Why Republication Matters

Published on by D. G. Hart

What exactly is so threatening about this?

Every Reformed minister loves preaching from Romans and Galatians. Presenting the Mosaic law as teaching a works principle really helps in explaining Paul’s doctrine of justification: what sin is all about, why people can’t rely on their own law-keeping, how faith is radically different from works, how Christ fulfilled the terms of the law so that we may be justified. That’s the gospel as I see it, but you can’t explain the gospel without understanding the law. Or take all of those Old Testament passages that call for Israel’s obedience and promise blessing and threaten curse in the land depending on their response. For example, the beginning of Deuteronomy 4, which tells Israel to follow the law so that they may live and take possession of the land. Or Deuteronomy 28, which recounts all sorts of earthly blessings in the land if the Israelites are careful to obey and all sorts of earthly curses if they aren’t. I don’t want a congregation to think that God was holding out a works-based way of salvation here, and I also can’t tell the congregation that this is the same way that God deals with the New Testament church when he calls her to obedience, for there’s nothing equivalent in the New Testament, no promise of earthly blessing for the church today if we meet a standard of obedience. Saying either of those things might by simple, but of course they’d be misleading, and damaging for the church to hear. (The Law is Not of Faith, 5)

Could it be that this view seems to allow Christians to think that law-keeping does not contribute to their salvation? Well, if the law requires “personal, perfect, and perpetual conformity and obedience thereunto, in the frame and disposition of the whole man, soul and body, and in performance of all those duties of holiness and righteousness which he owes to God and man: promising life upon the fulfilling, and threatening death upon the breach of it,” who is up to that challenge? Don’t be bashful.

809 thoughts on “Why Republication Matters”

  1. You’re right, I haven’t made clear the difference between FT and my own interpolations. So let me do that here. I’ll put out some things that I think FT teaches that clearly respond to your questions, and then add some of my interpolations that complete that response. And you can indicate “agree” or “disagree.”

    For Turretin,

    (1) The moral law re-expresses the covenant of works. It holds out the requirement of perfect, perpetual, sincere, natural obedience and promises eternal life as reward.
    (2) In the Mosaic Covenant, this re-expression is hypothetical for all but Christ because of inability.
    (3) The ceremonial law in its legal aspect is an intolerable yoke of ceremonies.
    (4) It requires sacrifices and observances upon which is contingent external purity and distinction of Israel from the Gentiles.
    (5) The external purity acquired through the sacrifices is without regard to faith or repentance.
    (6) The ceremonial law in its legal aspect pictured what was deserved for sin.

    I’m not looking at the moment, but I believe all of those are pretty close to direct quotes.

    My interpolations:

    (7) For FT, the condition of the ceremonial law is not perfect, sincere, perpetual obedience. No word on “natural.”
    (8) Likewise, the promise is not eternal life but external purity.
    (9) Therefore, the ceremonial law in its legal aspect is not, directly, the CoW NOR the CoG. Different stipulations, different promises.
    (10) In its evangelical aspect, the ceremonial law is directly the CoG: eternal life and salvation is pictured — and actually obtained by faith.
    (11) We understand therefore that the legal economy wrt the ceremonial law is neither CoW, nor CoG, nor a distinct covenant that mixes the two, but an economy under which the CoG is administered. Israelites DID NOT actually come under the CoW anew. They COULD come under the CoG by faith. They DID come under something (a legal economy) that depicted elements of both covenants.

    That’s my understanding of Turretin. Much of my understanding of the ceremonial law rests on Turretin’s assertion that external purity came without regard to faith or repentance, which explicitly disqualifies the legal aspect from being “of the substance of the CoG”, since it is entirely apart from its stipulations.

    Now, the judicial is more speculative, inasmuch as FT does not dwell on it. There, I am relying on his categories rather than his direct statements. I reason:

    (12) The judicial law provided sanctions for failure to obey the moral law.
    (13) Those sanctions were meted out to believers and unbelievers alike, without regard for faith or repentance. Thus the two examples above.
    (14) In the case of the land sanctions specifically, punishments were applied to people whom we know were of faith (Moses, Daniel).
    (15) Hence, if the land promises were purely by faith per the CoG, both Moses and Daniel would have received them.
    (16) And they didn’t; hence the land promises were not purely by faith.
    (17) The stipulations actually required for possession of the land are best found by examining two classes of texts: the Pentateuch, and the lawsuits brought by the prophets, esp Hosea etc.
    (18) In those texts, we find something resembling the CoW (“do not turn to the left or right”) but not actually the CoW, inasmuch as repentance was allowed after failure.
    (19) But nor is it the CoG, inasmuch as faith in Christ is no part of the condition for land sanctions.
    (20) Nor is it the CoG in that failure was a real possibility, indicating that the requirement was not given by promise, which is the defining feature of the CoG.
    (21) But the sanctions did resemble the CoG inasmuch as the interventions of mediators took away God’s wrath at disobedience, at times.

    Putting all this together:

    (22) The judicial laws fall under the same category as the ceremonial, as a part of the “rigor” of the legal economy, having a form of the CoW but not being an exact copy of it.
    (23) And the land sanctions, in particular, in that they defined national Israel and set it apart from the Gentiles, were a part of that judicial law.

    I hope that answers your question? Not “perfect obedience”, but “something like perfect obedience” was stipulated. In practice, not “the merits of Christ” but “the intervention of mediators” was accepted in place of national obedience (leaving the vexed term ‘merit’ out of the equation for the moment).

    What did NOT happen was that Israel retained the land under the terms of the CoG, which required (and gave) faith and repentance, which we know that Israel in general did not possess — and the CoG gives what it requires.

    Like

  2. Number 20 needs to be stronger.

    recte
    (20) Nor is it the CoG in that failure was a real and realized possibility. Israel broke the covenant, which point is the defining contrast with the New Covenant, which God explicitly makes unbreakable, and the promise to Abraham, which is eternal. Hence, the land sanctions are not to be identified with a condition under the CoG. What is required is not given, in contrast to Jer 31.

    Like

  3. Thanks. I agree with your (1) through (6). However….

    (7) For FT, the condition of the ceremonial law is not perfect, sincere, perpetual obedience. No word on “natural.”

    Disagree. Rather, the external economy required morally perfect obedience to the entire law, including the ceremonial. I think that’s clear in the stuff I posted recently. (Obviously, one didn’t have to be morally perfect to be ceremonially purified, but see below.)

    (8) Likewise, the promise is not eternal life but external purity.

    Disagree. The external economy, of which the ceremonial law was certainly a part, promised eternal life, typified by the land inheritance. (Again, more below.)

    (9) Therefore, the ceremonial law in its legal aspect is not, directly, the CoW NOR the CoG. Different stipulations, different promises.

    You are intent on extracting from poor Turretin some sort of covenant, or quasi-covenant, that was legal, yet didn’t demand perfect obedience nor promise eternal life. But you can’t do it (without distorting) cuz it ain’t there….

    The question we need to address is, What was the purpose of the ceremonial law wrt the legal relation? You seem to want to say that it “republished” the CoW pictorially via the worshippers meriting ceremonial purification by offering sacrifices.

    But that’s not in Turretin. According to him (and likewise Calvin) the design of the rites of ceremonial cleansing was to be a “handwriting of ordinances” (Colossians 2:14), that is, an ongoing testimony to the presence of sin and guilt, which those ceremonies, though continually repeated, were inefficacious to remove. In this way, the ceremonial law helped the moral law to convince the Israelites of their sin and misery.

    For as there was a twofold relation (schesis) of that law which must be carefully attended to (the one legal, referring to the covenant of works and its violated law; the other evangelical, by which it was referred to the covenant of grace, and its Mediator), so we must reason concerning it in different ways according to that double relation (schesin). For with regard to the former, there is no doubt that it had the use of discovering sin, sealing its guilt and threatening the wrath and curse of God impending on account of sin. In this sense, Paul says that the “handwriting” was against us and by them was made a remembrance (anamnesin) of sins. (11.24.11)

    (10) In its evangelical aspect, the ceremonial law is directly the CoG: eternal life and salvation is pictured — and actually obtained by faith.

    Yes.

    (11) We understand therefore that the legal economy wrt the ceremonial law is neither CoW, nor CoG, nor a distinct covenant that mixes the two, but an economy under which the CoG is administered. Israelites DID NOT actually come under the CoW anew. They COULD come under the CoG by faith. They DID come under something (a legal economy) that depicted elements of both covenants.

