What exactly is so threatening about this?
Every Reformed minister loves preaching from Romans and Galatians. Presenting the Mosaic law as teaching a works principle really helps in explaining Paul’s doctrine of justification: what sin is all about, why people can’t rely on their own law-keeping, how faith is radically different from works, how Christ fulfilled the terms of the law so that we may be justified. That’s the gospel as I see it, but you can’t explain the gospel without understanding the law. Or take all of those Old Testament passages that call for Israel’s obedience and promise blessing and threaten curse in the land depending on their response. For example, the beginning of Deuteronomy 4, which tells Israel to follow the law so that they may live and take possession of the land. Or Deuteronomy 28, which recounts all sorts of earthly blessings in the land if the Israelites are careful to obey and all sorts of earthly curses if they aren’t. I don’t want a congregation to think that God was holding out a works-based way of salvation here, and I also can’t tell the congregation that this is the same way that God deals with the New Testament church when he calls her to obedience, for there’s nothing equivalent in the New Testament, no promise of earthly blessing for the church today if we meet a standard of obedience. Saying either of those things might by simple, but of course they’d be misleading, and damaging for the church to hear. (The Law is Not of Faith, 5)
Could it be that this view seems to allow Christians to think that law-keeping does not contribute to their salvation? Well, if the law requires “personal, perfect, and perpetual conformity and obedience thereunto, in the frame and disposition of the whole man, soul and body, and in performance of all those duties of holiness and righteousness which he owes to God and man: promising life upon the fulfilling, and threatening death upon the breach of it,” who is up to that challenge? Don’t be bashful.
Old Life 
Jeff,
I just knew you hadn’t refuted Bryan Cross without even reading your post because it’s never been done and never will be done.
Even by his wife.
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Responses
You object
DR: My question: Does this second (broad and improper) merit category actually reflect Turretin’s own view? For one thing, it would prove far too much, e.g., that believers merit (albeit broadly and improperly) forgiveness of sins, as in the Augustine citation. Another clue that he doesn’t personally endorse this notion is his observation, “The Romanists don’t deny the abuse of this word” (17.5.2), i.e., in the church fathers.
I reply:
Yes, it does reflect his view insofar as conditions are concerned, and not his only, but also the views of Colquhoun and Hodge the younger. I think I substantiated that fully in (O1) above.
Now, I admit that Turretin’s language is not universal. Hodge the elder treats of strict merit only (and would have Adam meriting in the Garden), and Ursinus likewise treats of strict merit only (Comm Heid Cat, Q91.VI). However, Ursinus takes the law in general to require a condition in order to obtain a reward, implying that a distinction between antecedent and concomitant conditions to be at the heart of the Law/Gospel distinction (ibid, Q92.I)
The absurd examples that we observe in 17.5.2 are not put forward to discredit the category of “broad merit” altogether – after all, Turretin uses it to describe Adam’s merit – but to show that not every instance of “merit” in the church fathers is of the strict sense.
Keep context in mind: FT lives in a time in which distinguishing and defending the Reformed faith against external (Romish) and internal (e.g. Arminian) errors is the order of the day. Topic 17.5 needs to be read in that context: He argues, There is no such thing as “congruent or condign merit”, which require virtue in the action itself; but not all “merit” in the fathers is of that sense.
Hence the ad absurdum examples. They are introduced to refute Bellarmine, not Kline.
You object
DR: When he refutes the doctrines of congruent/condign merit, he does not argue that they have been mislabeled as proper merit and would not be objectionable as improper merit; rather, he argues against them absolutely on the ground that sinners (whether believers or not) can’t merit from God.
I reply
Actually, I think that’s an incorrect objection. He argues that congruent and condign merit are impossible because it is impossible for creatures – not just sinners – to merit from God. He’s working from Bellarmine’s “merit properly so called” (17.5.5) and knocks it down as impossible for all creatures (17.5.7, 22). The sinfulness of fallen man is an additional argument, but not the chief one.
