of the law taken in all three parts: moral, judicial, and ceremonial.
I repeat the terms: Can you point to a place where Turretin says that the judicial and/or ceremonial laws require perfect obedience and offer eternal life upon fulfillment?
You try to smuggle obligation to judicial and ceremonial in under the moral law, but even there, you’re relying on the sanction of the moral law to do your heavy lifting.
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No beer for you, yet. In every single one of the five quotes, the writer is speaking either of the moral law, or of the law taken in all three parts: moral, judicial, and ceremonial.
I repeat the terms: Can you point to a place where Turretin says that the judicial and/or ceremonial laws require perfect obedience and offer eternal life upon fulfillment?
So what you’re asking me is if Turretin ever says that the judicial and/or ceremonial laws require perfect obedience and offer eternal life upon fulfillment even if the moral law is transgressed? Of course he never says that, but if I had known that’s what you were asking, I wouldn’t have wasted my time.
Now if you wouldn’t mind answering my question:
By way of clarifying your thesis, are you arguing that under the MC, Israel merited their retention of the land by their obedience to the ceremonial and judicial law alone, with no respect to the moral law whatsoever, so that even if they obeyed merely externally and hypocritically they still would have merited land retention? If this isn’t what you’re saying, would you mind clarifying?
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DR: By way of clarifying your thesis, are you arguing that under the MC, Israel merited their retention of the land by their obedience to the ceremonial and judicial law alone, with no respect to the moral law whatsoever…?
No, and that’s a good question. As you recall from Turretin (not in front of me at the moment, forgive the lack of cites), the ceremonial and judicial laws are tied into the moral law.
So for example: A man is taken in adultery. That’s a violation of the moral law. The man is now tried, convicted, and receives the death penalty. That penalty is
* Given under the judicial law,
* Given without regard to faith or repentance,
* Applied whether the individual is justified or unjustified, and
* Is not in fact the actual penalty that derives from breaking the moral law (eternal death), but instead
* Pictures God’s judgment for sin.
So the judicial law ties into the moral law in the sense of punishing outward violations of the moral law. Yet it is distinct from the moral law because it punishes with a sanction that is different from, yet depicts the actual sanction under the CoW.
The moral law always brings eternal death to its breakers and eternal life to its keepers. That’s why imputation is so necessary, right?
Judicial and ceremonial did not do so. They were legal economy, not CoW per se.
Another example: A man steals some sheep. That’s a violation of the moral law. He does not receive God’s penalty for violating the moral law (eternal death), but a different penalty (repaying four-fold). He also has to offer a sin-offering.
The offering of that sin-offering is under the ceremonial law because his outward violation of the moral law has made him ceremonially guilty apart from any question of whether he is justified. The offering then typifies being made clean by blood, which is familiar territory for both of us.
When he offered that offering, his external guilt was removed, without reference to sincerity, or faith, or repentance (that’s per Turretin, as I’ve pointed out above).
So the legal economy policed outward violations of the moral law in a manner that depicted both grace (in its evangelical aspect) and law (in its legal aspect).
Specifically, the land sanctions depicted God’s wrath to violators of the moral law. Outward violations were punished and outward (and even some inward) obedience was promised a reward per Deut 28, 29. The whole thing happened within the framework of type.
Within this framework, there was also a picture of grace, as occurred whenever God relented for the sake of Moses or another mediator.
But this was all “in the sandbox” of typology. None of it was literally the Covenant of Works, which has but one stipulation (perfect, permanent, sincere, natural obedience) and but one promise (eternal life). Nor was it literally the Covenant of Grace, which has but two stipulations (faith and repentance, required and given) and but two promises (salvation and eternal life).
Instead, it was a dispensation or economy that, inasmuch as it rewarded obedience as an a priori condition, it was legal. That aspect depicted the Covenant of Works.
That’s what the sanctions of the judicial law were. That’s what the demands for sacrifice were (distinct from the promises given under the sacrifices).
So I would put my thesis like this: Under the judicial law, Israel was required to merit land retention by remaining obedient as a condition that had to be met in order to (that is, a priori) stay in the land.
I don’t think they were successful at it, but instead required the constant intervention of this mediator or that. So if the objection is that “no-one could merit”, then, yeah, I would agree. Berkhof would have it that imperfect obedience was required … OK, maybe.
But no matter, that merit required under the land sanctions is not same as the merit required under the CoW, nor was the land promise the same as the promise offered under the CoW, nor was it even the same as the land promise to Abraham (which was really, as we know, the promise to inherit the whole world). CoW and legal economy had different, but typologically related, promises and different, but typologically related, stipulations (recall that in Deut 30, Israel was allowed to repent as a condition for return after exile. This is clearly not a stipulation in the CoW, nor is it a stipulation in the CoG).
Instead, the land sanctions required merit within the confines of a typological picture. It was legal, but it was not the Covenant of Works. It policed violations of the moral law, but it was not itself the moral law.
The whole thing was a living picture, not real eternal reality.
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Yes, the bet was intended to be rhetorical. Sorry that wasn’t clear.
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So I would put my thesis like this: Under the judicial law, Israel was required to merit land retention by remaining obedient as a condition that had to be met in order to (that is, a priori) stay in the land.
I’m not clear yet. You are saying that Turretin says that the meritorious condition for Israel to stay in the land was perfect obedience to the moral law, but imperfect obedience to the ceremonial/judicial?
Imperfect obedience to all three?
Could sinners hypothetically fulfill this condition or not?
Was it the same as the condition required to merit eternal life or different?
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