    No. The external economy definitely repeated the demands and promise of the CoW. It did not administer grace at all, but rather, subserved the CoG pedagogically by exposing sin and misery. The ceremonies functioned in both the exernal (legal) and the internal (gospel) economies. As law (to recap), they functioned pedagogically (alongside the moral law) as “handwriting,” testifying of sin and misery on account of the broken CoW. But wrt their typological function, in the internal economy, they revealed Christ and His benefits.

    The following is from Calvin, not Turretin, but is nonetheless helpful regarding the question of the function of the ceremonial law as to its legal relation:

    I cannot doubt that I have ascertained the genuine interpretation, provided I am permitted to assume what Augustine has somewhere most truly affirmed, nay, derived from the very words of the Apostle—viz. that in the Jewish ceremonies there was more a confession than an expiation of sins. For what more was done in sacrifice by those who substituted purifications instead of themselves, than to confess that they were conscious of deserving death? What did these purifications testify but that they themselves were impure? By these means, therefore, the handwriting both of their guilt and impurity was ever and anon renewed. But the attestation of these things was not the removal of them. Wherefore, the Apostle says that Christ is “the mediator of the new testament,—by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament,” (Heb. 9:15). Justly, therefore, does the Apostle describe these handwritings as against the worshipers, and contrary to them, since by means of them their impurity and condemnation were openly sealed. There is nothing contrary to this in the fact that they were partakers of the same grace with ourselves. This they obtained through Christ, and not through the ceremonies which the Apostle there contrasts with Christ, showing that by the continued use of them the glory of Christ was obscured. We perceive how ceremonies, considered in themselves, are elegantly and appositely termed handwritings, and contrary to the salvation of man, in as much as they were a kind of formal instruments which attested his liability. On the other hand, when false apostles wished to bind them on the Christian Church, Paul, entering more deeply into their signification, with good reason warned the Colossians how seriously they would relapse if they allowed a yoke to be in that way imposed upon them. By so doing, they, at the same time, deprived themselves of all benefit from Christ, who, by his eternal sacrifice once offered, had abolished those daily sacrifices, which were indeed powerful to attest sin, but could do nothing to destroy it. (Institutes 2.7.17)

    Like

  4. DR:The question we need to address is, What was the purpose of the ceremonial law wrt the legal relation? You seem to want to say that it “republished” the CoW pictorially via the worshippers meriting ceremonial purification by offering sacrifices.

    But that’s not in Turretin. According to him (and likewise Calvin) the design of the rites of ceremonial cleansing was to be a “handwriting of ordinances” (Colossians 2:14), that is, an ongoing testimony to the presence of sin and guilt, which those ceremonies, though continually repeated, were inefficacious to remove. In this way, the ceremonial law helped the moral law to convince the Israelites of their sin and misery.

    Then address away. Turretin does indeed say that worshipers who offered sacrifices received external expiation without regard to faith or repentance. I’m not making that up, and you haven’t touched it

    What does he mean, and how is that functioning?

    In particular, explain how you can agree with (4-5) and disagree with (7) with any consistency?

    Like

  5. I think in your objection to (8) you are conflating the evangelical aspect and the legal aspect of the ceremonial law.

    This goes to my warning to you: You will not be able to sustain your strong law/gospel clarity AND sustain an anti-repub position.

    Like

  6. Then address away. Turretin does indeed say that worshipers who offered sacrifices received external expiation without regard to faith or repentance. I’m not making that up, and you haven’t touched it

    I did address it and I did so by summarizing what Turretin actually says, not by interpolating. The legal relation was a testimony to sin and misery, and the evangelical relation typified Christ and his benefits. Sacrifices and carnal purity were simply two signs appointed by God, and those who offered those sacrifices deserved (i.e., merited) nothing but condemnation (and that condignly). But those who offered them in faith received forgiveness. You are imposing your own categories on Turretin.

    Like

  7. I think in your objection to (8) you are conflating the evangelical aspect and the legal aspect of the ceremonial law.

    Again, I’m just going by what Turretin actually says.

    The matter of that external economy was the threefold law–moral, ceremonial and forensic. The first was fundamental; the remaining appendices of it. The form was the pact added to that external dispensation, which on the part of God was the promise of the land of Canaan and of rest and happiness in it; and, under the image of each, of heaven and the rest in him (Heb 4:3, 9); or of eternal life according to the clause, “Do this and live.”

    Like

  8. I’m sorry, but you are not addressing what Turretin actually says.

    You say, the legal relation was a testimony to sin and misery, and the evangelical relation typified Christ and his benefits.

    Turretin says,

    That rigor was not without purpose; the wantonness of Israel could hardly otherwise be thoroughly tamed, whom Moses and the other prophets so often reproached for its hard neck and adamantine heart. To that economy belonged [external] purity of the flesh or immunity from carnal guilt, purged of which (from the institution of the law) they could freely mingle in public assemblies and perform public worship together with others, such as consisted in the observance of ceremonies (Heb 9.13); in contradistinction to this is purity of conscience and immunity from the spiritual guilt of sin. Here comes in the immunity from temporal punishments in the court of earth which (as to sins not committed with uplifted hand) was granted through the sacrifices, which (without relation to either repentance or faith) restored men to their rank and rendered them free from all forensic punishment

    Your summary completely ignores what he says and substitutes categories that come from other sections dealing with other issues. On the strength of your importation, you merge external purity (which Turretin locates in the institution of the law) with what it typified, actual freedom from guilt, which Turretin locates in the gospel, EVEN THOUGH Turretin explicitly places them in contradistinction here.

    Again, please deal with the above directly and clearly. What is going on with “external purity”? Who receives it? On what condition? What is happening with “freedom from forensic punishment”? Who receives that freedom? On what condition?

    If your basic analytic method is “stipulation and promise”, then now is the time. What are the stipulations and promises in the above paragraph?

    Like

  9. On the strength of your importation, you merge external purity (which Turretin locates in the institution of the law) with what it typified, actual freedom from guilt …

    Where did I do that? So you think that passage teaches that the Israelites merited carnal expiation? Or maybe that the dead animals merited carnal expiation on behalf of the Israelites? No thanks, I’ll stick with Turretin’s actual explanation and leave the interpolating to you.

    Like

  10. A quick primer on merit in Turretin and Reformed theology:

    1. What did innocent Adam merit? Nothing, because his obedience was a debt. But by virtue of the covenant and God’s free promise, he was placed into a position to merit (in an improper sense) eternal life for himself and his posterity.

    2. What do sinners merit? Eternal condemnation.

    3. But didn’t the Israelites merit carnal expiation by offering sacrifices? No (see #2).

    4. What did Christ merit? Life and salvation for those whom He represented.

    That about covers it I think.

    Like

  11. The primer is helpful for understanding your overall framework, but it doesn’t answer the question.

    Again: In the above paragraph, who receives external purity? On what condition? Who is restored to rank and free from forensic punishment? On what condition?

    Like

  12. If your basic analytic method is “stipulation and promise”, then now is the time. What are the stipulations and promises in the above paragraph?

    As much as you give a denial of a third covenant with one hand, you keep taking back that denial with the other…. As for me, I see no stipulations and sanctions per se in that paragraph. What I see are carnal ordinances, characteristic of the external economy, that could not, in and of themselves, remove sin, but rather (as he elsewhere explains) by their repetition underscored the worshippers’ sinfulness and thus their liability to wrath, thereby driving them to Christ, the doctrine of whom was concealed under those ordinances. If that is mixing law and gospel, then at least I’m in good company….

    Calvin again, speaking of the same thing:

    For what more was done in sacrifice by those who substituted purifications instead of themselves, than to confess that they were conscious of deserving death? What did these purifications testify but that they themselves were impure? By these means, therefore, the handwriting both of their guilt and impurity was ever and anon renewed. But the attestation of these things was not the removal of them.

    Like

  13. You claim to be “relying on Turretin’s categories” in your (14) – (20), but I cannot for the life of me figure out which of his categories you’re referring to. What you’ve presented is clearly drawn from your own categories (which you outlined pre-Turretin), and is nothing like Turretin’s clear law-gospel distinction (yet you caution me …). I guarantee that the following has no relation to Turretin’s categories:

    (18) In those texts, we find something resembling the CoW (“do not turn to the left or right”) but not actually the CoW, inasmuch as repentance was allowed after failure.
    (19) But nor is it the CoG, inasmuch as faith in Christ is no part of the condition for land sanctions.
    (20) Nor is it the CoG in that failure was a real possibility, indicating that the requirement was not given by promise, which is the defining feature of the CoG.