The issue for FT is the “intrinsic worth” of the works (17.5.14), which he denies even if the works are sourced in grace and not nature (17.5.17ff)
You object
JRC’s paraphrase: Turretin speaks of antecedent conditions in 12.3.15-16 and again in 17.3.14, 17.5.13. In all those places, there is no merit of man, yet there is an antecedent condition. This falsifies your [JRC’s] claim that “antecedent conditions are meritorious conditions.”
I reply
This is a good objection, in that it goes to the heart of the argument. What is going on in 12.3.15-16?
Short answer: Relative sense of the word “antecedent.” Strange as it may seem, faith is an “a posteriori condition, antecedent relative to repentance and obedience.”
Long answer: Let’s walk through 12.3. Coming into this section, FT has previously established that the conditions of the CoG are faith and repentance (12.2.29). However, both of these conditions are promised as gifts from God, with the result that that CoG cannot fail as the CoW did (12.2.30).
That said, FT announces his purpose: To preserve the conditionality of the CoG while continuing to distinguish Law and Gospel (12.3.1). He does so by creating a category: There are a priori and a posteriori conditions. The former are meritorious, the latter not. (12.3.2). Then:
These things being laid down, we say first, if the condition is taken antecedently and a priori for the meritorious and impulsive cause and for a natural condition, the covenant of grace is rightly denied to be conditioned. It is wholly gratuitous, depending upon the sole good will of God and upon no merit of man. Nor can the right to life be founded upon any action of ours but on the righteousness of Christ alone. But if it is taken consequently and a posteriori for the instrumental cause, receptive of the promises of the covenant and for the disposition of the subject, admitted into the fellowship of the covenant (which flows from grace itself), it cannot be denied that the covenant is conditional (12.3.3) (and proofs follow).
So there’s our lead: the conditions of the CoG are a posteriori and instrumental causes, NOT a priori and impulsive causes. And this distinction keeps Law/Gospel separate (12.3.6) WHILE preserving the obvious conditionality of the CoG (12.3.3, 12.3.10). It also preserves the “efficacy and immutability” of the CoG (12.3.7).
Then follows a discussion of whether faith alone is the condition, or faith AND repentance/obedience? (12.3.10). He then reiterates: faith is a condition ONLY as relatively and instrumentally and not materially, as a work; not as a meritorious and principal cause, but as an “organic and instrumental” cause (12.3.11-12). As far as I can tell, he is here repeating 12.3.3 using different words.
Within this discussion (started in 12.3.10) he then points out that faith bears the relation of instrumental cause only “in reference to Christ” as a means of uniting us to him (12.3.13); and our knowledge of its efficacy is only a posteriori from its effects, and not a priori from the (perceived) quality of our faith. (12.3.13-14). I take this to be a supporting argument to show that faith is instrumental, not principally causal.
Finally then he considers faith in relation to repentance and obedience, and he distinguishes them: faith is antecedent; repentance/obedience are posterior:
— 12.3.15
And then he goes on to assert that faith has instrumental cause in receiving Christ and his benefits, while repentance and obedience are the “mean and way” but not the cause of either justification nor eternal life (12.3.16).
What’s going on? He seems at first glance to be significantly retrenching. After expending much Latin to show that faith is not an antecedent condition, now here he says that it is.
I think a certain answer is probably impossible, but here is my take: In 12.3.15, he is speaking of faith relative to repentance and obedience. He continues to affirm that faith does not have the force of an “a priori, meritorious cause”, but is an instrumental cause (hence “a posteriori” per 12.3.3 and 12.3.10-11).
But relative to repentance and obedience, it is “antecedent” in the sense that it comes prior in the ordo: faith first, uniting us to Christ; then repentance and obedience.
This would be consistent with Calvin’s Institutes as well with all of the sources I cited back in our union discussions – but not, of course, Ursinus or AA Hodge who place justification as prior to union!
That’s my best shot at untangling this according to the text.
Here’s what I feel very confident about, though: He does not admit of faith to be “a priori” or “antecedent” in the sense of 12.3.2-3. Whatever is going on in 12.3.15, he is not so addled as to simply contradict himself.
And so it goes also in 17.3.14: Good works are antecedent in ordo but not in sense of an antecedent condition in 12.3.2. We are not rewarded with glorification because of the goodness of our works (a priori condition), but we are rewarded according to them after they have been done (antecedent to glorification).
In 17.5.13, there is a similar logic, oddly expressed: Works have a relation to reward as “means to end, antecedent to consequent” – but “not causally.”
In all three of those sections, I sense that FT is wrestling with how to describe something that is caused by grace, first to last, just as Eph 2.8-10 describes.
Hence: all antecedent conditions are meritorious, but not all “antecedences” are antecedent conditions. Some are simply antecedent relative to other things in the ordo. That’s my best shot.
You object
Regarding your claim that the Israelites merited external expiation by virtue of the sacrifices, I would argue in response: If so, it’s either proper merit or pactum merit (since for FT, there is no other). We agree it’s not proper merit. Neither is it pactum merit because that requires perfect obedience. Additionally, a number of FT’s arguments against congruent/condign merit also would apply here.
I reply
Since merit pactum does not mean what you say, but means rather “merit according to pact”, or “fulfilling an antecedent condition for a reward”, this argument falls to the ground. Nor do the arguments against congruent/condign merit help, for they are both species of “strict” merit for FT (in which the action has virtue of itself), and he argues against them accordingly (17.5.7).
But let’s take the objection behind the objection, which you have mentioned before:
You object
(JRC’s paraphrase) If the Israelites merited external expiation by virtue of the sacrifices, then we have mixed Law and Gospel in the Mosaic Covenant
(JRC adds) And anyways, why doesn’t Turretin call it ‘merit’?
Here, I want to be clear about what is NOT being said.
* It is not a question of whether Israelites could be justified by works in any sense. We agree this did not happen.
* It is not a question of Israelites finding favor in God’s eyes by their works. We agree this did not happen.
* It is rather a question of whether the works required under the ceremonial law were legal in nature; and whether the punishments levied under the judicial law were legal in nature, or whether both were of grace. The former I affirm, the latter I deny, but anti-repubs affirm.
* Hence, it is a question of whether we can look to the promises and sanctions under the judicial and ceremonial law, including the land sanctions, and take them as a model for temporal blessings and disciplines of believers. Are they the same in kind? I deny; anti-repubs affirm.
So at the outset, it is clear that there is no mixing of Law and Gospel in the repub position for the simple reason that the stipulated, typical, outward obedience did not have the promise of eternal life or communion with God annexed to it. Obedience to the ceremonial law, with respect to externals, did not provide forgiveness of sins. There was no “life” on the table, but only a picture of life. The stipulations and rewards were not of the substance of the covenant, but of its accidents, of the legal economy only, serving to teach through type in the service of the CoG.
Now, I want to be clear about what is and is not important in this question
* It is not important that we insist on the term “merit” (in the broad sense) to be used of the external commands, benefits, and sanctions under the ceremonial and judicial law. I believe Kline used this term purposefully as a polemic against Shepherd, but the term itself is not of the utmost importance.
* It IS important that we understand that the “legal cloak was legal.”
The external benefits such as external expiation were granted upon an antecedent condition such as sacrifice. The “yoke of ceremonies” set forth “what men owed what men owed and what was to be expected by hem on account of duty unperformed.” (12.7.31). And those outward benefits were “granted through the sacrifices” “without relation either to repentance or faith.” (12.7.39).
In that sense, those benefits and sanctions were “of works”, holding under bondage (Gal 4.3), and were hostile to us per Col 2.14. They served, NOT as a source of benefit and life, but as a source of misery, pedagogy, and tutelage. This is where Turretin takes the discussion in 12.7.34 – 41. The “external purity” and “free from all forensic punishment” were all in the relation of “bondage”, “rigor”, and “severity”, not to gospel promises:
As to spiritual punishment in the court of heaven, freedom from it could not be obtained by the sacrifices of beasts as such (12.7.39).