    Like

  14. To quote Arlo Guthrie, “I’m not proud … Or tired.”

    Once more, with feeling and four-part harmony: in the passage above, who receives external purity? On what condition? Who is restored to rank and freed from temporal punishment? On what condition?

    Until you deal with the text, I. Wont. Move.

    It’s fine if you think that Turretin elsewhere says that these sacrifices underscored sinfulness as a legal handwriting. I agree with you, and him.

    But that isn’t what he says here. Admit it. Deal with what he says.

    Like

  15. Once more, with feeling and four-part harmony: in the passage above, who receives external purity? On what condition? Who is restored to rank and freed from temporal punishment? On what condition?

    And once more, with drum intro and instrumental accompaniment, you are imposing your own categories on Turretin. I have answered you already but I will try once more….

    Utilizing Turretin’s expressed categories, we find that in the external economy, the condition demanded was perfect and personal obedience to the threefold law. The promise held out was eternal life, typified by temporal blessings. The threat was eternal punishment, typified by temporal punishment.

    The problem however, which the external economy was designed to highlight, was the presence of sin, and therefore liability to the threatened curse (and the hopelessness of obtaining the promised blessing).

    The obligation to continually offer sacrifices in order to avoid temporal punishment (constituting as it did a perpetual “handwriting against them”), served to further underscore the problem of sin, but did not actually deal with it, because the sacrifices (in and of themselves) did not purify the conscience, nor did they render the Israelites immune from the spiritual guilt of sin, nor did they free them from the threatened curse of eternal punishment.

    Thus, the ceremonial law served alongside the moral law to expose the Israelites’ sin and misery and thereby drive them to Christ to be purified from their sins, saved from God’s wrath, and granted the promised inheritance according to the terms of the covenant of grace, administered via the types hidden under those same ceremonies.

    That should cover your questions, but if it is not to your satisfaction, I don’t know that I can help any further.

    Regarding categories, for Turretin, there is the CoW and the CoG, law and gospel, with all stipulations and sanctions connecting to either one or the other, or both. But what you won’t find in Turretin is a category for “something resembling the CoW … but not actually the CoW … But nor is it the CoG …”

    That’s not in Turretin. Admit it. Deal with it.

    Like

  16. DR: That should cover your questions, but if it is not to your satisfaction, I don’t know that I can help any further.

    Dear David,

    You are working way too hard at this. I am simply trying to draw your attention to the obvious thing that is in front of our faces. Perhaps it seems insulting to your intelligence, but we’ve reached the point where I’m not entirely convinced that you are reading as opposed to interpreting without reading. To get anywhere, we have to agree on what is said before we can hope to discuss to what is meant. And right now, I’ve asked you five times going on six to simply acknowledge basic facts, to answer some basic reading comprehension questions.

    In asking those questions, I’m not trying to set a trap, I’m asking you the questions I ask myself as a reader: who, what, when, where, why?

    You, so far, seem stubbornly unable to address those questions. I don’t get that.

    Once more: In the paragraph above, who receives external purity? On what condition? Who is restored to rank and free from forensic punishment? On what condition?

    When you have satisfied me that you are actually reading those words, we can move on to questions about Turretin’s categories. When we do so, I will cheerfully let you give me primers on Turretin, and respond in kind.

    So for example, I will admit that Turretin does not use the word “merit” in the above paragraph. I think he’s talking about “merit” in his broad, improper sense, and I’m prepared to fully defend the correctness of my understanding of his categories. But I admit that I’m interpreting at that point. Honesty requires me to admit that.

    I’m asking you to do the same, to separate your interpretation from the basic data that is in front of us. That’s a fundamental part of being honest.

    So until I am satisfied that you can correctly articulate what he says and not what you think he means (or in this case, doesn’t mean), we’re not moving on.

    I hate this, frankly. I think of you as being smarter and more honest than this.

    Like

  18. Jeff,

    I am not intentionally being stubborn or dishonest (or stupid). It is just that I see where you are going with your reading of the doctrine of merit-by-imperfect-obedience into Turretin’s teaching on the ceremonial law, and I have been trying to save you from what I consider to be a fool’s errand. But alas….

    I’m not entirely convinced that you are reading as opposed to interpreting without reading.

    This is precisely my beef with you. What I’ve seen from your “interpolations” in some cases directly contradict Turretin’s plain teaching. For example, you had said: “Much of my understanding of the ceremonial law rests on Turretin’s assertion that external purity came without regard to faith or repentance …” But what I don’t get is why you (stubbornly?) insist on deriving your understanding of Turretin’s view of the ceremonial law from your interpolation of one paragraph , while completely ignoring things he explicitly teaches in his several pages of exposition of the ceremonial law and its purposes, as well as his clear teaching on other related subjects (e.g., merit, the covenants). Perhaps you need to remove the log from your eye?

    You are no doubt smart enough to understand my previous answers to your questions, but since you insist that I play your game and pretend that the one paragraph in isolation from everything else is determinative for grasping Turretin’s categories, and since you insist on utterly ignoring my repeated protests, and since my efforts to dissuade you from continuing down a dead-end path have failed, and even though you now attack my character and intelligence, I will acquiesce.

    In the paragraph above, who receives external purity?

    Israel.

    On what condition?

    Through the sacrifices.

    Who is restored to rank and free from forensic punishment?

    Israel.

    On what condition?

    External purification of the flesh.

    So for example, I will admit that Turretin does not use the word “merit” in the above paragraph. I think he’s talking about “merit” in his broad, improper sense, and I’m prepared to fully defend the correctness of my understanding of his categories.

    I assume that what you are fully prepared to defend is the claim that Turretin teaches (implicitly) that the Israelites merited external purity and freedom from forensic punishment by offering a sacrifice, and furthermore, that they merited their continued possession of the land by imperfect corporate obedience? If so, and if you are planning to defend the correctness of this claim by reading your own categories into one isolated paragraph while completely ignoring context and explicit teaching, then frankly, I’m not interested. (I’ve seen too much of that sort of thing from others recently.) But if you are prepared to make your case from an honest reading of, and engagement with, Turretin’s categories, derived from a careful reading of his entire teaching on the issues involved, then I’m all ears, and looking forward to your attempt.

    Like

  19. I do not think badly of your character. I think we had a bad interaction, and I apologize for contributing to that with my snark and strong-willed-ness.

    Like

  20. The Category of Merit in Turretin

    I’ve already addressed this above, but we can refine and supplement here.

    For Turretin, there are two categories of the word “merit.” The first is proper and strict, denoting that work to which a reward is due from justice on account of intrinsic value and worth (17.5.2). Turretin denies that any creature, not even Adam in the state of innocence, was capable of this kind of merit (17.5.7 and 8.3.17).

    The second category is improper and broad, used for the consecution of any thing (17.3.2) [meaning: the relation of consequent to antecedent]. Fulfilling an antecedent condition is said (broadly) to “merit” the consequent.

    This is a very broad definition indeed, and Turretin follows it up with a set of examples from the church fathers in which “merit” is used broadly to mean “gain”, “obtain”, or “attain.” Even ludicrously or ironically, this includes phrases such as “guilt merited a redeemer” (17.3.2).

    Turretin’s fundamental complaint with Rome’s notion of merit, which follows in 17.5, is that Rome has taken the broad meaning and confused it with the strict:

    …the phrases of the fathers being received badly and contrary to their meaning, they [church doctors] began to say that men properly merited eternal life by their works and that good woks are meritorious of eternal life, not only from the covenant, but also by reason of the work itself. (17.5.2)

    In other words, there has been (acc to Turretin) a category confusion in the Roman doctrine. They have taken what could broadly be called merit and labeled it “strict.”

    He then knocks down Romish doctrines of merit in the following sections, NOT ONLY on the grounds of sinful inability, BUT ALSO on the grounds that strict merit is impossible for man in any state. In particular, he says that Adam himself, if he had persevered, would not have merited life in strict justice, although … God promised him by a covenant life under the condition of perfect obedience (which is called meritorious from that covenant in a broader sense because it ought to have been, as it were, the foundation and meritorious cause in view of which God had adjudged life to him (17.5.7).

    This same distinction is in play in 8.3.17, in which Adam is required under the CoW to “obtain this merit” not in a strict sense, but because the CoW “demanded antecedently a proper and personal obedience…”

    So: Two kinds of merit — strict (of the value of the work itself), impossible for created man; broad (the consecution of any thing), which includes the merit pactum of the CoW.

    We notice with some puzzlement or dissatisfaction that “broad merit” is really, really broad. Is Turretin serious about such a broad category? Yes. More anon.

    Further, we note that these definitions of merit do not yet have reference to covenants. When we get to the CoW/CoG category, the definition of merit will come into play.

    Meanwhile, if you believe that Turretin has other categories of merit, now is a good time to interject with citations. I’ve got taxi duty. Next up: the category of conditions.

    Like

  21. The Category of Conditions in Turretin

    This has also been covered above, but it now takes shape when considering “merit.”

    The need to discuss conditions arises because “some” of the evangelical party had wished to deny that the CoG had any conditionality whatsoever (12.3.1). Since Turretin has already defined a covenant in terms of conditions (or duties) and promises (12.1.8), he clearly is not of this party. However, he does wish to keep a clear distinction between law and gospel. In order to preserve both conditionality and law/gospel, he makes the following distinctions, re-quoted for convenience:

    (1) Condition is used either antecedently and a priori, for that which has the force of a meritorious and impulsive cause to obtain the benefits of the covenant (the performance of which gives man a right to the reward); or concomitantly and consequently a posteriori, for that which has the relation of means and disposition in the subject.

    (2) A condition is either natural, flowing from the strength belonging to nature; or supernatural and divine, depending upon grace.

    (3) The federal promise is twofold: either concerning the end or the means, i.e., either concerning salvation or concerning faith and repentance (because each is the gift of God)

    (4) The covenant can be considered either in relation to its institution by God or in relation to its first application to the believer or in relation to its perfect consummation.

    These things being laid down, we say first, if the condition is taken antecedently and a priori for the meritorious and impulsive cause and for a natural condition, the covenant of grace is rightly denied to be conditioned … but if it is taken consequently and a posteriori for the instrumental cause, receptive of the promises of the covenant…it cannot be denied that the covenant is conditional.

    (12.3.2).

    Here, we see the force of what puzzled us above. Why does Turretin make “broad merit” such a weak condition? Because he wishes to exclude any antecedent condition whatsoever from the covenant of grace.

    In particular, he wishes to deny that faith itself is antecedent and meritorious (12.3.11). That’s the prize, the benefit of the category of merit established above.

    So conditions: a priori and meritorious, or a posteriori and concomitant; natural or of grace.

    Like

  22. The Category of Covenants in Turretin

    This has to be abbreviated, but for Turretin, a covenant proper is a mutual agreement between equals concerning certain goods and offices exchanged for a common utility (8.3.1). Given this definition, there are no covenants proper between God and man.

    Instead, there are two covenants of condescension, the first of works and the second of grace. Each of these has promises and stipulations.

    And even more broadly, there are covenants that God makes that consist of promises with no stipulations, such as the promise never to flood the world again. Yet strictly and properly, covenant denotes the agreement of God with man by which God promises his goods (and especially eternal life to him), and by man, in turn, duty and worship are engaged (certain external signs being employed for the sake of manifestation) (8.3.3) We see here that “strictly and properly” means “relative to God’s condescension.”

    The characteristics of the Covenant of Works are that it is

    * of nature — requiring obedience in man’s own strength
    * of works — dependent on works or proper obedience
    * legal — requiring as a condition the observation of the law of nature written within (8.3.5)

    the Covenant of Grace meanwhile is

    * of grace — resting on God’s grace
    * of faith — depending on faith
    * evangelical — (“of good news”) supplying the required condition. (12.3.6)

    Here in the last we see the category of condition coming into play: The CoW is legal because the condition is demanded a priori, while the CoG is evangelical because the condition is supplied and is concomitant. (12.4.6-7)

    Faith can consist only with the promises of the gospel, which sets life before man, not as to be acquired (like the law), but as already purchased. (12.3.11e)

    Hence the two covenants. The one promises eternal life; the other, salvation and eternal life. The characteristics of the one are natural, legal, of works; of the other, of grace, evangelical, of faith.

    Like

  23. The Categories of Law in Turretin

    Turretin distinguishes natural law, moral law, ceremonial law, and judicial or forensic law.

    The natural and moral law have the same content, but the former is written on the heart per Adam, while the moral law was given on two tablets. The distinguishing feature is that the natural law is of the nature of God and thus immutable (11.1-2, 23).

    The moral law, being the law of nature, was and is the stipulation required in the CoW. It is in absolute nature the rule directing our lives (11.22.2). It speaks to men as individuals (11.24.2).

    Relative to man in

    * innocence: was the stipulation of the CoW (11.22.8)
    * sin: brings conviction, restraint, condemnation (11.22.9)
    * pre-conversion election: humbling, schoolmastering (11.22.10)
    * post-conversion grace: directs in the ways of the Lord (11.22.11)

    The ceremonial and judicial law on the other hand is of positive right (of God’s arbitrary decree) (11.1.4, 11.24.3) Their precepts are good only inasmuch as God has commanded, and not according to who He is (11.24.5).

    The ceremonial law differs from the moral in that it treats Israel as the church expecting the promised Messiah (11.24.2). Very importantly, Turretin is clear that the ceremonial concerns itself with external elements only. That is, it is subservient to the moral law (11.24.3); it gives “carnal commandments and ordinances” (11.24.4, 11.24.18) that are external rites and sacred accidents, but are not of themselves the worship of God (11.24.5).

    It therefore had a manifold end (11.24.7): to provide good order to worship in its external form; to subserve the moral law in convincing of sin and guilt; to distinguish Jew from Gentile; and to serve the CoG by showing sin and misery as well the mercy of Christ.

    In particular, man’s misery was shown in the legal relation of the ceremonial law. God’s mercy and the duty of gratitude were shown in the sacraments of evangelical grace (11.24.9).

    These three were expressly designated in the sacrifices. For as they were a “handwriting” on the part of God representing the debt contracted by sin, so they were a shadow of the ransom to be paid by Christ and pictures of the reasonable and gospel worship to be given to God by believers. (11.24.9).

    However, these relations are so connected that whoever wishes to rightly understand he nature of the Old Testament economy and the use of the ceremonial law, ought always to join them together; nor can they be wrested asunder except at a heavy expense of the truth. (11.24.11).

    So in particular, we cannot attribute the ceremonial law to either the broken CoW ONLY nor the CoG ONLY (11.24.13). But rather, we can speak of the legal relation or the gospel relation; the two worked side-by-side, sometimes two external things pointing to one antitype (11.24.16) and sometimes one external thing pointing to more than one antitype (11.24.17).

    This category is clearly the most complicated, so we must summarize:

    * The ceremonial is of positive right,
    * Subserves the moral law, but also
    * Subserves the CoG,
    * Concerns external matters only according to its strict nature,
    * Yet shadows spiritual matters by type,
    * And these relations are connected such that they cannot be separated (“distinguished but not separated” could be an effective slogan). Nor is there a one-to-one correspondence between signs and things signified. Rather, the relations work side-by-side.

    Finally, the judicial law served Israel as a theocracy (11.26.1). It restrained, kept good order, and in particular punished violations of the moral and ceremonial laws. Whatever is of positive right is abrogated; of nature remains in force (11.26.3-10).

    So we see the three-fold category of law:

    * The moral is natural, a law for life, always in force; in this age, it convicts, schoolmasters — and directs believers in grateful obedience.
    * The ceremonial is complicated, subserving the moral law in the legal relation; subserving the covenant of grace in types and shadows; and also generally providing order for God’s worship — all of this in external and carnal ordinances.
    * The judicial provided for restraint of violations of the moral law, generally identified with the law directed at the theocracy.

    Like

  24. “Relations”

    Turretin commonly uses the term “relation”, and it is the “legal relation” of the ceremonial law (as well as the “legal dispensation of the covenant of grace”) that we have been debating.

    For FT, the legal relation of the ceremonial to the moral is as follows:

    * The ceremonial law provided external commands regulating the first table (11.24.1, 6, 8).
    * It convinced of sin and misery. This subserved BOTH the moral law and also the covenant of grace (11.24.8,9), in particular by [keeping] up the expectation and desire of [Christ] by that laborious worship and by the severity of its discipline to compel them to seek him; and to exhibit the righteousness and image of the spiritual worship required by him in that covenant (11.24.9).

    The evangelical relation of the ceremonial law to the covenant of grace is as follows

    * It shadowed Christ to come by type, and
    * It showed God’s mercy, and
    * It showed the duty of gratitude (11.24.9-10), speaking here of third use of the law.

    Like

  25. Economy v. Covenant

    The final category is the distinction between a covenant and its economy, or mode of dispensation, the way in which its goods are dispensed.