Hence, against the anti-repubs, I insist: Our blessings and disciplines are of an entirely different quality from the terms of this legal economy.
Now, I think that Turretin does not call this “merit”, while Kline does, because of their different polemical environments. Turretin is arguing against the Catholics in discussions of merit. To have brought up “merit” here – even though the logical description fits – would have clouded his argument.
Kline, meanwhile, is arguing in a context (much like today’s) in which teachers were boldly saying that God requires of believers an antecedent condition of imperfect obedience as a condition for obtaining eternal life. Kline’s point: That’s of works. Their response: But there were antecedent conditions in the Old Testament economy! His counter: That was of works, too.
That’s how I read the argument from 30,000ft.
As I have said before, I am not sold on using the term “merit” to describe the legality of the law. I think it causes an allergic reaction to many, and with cause. However, I am quite sold on being clear that the legal economy did not operate on the same principle that believers are under today. It was of works, and we are not of works. Believers in the OT were under bondage, relatively speaking, as “slaves in body, but not in soul” (12.7.36, 37).
We aren’t under the Law! That’s my big thesis, for which I will fight, die, and write horribly long posts about.
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@Jeff… “The legal economy was legal.”
Game over, man! Game over…
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Final thoughts:
Everything needful, and more, has been said above. My greatest hope for you is that you will consider more carefully the important relationship between the nature of conditions and legalism. Even if I, as a “repub in some sense” am a flawed messenger for that message, I hope that you will read Colquhoun and Boston side-by-side with the anti-repubs to see the huge gulf between.
And I hope that I’ve persuaded you, if nothing else, that the legal economy was legal. It operated on a principle of works, severity, bondage, rigor — and in the case of the ceremonial law, with respect to the outward signs over against the things signified.
If I’ve convinced you of that, then you can cheerfully be a crypto-repub-anti-repub. 🙂
But seriously, thanks for your time and efforts. May God bless you and keep you through no merit of your own.
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@ Jeff. Thanks from this spectator in the bleachers… “The legal economy was legal.”
Deut. 15:4b … for the LORD will bless you in the land that the LORD your God is giving you for an inheritance to possess-
5 if only you will strictly obey the voice of the LORD your God, being careful to do all this commandment that I command you today.
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Jeff,
Thanks for your thorough explanation of your objections to my view. I too have valued our interaction, but I’m happy to wind down if you’d like. I am considering what you’ve most recently written and will offer some responses as I am able.
First, a quick comment or two about how you’ve summarized our respective views….
As I understand your view, Turretin uses “merit” in three possible ways:
(1) Strict merit (which none earn save Christ);
(2) Merit pactum, meaning, merit according to the terms of the CoW;
(3) The “merit” of eternal punishment for Adam’s posterity under the terms of the CoW. (would “demerit” be an appropriate term here?). From this, the rest follows — your objections to my own view, and indeed the broader anti-Repub position.
Just for comparison, I repeat my own read of Turretin:
(1) Merit may be “strict” or “broad.”
(2) Conditions may be antecedent, hence meritorious; or posterior, hence concomitant.
(3) Under the CoW, Adam was antecedently required to have “broad” merit that was sincere, natural, perfect, perpetual. It is the antecedence relation that makes this covenant “of works.”
(4) From this flows the rest of my points.
A couple of things:
1. Whereas your summary of my position on merit in Turretin (and Reformed theology in general) is relatively complete; you have, for some reason, given only a partial summary of yours. To make it complete, in the interests of full disclosure, it seems to me that you would need to add (at least?) something like the following:
(4) Under the MC, Israelites merited external expiation by offering sacrifices; and national Israel was required to merit their retention of their land inheritance by their external obedience to the ceremonial and judicial law.
2. I’ll also observe that, even with that addition, you would still have an inadequate (and inaccurate) summary of the repub view. A more adequate summary of that view would be along these lines:
(1) Merit is defined according to the terms of God’s covenants, and thus, the traditional category of intrinsic merit is an unscriptural abstraction.