    For FT, a covenant in the broad sense has distinct stipulations (optional) and promises. But the covenants of God with man have an especial promise (eternal life) (8.3.3). For this reason, because there are only two modes of obtaining happiness and communion with God (12.12.8), there can only be two covenants, selah.

    And in particular, for FT, since the legal relation subserved the covenant of grace proves that it pointed to Christ — and since it had that end, it was really a dispensation of the CoG rather than a distinct covenant (12.12.17). The promises attached to the law were not primary and principal, but accessory. This is particularly true of the land promise:

    The promise of the land of Canaan given to the people was not primary and principal, but only secondary and less principal (added by way of proposition); of addition to the primary concerning God about to be their God and indeed as a pledge and symbol of the heavenly Canaan (of which it was a type, Heb 4), to which the fathers looked. Therefore, a specific diversity of covenant cannot (except falsely) be inferred from the diversity of that promise from the one given us in the gospel. Rather only a diversity of dispensation may be inferred which even the other differences between the Old and New Testaments here adduced concerning the spirit of bondage (of which we have spoken before) imply. (12.12.24).

    Likewise, the legal economy had different stipulations from the covenant of grace:

    It agrees with the covenant of grace (1) in the author…(2) in the object (to wit: man, a sinner) (3) in the mediator … (4) in the end — the end of both is to show sin and to lead to Christ. It differs (1) as to the relation of the author, for in the legal God is considered simply as rebuking sin and approving righteousness alone, but in the evangelic, as pardoning sin and renewing righteousness in man; (2) as to stipulation – for that of the former is “Do this and live”; of the latter, “Believe and thou shalt be saved”; as to the mediator, who in the former was Moses [who was a type (12.12.23)] ; in the latter Christ, the God-man; (4) as to the object, man stupefied by sin was the object of the former; the conscience terrified by sin was the object of the latter; (5) as to the effects, the former gendered to bondage, the latter to liberty; that led to Christ indirectly, this directly. That was a handwriting against us, this a disburdener; the one restrains from sin, but with compulsion, while the other restrains with spontaneous inclination

    — (12.12.4) .

    Yet these different requirements did not make a difference in covenant (12.12.22)

    So the legal economy was an economy and not a separate covenant because

    * Subserved the CoG because its end was Christ.
    * Had “a diversity of promises” from the gospel promise, but only secondarily and not as the end.
    * Had a “diversity of conditions” from the gospel promise, but not in the same way nor to the same end. The end of the legal requirements was conviction and misery IN ORDER TO point to Christ; the end of the gospel promise was Christ.

    So the covenants dispensed goods according to stipulation, and the good they dispensed was eternal life. The legal economy also dispersed goods, diverse from that of the CoG, according to conditions diverse from those of the CoG, and yet secondarily and always with the end of pointing to Christ.

    Put another way, the legal economy dispensed Christ indirectly by making those under it ready to receive Christ through rigor, ceremony, and type.

    Like

  26. Now that the categories are clear, the following also becomes clear as well:

    It is a great error to say that a difference in stipulation or difference in promise makes a difference in covenant.

    Turretin is clear: a diversity of conditions does not make a different covenant; a diversity of promises does not make a different covenant.

    In fact, he explicitly says that the legal economy had different stipulations from the covenant of grace. Those stipulations did not make the economy a distinct covenant, because the end of those stipulations was the same as the end of the covenant of grace.

    He also explicitly says that the legal economy had different promises from the covenant of grace. Those different promises (FT explicitly mentions the land promise as the example) did not make a different covenant, but only a diversity of dispensation.

    The core principle, repeated for emphasis:

    A specific diversity of covenant cannot (except falsely) be inferred from the diversity of that promise from the one given to us in the gospel. Rather only a diversity of dispensation may be inferred … (12.12.24)

    So for example, your quip above about “As much as you give a denial of a third covenant with one hand, you keep taking back that denial with the other…” is quite mistaken.

    We need to both be clear about what does and does not constitute a difference in covenant. A diversity of promise doesn’t do it. A diversity of condition doesn’t do it.

    What makes one covenant different from the other is a difference in mode of happiness and communion with God. There are only two of these; there are only two covenants.

    What makes one covenant different from the other is a difference in end: communion with God by natural obedience, or by Christ.

    Like

  27. Finally, I’m prepared to defend my statements above about sacrifices.

    Did the Israelites “merit” carnal expiation by the sacrifices?

    What kind of “merit” is in view? “Broad improper merit”, defined by Turretin as the consecution of any thing, or obtaining by fulfilling a condition.

    On the a priori condition of offering the sacrifice, the Israelite — whether believer or otherwise — received external expiation (12.7.39), was restored to rank, was free from forensic punishment.

    That’s it. Nothing further is implied. To refute this, you would have to show that either (1) The condition was a posteriori, not a priori, or (2) that external expiation was not actually received by the sacrificer. I’ll take an eBeer on that one, too.

    Now, what bothers you about this is indicated in your comments above. You tie the outward ceremonies with what they signify, so that the two cannot be separated absolutely.

    And I absolutely agree with you there. The primary thing in view in the sacrifices was actual cleansing from guilt, and that was received by faith. That’s the end of the sacrifices, not to provide external expiation. I’m not suggesting for a moment — and have never intended! — that the external expiation was somehow an end in itself.

    But it’s one thing to deny separation. It is another to deny distinction at all.

    In fact, we can distinguish between

    * The external expiation (sign, ceremonial law) versus the real cleansing signified (gospel).

    The law did not provide that real cleansing, not even through the agency of faith. The law was legal, and could only require. The gospel provided the faith needed to receive the real benefits signed. Hebrews were not forgiven by grace-enabled law-keeping, but by faith receiving the promise.

    And, we can distinguish also between

    * The generic Israelite who by virtue of the sacrifice received an outward expiation, versus the believing Israelite who, by faith, received the real propitiation.

    And, we can distinguish between

    * The legal mode of dispensation of the outward expiation, according to an a priori condition, versus the evangelical mode of dispensation of the genuine propitiation, according to a concomitant condition of faith supplied by God.

    Those distinctions show how the law and gospel worked side-by-side, never commingled, to serve Turretin’s various ends of the ceremonial law:

    * It was legal in convincing people of their misery: They needed expiation, and they were compelled to sacrifice of their own to provide it; yet their own best-of-flock provided only outward forgiveness and had to be repeated, to no real avail. Message: Expiation requires blood and cost, more than I can pay.
    * Evangelical in signifying a remedy not of their own flock. Message: God Himself will provide a lamb.

    Why do I care in making these distinctions? To defend the real “otherness” of the legal economy. Taken of itself, according to its nature, it was of the Covenant of Works (12.12.25 and many other places). It was legal. According to Turretin, this is the proper way to understand Paul’s “the law is not of faith” and the other passages that pit Moses against grace.

    But taken in context, the legal economy was subservient to the end of the covenant of grace by doing all those things that we agree on: conviction, schoolmastering, etc.

    Like

  28. Jeff,

    Thanks, and my apologies too for being at least as stubborn and strong-willed….

    Very nice little summaries. The crux of the issue of course is FT’s categories of merit. You are definitely helping me process, and reading your stuff, I realize I’m not as clear yet as I had hoped…. I’ve been pondering though, and I don’t believe you’ve quite captured FT’s categories (though you’ve made a good start). I think some additional data (and perhaps an important correction or two) may impact your conclusions (or maybe not). Some comments forthcoming….

    Like

  29. David R. and Jeff, once you finish with Turretin, maybe you can work on Paul? It’s all pretty interesting and I am learning. But I was not aware that Turretin had been added to the canon.

    Just keeping it Protestant.

    Like

  31. Jeff, be careful with those crowns. Give some credit to Ken Loses, Foxy Lady, and Susan. Nothing brings out the sola scriptura in you more than following the RC blogs and news stories.

    Like

  33. D.G., you’re the same guy who once argued thusly, or are you throwing caution to the wind?

    What is more, because of the human tendency toward sin and unbelief, I would think that if my interpretation of the Bible conflicted with that of the Puritans or Calvin I would be cautious about going with my understanding. Am I wiser than they were? How could I be right and they be wrong? Doesn’t their body of work stand up better than mine? After all, will anybody be reading me in 400 years (for edification, that is, not for laughs)?

    Like

  34. David R., but so far you’re not even concerned with what Paul says. You only seem to have a vendetta against Kline. Could it have something to do with your work for Jews for Jesus? Are you a Christian Zionist?

    Like

  36. There are people in Christian churches who do not consider Paul’s writings to be valid. Used to attend an E-Free Church which such a family. Tom Van Dyke is down on Paul, although he does not appear to attend a Christian Church regularly.

    Like

  37. Jeff,

    Some initial thoughts by way of response to what you’ve written regarding Turretin’s categories of merit. One challenge in determining those categories is that he nowhere comprehensively lays them out, but rather offers them piecemeal, as they relate to particular controversies. Hence it’s necessary to gather from what he’s scattered among the several volumes. As far as I can tell, the primary places where he offers his categories of merit are within the contexts of the following controversies: 8.3 (“The Covenant of Nature”), 9.4 (“Venial and Mortal sin”), 14.13 (“The Matter of the Satisfaction”), and 17.5 (“The Merit of Works”).

    As you note, in 17.5, he initially speaks of two usages of the term “merit,” i.e., (1) “strictly and properly,” denoting intrinsic value and worth, and (2) “broadly and improperly,” denoting “the consecution of any thing,” often used by the church fathers in the sense of “to gain,” to “obtain,” or “to attain.” One example he cites is from Augustine: “The sinner ought not to despair of himself because Paul obtained pardon.”

    My question: Does this second (broad and improper) merit category actually reflect Turretin’s own view? For one thing, it would prove far too much, e.g., that believers merit (albeit broadly and improperly) forgiveness of sins, as in the Augustine citation. Another clue that he doesn’t personally endorse this notion is his observation, “The Romanists don’t deny the abuse of this word” (17.5.2), i.e., in the church fathers.

    Granted, Turretin isn’t terribly concerned about the church fathers’ equivocal usage of the term, and even seems willing to excuse them, except that they opened the door to the later RC abuses (which I agree largely involved confusion of the strict category with the broad one). However, I think you are mistaken to assume that this broad and improper usage of the term is one that Turretin would own. Rather, I think it’s clear that he is simply documenting how the term had been used by the church fathers, and then how their usage was later abused by the scholastics. This is merely historical background for his polemics against the doctrines of congruent and condign merit. (He does indeed have an improper merit category, but defined differently, more on this to follow). And obviously, if this isn’t one of Turretin’s categories, then your conclusions don’t follow. More to come…..

    Like

  38. DR: Does this second (broad and improper) merit category actually reflect Turretin’s own view?

    Right, this is definitely the right question. Just so we’re clear on the lay of the land, my argument is “yes”, not merely because Turretin mentions it here, but because

    * He repeats that definition multiple places elsewhere,
    * He relies on that definition to show that Adam was required to merit under the CoW, and
    * He relies on that definition to show that faith does not merit justification in any sense, and
    * He intertwines the definition of merit with the category of “condition.”

    I just wanted to be clear that you’re not trying to stare down a bare assumption there …

    Like

  39. * He repeats that definition multiple places elsewhere,

    Can you point me to where? The only time I see him using utilizing a “broader” category of merit is with Adam in the CoW.

    * He relies on that definition to show that Adam was required to merit under the CoW, and

    Right.

    * He relies on that definition to show that faith does not merit justification in any sense, and

    Where? You have a reference?

    * He intertwines the definition of merit with the category of “condition.”

    Reference?

    Like

  41. Jeff,

    My arguments, in brief, are as follows. There’s more to say regarding your last few posts on Turretin, but I think this is more than enough for now. If need be, I can try to flesh out or clarify anything.

    1. FT does not own the equivocal broad merit category as defined and used in the church fathers (signifying not merit, but consecution); rather, he’s simply giving historical background for his polemics against congruent/condign merit. According to this usage, Augustine could say that Paul “merited” forgiveness of sins, which we know FT didn’t hold in any sense. (17.5)

    2. FT argues that man cannot properly merit from God (in any state) because, limited by his creaturehood (and post-fall by his sinfulness), he is unable to fulfill the five qualifications demanded of properly meritorious work, i.e., that the work be (1) undue, (2) proportional to the reward, (3) free from taint (innocent Adam could meet only this one qualification), (4) his own work, and (5) deserving of the reward from strict justice. (17.5.6)

    The question is, does he qualify the above in any way?

    3. Yes, but the only caveat FT offers to the above (#2) is wrt innocent Adam’s stipulation in the CoW. If Adam had stood the probation, it would not have been properly meritorious—because he would have fulfilled only one of the conditions for proper merit, i.e., freedom from taint (which, btw, constitutes the image of God). However, by virtue of God’s condescension in entering into the CoW, Adam was enabled to merit (in a broader sense) eternal life for himself and his posterity on the ground of his perfect and personal obedience. Thus, “pactum merit” is FT’s merit category #2, and this is the only improper merit category he ever argues for. (8.4.17; 17.5.7)

    4. According to FT, Christ properly merited (i.e., meeting all five qualifications) life and salvation on behalf of the elect. This could only be achieved by a divine Person (as four of the five qualifications necessitated this). Christ’s proper merit as the foundation of the CoG corresponds to Adam’s improper merit as the foundation of the CoW. Christ’s merit is FT’s category #1. (E.g., 12.4.4; 14.12.6; 14.13.12)

    When FT speaks of conditions in the CoG, it is that which Christ’s merit purchased, i.e., the obtaining of the benefits of the covenant, that FT excludes as a condition (for the elect).

    5. According to FT, Adam’s posterity properly merit eternal punishment by virtue of Adam’s sin and their own. Thus, merit category #3. (E.g., 9.4.8, 21.)

    6. These three are FT’s only merit categories. When he refutes the doctrines of congruent/condign merit, he does not argue that they have been mislabeled as proper merit and would not be objectionable as improper merit; rather, he argues against them absolutely on the ground that sinners (whether believers or not) can’t merit from God.

    7. Regarding those other topics you mention, i.e., conditions in the CoG, etc., the only two categories of merit FT ever references in connection with them are Christ’s and innocent Adam’s.

    I think that perhaps you are too heavily freighting the term “antecedent”? For FT, it’s a relative term that he uses in connection with all three conditions that he enumerates in the CoG (not only the meritorious cause). To wit,

    1) FT explains (as you know) that wrt the obtaining of the benefits of the covenant the CoG is unconditional because the righteousness of Christ is the only meritorious cause (antecedent condition) of the obtaining of those benefits and thus whatever other conditions there be are graciously bestowed (consequent conditions).

    2) But otoh, wrt receiving the benefits of the covenant faith is the instrumental cause, and in that sense, is “antecedent.” See 12.3.15-16.

    3) Finally, FT argues that repentance/new obedience is also a condition, though not causal in any sense. However, wrt glorification, he states that there is a non-causal connection as means to end, antecedent to consequent, etc. See 17.3.14 and 17.5.13.

    IOW, for FT, all meritorious conditions are “antecedent”; but not all “antecedent” conditions are meritorious. Wrt the connection between the topic of merit and the topic of conditions in the CoG, the point that FT is careful to stress is that category #1 (i.e., Christ’s obedience) is the only meritorious cause, not that no other conditions are “antecedent” in any sense.

    8. Regarding your claim that the Israelites merited external expiation by virtue of the sacrifices, I would argue in response: If so, it’s either proper merit or pactum merit (since for FT, there is no other). We agree it’s not proper merit. Neither is it pactum merit because that requires perfect obedience. Additionally, a number of FT’s arguments against congruent/condign merit also would apply here. For example,

    1) Nothing good can be done by sinners not yet renewed, and thus they cannot merit. (17.5.8)

    2) Enemies of God can deserve nothing. (17.5.8)

    3) Either this merit arises from all works or from some only. No one would say all, but it can’t be some either because he who sins in one is guilty of all (James 2:10). (17.5.8)

    4) Man would be giving something to God first (contrary to Romans 11:35). (17.5.8)

    5) Believers are the servants of God, and thus can do nothing that they don’t already owe. (17.5.20)

    Like

  42. Therefore …

    * He repeats that definition multiple places elsewhere,

    The only merit categories he repeats multiple places elsewhere are Christ’s proper merit and Adam’s improper (which he defines narrowly in terms of perfect and personal obedience, and which continues as the hypothetical condition of eternal life).

    * He relies on that definition to show that Adam was required to merit under the CoW, and

    He does speak in terms of a “broader” category, but he defines it narrowly and specifically in terms of Adam’s obedience, not in terms of the church fathers’ usage.

    * He relies on that definition to show that faith does not merit justification in any sense, and

    Again, he uses a much narrower definition.

    * He intertwines the definition of merit with the category of “condition.”

    I think the problem is that you are confusing the church fathers’ broad usage of the term (“for the consecution of any thing”, which FT illustrates using absurd examples) with FT’s category for Adam’s merit, had he stood, “which is called meritorious from that covenant in a broader sense.”

    These are two vastly different categories for broader merit.

    Like

  43. David,

    Thanks for putting all this together. I’ve read it carefully a couple of times and am working on a response.

    Like

  44. David,

    Thanks for laying out your view. I’m ready to wind our discussion down, so I’m going to (1) speak to the obstacles that keep me from accepting your view, (2) respond to some of your objections, and (3) give a final statement indicating why I think this is theologically important. In particular, I want to stress again the connection between Turretin’s categories as I have outlined them, and a proper distinction between law and gospel. In these responses, I will bring in others as confirming witnesses.

    I have valued your time and industry and hope we can speak again in the future.

    As I understand your view, Turretin uses “merit” in three possible ways:

    (1) Strict merit (which none earn save Christ);
    (2) Merit pactum, meaning, merit according to the terms of the CoW;
    (3) The “merit” of eternal punishment for Adam’s posterity under the terms of the CoW. (would “demerit” be an appropriate term here?). From this, the rest follows — your objections to my own view, and indeed the broader anti-Repub position.

    Just for comparison, I repeat my own read of Turretin:

    (1) Merit may be “strict” or “broad.”
    (2) Conditions may be antecedent, hence meritorious; or posterior, hence concomitant.
    (3) Under the CoW, Adam was antecedently required to have “broad” merit that was sincere, natural, perfect, perpetual. It is the antecedence relation that makes this covenant “of works.”
    (4) From this flows the rest of my points.

    Objections

    These are the major objections or obstacles to your reading as I see them. I would consider that all of these objections would need a robust answer before your view would be able to stand scrutiny as a viable possibility.

    (O1) Your method pieces together Turretin’s category of merit from three disparate sections dealing with three loosely related topics. This is contrary to Turretin’s standard category form. Thus, it is likely that you have discovered a spurious category.

    When Turretin creates a category or distinction, he has a somewhat standard “category format”:

    Distinction --> Detail --> Use.

    For illustration, we can consider a section that we both agree on: Topic 15 on Calling and Faith.

    He begins with a definition (15.1.1-3) of “calling.” He then distinguishes types of calling (visible, invisible, 15.1.5 – 6), then giving further detail and answering objections to the category (15.1.7 – 9), followed by giving additional distinctions (15.1.10). He then goes on to use that category of visible/invisible to answer an important controversy: Does God call all, and if so, is He a hypocrite? (15.2). Then follows a new category of Grace (sufficient v. efficacious) in 15.3ff, which follows the same format.

    We observe in 15.1-2 the pattern Distinction –> Detail –> Use, where “definition” is optional and rolled up into the Distinction section.

    This pattern is so typical for Turretin that I confidently generated our example by turning to an arbitrary chapter not involved in our discussion and going straight to the first question in that chapter. It was good odds ahead of time that we could find a distinction being made, details given, and then distinction used, according to the standard pattern. I could have picked almost any chapter and found several instances of that same pattern.

    The upshot is that we can easily identify when Turretin is creating a category: We just look for the structural clues.

    However, your asserted category of “strict merit/pactum merit/demerit” is not found in that pattern anywhere in the three-volume institutes. There is no place in which Turretin says anything along the lines of, Merit is of three-fold usage: The orthodox speak of strict merit, or else of merit pactum according to the terms of the CoW, or else of the demerit of punishment earned under the CoW.

    How great of a problem is this? Well, if Turretin did not address the definition of merit anywhere, then we might consider pulling in different sections to see how he uses the word variously.

    But given that he defines ‘merit’ in his usual pattern Distinction –> Detail –> Use in 17.5, it seems like a risky methodology to first ignore his own distinction, then cobble together your own from different sections. Given the evidence, your method seems likely to produce a spurious result.

    As confirming evidence, we consider what AA Hodge does with the same question:

    18. What are the different senses which have been applied to the
    term “merit?”

    It has been technically used in two different senses : 1. Strictly, to designate the common quality of all services to which a reward is due, ex justicio, on account of their intrinsic value and dignity.

    2. Improperly ; it was used by the fathers as equivalent to that which results in or attains to a reward or consequent, without specifying the ground or virtue on account of which it is secured.

    — Outlines of Systematic Theology 32.18. Incidentally, it is clear from 32.20 that he is deriving this from Turretin.

    Same category, but without the distractor of including absurd examples.

    So it appears that you have ignored Turretin’s really clear textual clues and instead cobbled together your own construction of his view. FT has a really clear structure that your view ignores and even dismisses.

    To address this objection, you need to first show why you can safely ignore 17.5, which explicitly follows the “category format”, and then further show why you are justified in piecing together your own distinction and calling it his.

    (O2) The question on conditions, 12.3, appears to be a strong falsifier for your view

    Turretin in 12.3 creates a category of conditions: There are two kinds of conditions.

    Condition is used either antecedently and a priori, for that which has the force of a meritorious and impulsive cause to obtain the benefits of the covenant (the performance of which gives man a right to the reward); or concomitantly and consequently a posteriori, for that which has the relation of means and disposition in the subject, required in the covenanted.

    — 12.3.2.

    The language here is unambiguous: There are antecedent conditions, which have the force of meritorious causes. All antecedent conditions are meritorious.

    Then there are concomitant conditions, which have the relation of means and disposition. No concomitant conditions are meritorious.

    This apparently strongly falsifies your view, since you claim that only the antecedent condition of the CoW counts as “merit”, which contradicts the plain language that “antecedent conditions have the force of meritorious causes.”

    Now for comparison, we pull up John Colquhoun, “Law and Gospel”:

    But conditions are of two sorts: antecedent, or consequent: antecedent, when the condition is the cause of the thing promised, or is that which gives a pactional title to it : consequent, when the condition is annexed to the promise, as an adjunct to the thing promised, or, as a qualification in the party to whom the promise is made.

    Notice “is that which gives a pactional title to it” – that’s merit pactum (as indeed JCol uses it in other places as well).

    So we have essentially identical categories from both men. FT is not speaking idiosyncratically, nor am I reading him idiosyncratically.

    [To be fair to your side: Colquhoun considers the land promises to be concomitant conditions. So he and I are not on the same page in every matter. But with regard to the basic category of condition, and its importance for the Law/Gospel distinction (O3), we are on the same page]

    Further, FT’s language here fits perfectly with his merit category of 17.5: Broad merit is any “the consecution of any thing.” Here in 12.3.2, he narrows a bit: A meritorious condition ” is an antecedent condition (hence, “merit pactum”, or “according to the agreement”).

    So the objection is simple: Turretin admits of only two kinds of conditions: those that are antecedent, hence meritorious; those that are concomitant, hence not. It immediately follows that any fulfillment of an antecedent condition is by his definition “meriting.”

    To overcome this objection, you would need to find a place in Turretin that overcomes the apparently clear, unambiguous, and elsewhere attested (Colquhoun) language of conditions.

    Now, you’ve given this a good shot with 12.3.15-16. However, 12.3.3 is controlling: the conditions of the covenant of grace are “a posteriori” and thus “instrumental causes”, not “antecedent.”

    Clearly there’s something going on in 12.3 that needs further consideration, since FT says that faith is both not antecedent and also that it is. This will be dealt with in the “Responses” post below. But nibbling around the edges is not going to overturn the basic category: There are two kinds of conditions. Antecedent conditions, when met, count as “merit.”

    (O3) Your view vitiates the distinction between the legal and the evangelical. As such, it unintentionally opens the door to Law/Gospel confusion.

    The CoW is legal and “of works” acc to Turretin because God required obedience as a condition for life: “Obey in order to live.” The CoG is gracious because God gives by promise the condition that is required. Hence, “Obey because you live.”

    The key difference between the two is NOT the matter of the condition, for perfect obedience is required in both. Instead, the difference is in the logical relation of the condition: perfect obedience is antecedent in the CoW (“Do this and live”), but consequent (because imputed) in the CoG.

    Theologically, this distinction functions for the Reformed as a kind of filter or net to identify and reject legalism. Anything required as a precondition is seen as a work. Hence, the CoG is not “of works” because its conditions are given concomitantly: We are brought into and sustained in the covenant by the work of Christ and not our own. Conversely, anyone who relies on preconditions of any sort (and not merely perfect obedience), counts as a legalist. This includes faith itself, which is why the Confession rejects the idea that faith is of itself meritorious.

    Here is John Colquhoun’s analysis, showing why faith is not an antecedent condition for justification or eternal life:

    Hence it is also manifest that, if any good quality or work of ours, were made the condition of our justification or title to eternal life; this would turn the covenant of grace, exhibited in the gospel, into a covenant of works. The covenant of grace, revealed and offered to sinners in the gospel, is the only covenant according to which, a sinner can be justified and entitled to life eternal. It is absolutely impossible that he can be justified, according to the broken covenant of works. But, were any graces, or acts, or works of his, the proper conditions of his justification; the covenant of grace, would be as much a covenant of works, as ever the
    … The condition of the one covenant, would be works, as well as that of the other; for works are still works, whether they be perfect, or sincere. All indeed who, according to the covenant of grace, attain justification, are justified by faith; but, it is one thing to be justified by faith, as merely the instrument of justification; and another, to be justified for faith, as an act, or work, affording a title to justification. It is one thing, for faith as an act of obedience, and as being seminally all sincere obedience, to give a title to justification ; and a very different thing, for faith as a mean or instrument, to receive a title to it. Faith, according to the gospel, gives no manner of title, to the smallest blessing of the everlasting covenant ; but it receives the surety-righteousness of the second Adam, which gives a full title to every one of them. It gives possession of nothing, in that gracious covenant; but it takes possession of every
    thing.

    — John Colquhoun, “Treatise on Law and Gospel”, p. 124

    And analyzing legalists

    The peculiar form of the covenant of works, or that which distinguishes it from every other contract, does not consist in the connection between the precept and the promise; but, in the manner of that connection. Obedience to the precept, is made to give a pactional title to the life promised. Eternal life is made so to depend on personal and perfect obedience, that without this obedience, that life cannot be obtained; it cannot be claimed on any other ground. But if the obedience be performed, the life promised becomes due, in virtue of the covenant. This being the manner of the connection, between the precept and the promise, of the first covenant; when this covenant was broken, that connection was as far as ever, from being dissolved. Eternal life, according to the covenant, will still follow upon perfect, personal, and continual obedience. It still continues true, ” That the man who doeth those things shall live by them.” But since no such thing as perfect obedience, is to be found now, among any of the sons of men; no man can have a title to life, according to the promise of that covenant. Thus, the law has become weak, not by any change in itself; but because men have not yielded perfect obedience to it. The reason, why it cannot now justify a man in the sight of’ God, or satisfy him with eternal life, is, because he cannot satisfy it, with personal and perfect obedience.

    Although eternal life was, in the covenant of works, promised to Adam and his posterity, on condition of his perfect obedience, and that only; yet, a man is to be counted a legalist, or self-righteous, if, whilst he does not pretend that his obedience is perfect, he yet relies on it for a title to life. Self-righteous men have, in all ages, set aside, as impossible to be fulfilled by them, that condition of the covenant of works, which God had imposed on Adam, and have framed for themselves, various models of that covenant; which, though they are far from being institutions of God, and stand upon terms lower than perfect obedience, yet are of the nature of the covenant of works. The unbelieving Jews, who sought righteousness by the works of the law, were not so very ignorant, or presumptuous, as to pretend to perfect obedience. Neither did those professed Christians in Galatia, who desired to be under the law, and to be justified by the law, of whom the Apostle therefore testified, that they had “fallen from grace,”(l) presume to plead that they could yield perfect obedience. On the contrary, their public profession of Christianity showed, that they had some sense of their need of Christ’s righteousness. But their great error was this: they did not believe, that the righteousness of Jesus Christ alone. Was sufficient to entitle them to the justification of life; and therefore they depended, for justification, partly on their own obedience to the moral, and to the ceremonial law. It was this, and not their pretensions to perfect obedience, that the Apostle had in view, when he blamed them for cleaving to the law of works, and for expecting justification by the works of the law.

    ibid, 22 ff, emph add.

    And Thomas Boston’s analysis

    How sinful and dangerous must the course of those be who practically corrupt the covenant of grace, pretending to make a covenant with God, as parties contractors and undertakers, for life and salvation, instead of taking hold of God’s covenant ; the carnal
    Jews did so corrupt it, looking for life and salvation, not for the sake of the promised seed alone, but for their obedience to the ceremonial and moral law: and thus do many to this day practically corrupt it. They think the covenant of grace is a promise of life and salvation upon condition of faith, repentance, and sincere obedience to the law : whereupon they consent to these terms, and solemnly undertake to perform them, and then, upon their (fancied) performance of them, they challenge life and salvation, as having done their part. This quite overturns the nature of the covenant of grace, Rom. iv. 4. and xi. 6.

    Thomas Boston, “Of the Covenant of Grace”

    (Notice that Boston goes further here than FT or JC, denying “condition” whatsoever! I read Boston as intending “proper condition” as he says elsewhere in the piece).

    All these men lay out the net to catch legalists: Anyone who makes salvation antecedently conditioned on anything, even faith or repentance, is overturning the CoG.

    But your view shrinks the net by conjunction. In requiring “merit” to satisfy two different conditions: antecedence and perfect obedience, you allow someone to say that “sincere, imperfect obedience is a condition for salvation” (no qualification) or even “precondition for salvation”, and the net fails to serve its function because the “perfect obedience” clause was not met.

    Anti-repub in general says that Israel was required to have antecedent, imperfect obedience to keep the land, which was “of grace” because perfect obedience was not required. Likewise, it is argued, we are required to have antecedent, non-meritorious obedience in order to inherit eternal life.

    Repub responds: No, any antecedent condition counts as “of works.”

    That’s what this whole fight is about, as I have said many times.

    So your understanding of merit breaks the net and lets in the legalists.

    To overcome this objection, you would have to … I don’t even know how you could overcome this objection. You would have to show that I am wrong to understand that placing works of any sort as an antecedent condition for salvation is legalistic.

    (O4) Your view confuses the form, or logical arrangement, of merit pactum with the matter of the condition of the CoW.

    As Turretin presents it, the form of improper merit (or a meritorious condition) is the logical relationship

    Antecedent condition + promised reward => condition met => reward given BECAUSE condition met.

    And the word “merit” (and associated terms “legal” and “or works”) have to do with the form. Hence, the term: “merit of the pact”, signaling that the merit occurs when the agreed-upon condition is met.

    Colquhoun makes the same distinction between form and matter:

    1. A precept, requiring perfect, personal, and perpetual obedience, as the condition of eternal life. The law of creation, requires man to perform perfect obedience, and says Do: but the law as a covenant of works, requires him to Do and Live: to do, as the condition of life ; to do, in order to acquire by his obedience, a title to life eternal. The command, to perform perfect obedience merely, is not the covenant of works; for man was, and is immutably and eternally bound to yield perfect obedience to the law of creation, though a covenant of works, had never been made with him: but the form of the command, in the covenant of works, is, — perfect obedience as the condition of life.

    — “Law and Gospel”, 16.

    It is not the matter (“perfect obedience”) that makes the covenant “of works”, but rather the antecedent relation between obedience and reward: “Do in order to live.”

    To overcome this objection, you would need to show that perfect obedience is, in general, a part of the meaning of merit pactum, and not simply the matter of the CoW. So far, you have only argued “by vigorous assertion”, as the saying goes.

    (O5) Your definition of merit does not fit well with the larger theory of the text

    In particular, these questions go entirely unanswered.

    * What is “legal” about the “legal economy”? And in what sense is that legal economy no longer operative for us?

    So far, your theory has not provided a coherent answer as to why this economy functioned the way it did, and as to why it was “legal” or “of the law.” It is clear why the moral law was legal (inasmuch as it repeated the matter of the CoW), but the ceremonial and judicial law? It had, acc to FT, “different stipulations” and “different promises”, including external expiation.

    At one point, we agreed that this was a “typological merit principle”, but I think you’ve since decided against that.

    So how does your theory fit with FT’s choice to call the legal economy “legal”, both the republicated CoW in the moral law and also the unbearable yoke of ceremonial law?

    * Why does Turretin deny that the Covenant of Grace is conditional in the sense of any antecedent conditions? What is his prize?

    Right now, you actually seem to deny that Turretin does this, appealing to 12.3.15-16 but again: 12.3.3 is really forceful, as is Colquhoun as cited above.

    So you need to explain how 12.3.3 fits into your larger theory of the text.

    To overcome this objection, you would need to give a big-picture understanding of Topics 11-12 and explain how your reading of “merit” fits within it.

    Forthcoming: “Responses”

    Like

  50. @ DGH: I’m not Zrim, for sure.

    @ Jack: “The legal economy was legal.”

    @ Erik: That’s just your individualistic interpretation.

    @ Kent: Who? Nevermind.

    Like

Leave a comment

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.