(2) Both Adam and Christ were required to merit the eternal inheritance by their perfect obedience, according to the terms of their respective covenants of works.
(3) Noah and Abraham merited, by their typologically legible obedience, temporal typological kingdoms (as covenants of grant) for their posterity.
(4) According to the terms of the MC, Israel was required to merit the retention of the typological kingdom by their typologically legible obedience.
Obviously Turretin and repub don’t agree in some important areas; but it’s still not clear to me whether you acknowledge this to be the case, and if so, where you differ with the one or the other.
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Jeff,
Following is my major objection to (or at least, question about) your overall position regarding Turretin’s discussion of merit.
Just for comparison, I repeat my own read of Turretin:
(1) Merit may be “strict” or “broad.
…
But given that he defines ‘merit’ in his usual pattern Distinction –> Detail –> Use in 17.5, it seems like a risky methodology to first ignore his own distinction, then cobble together your own from different sections. Given the evidence, your method seems likely to produce a spurious result.
First of all, I don’t know why you think I’m ignoring Turretin’s distinction. But more importantly, I am not clear as to how you understand his explanation of the church fathers’ “broad and improper” usage of the term “merit,” and especially why you think that their equivocal (as I understand it) usage is so important to preserving the law-gospel distinction.
If we could review 17.5.2 once again, Turretin distinguishes two uses of the term, “merit.” Here he is not giving an orthodox definition (after all, “merit” is not an article of the faith), but simply explaining how the term is used in the patristic literature. The definition he provides for the church fathers’ “broad and improper” usage of the term is, “the consecution of any thing.” He further explains that, “In this sense, the verb ‘to merit’ is often by the fathers put for ‘to gain,’ ‘to obtain,’ ‘to attain.’” He then cites several examples, such as: “The sinner ought not to despair of himself because Paul obtained pardon” (Augustine), “O Water! which hast merited to be the sacrament of Christ, which dost wash all things, and art not washed” (Ambrose), and “O happy guilt, which merited to have a Redeemer” (Gregory).
Now, if anything is obvious, it is that this is an equivocal usage of the term that does not actually signify “merit” in any meaningful sense.
You cited A.A. Hodge’s definition of improper “merit,” but I am unclear as to what you think that citation adds, since he appears to simply be summarizing Turretin. To your Hodge citation, we can add another one from R.L. Dabney, also a disciple of Turretin, also apparently summarizing Turretin’s initial explanation in 17.5:
Thus, according to the church fathers’ broad and improper use of the term “merit,” the works of the regenerate are meritorious (i.e., praiseworthy, approvable), and can even be said to “merit” eternal life.
I realize that the cash value for you in claiming this as Turretin’s view of merit is that it enables you to argue that the Israelites “merited” external expiation, and that they were also required to “merit” their retention of the land by their imperfect obedience. But if (in this “broad and improper” sense of the term), it can also be said that Christians’ good works are “meritorious,” and even that they “merit” eternal life, then how precisely does this help you preserve the law-gospel distinction? After all, according to your view, innocent Adam’s merit and that of believers (post-fall) are apparently indistinguishable.
IOW, your argument proves too much (as I’ve already observed somewhere above), and contrary to your purported intent, it actually blurs (if not obliterates) the distinction between the CoW and the CoG, since “merit” is apparently the same in both. Now, I have no doubt that you will disagree with at least some of what I’ve said here, but I don’t see that you’ve spoken to this objection yet, and if you’d like to, I’d be interested in hearing.
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Jeff,
Here finally are some thoughts in response to your first objection (perhaps a bit wordier than it needs to be).
These are the major objections or obstacles to your reading as I see them. I would consider that all of these objections would need a robust answer before your view would be able to stand scrutiny as a viable possibility.
(O1) Your method pieces together Turretin’s category of merit from three disparate sections dealing with three loosely related topics. This is contrary to Turretin’s standard category form. Thus, it is likely that you have discovered a spurious category.
As I see it, this objection fails to account for a number of things:
1. “Merit” is not an article of the faith, and thus, it is not to be expected that FT would give a comprehensive account of it anywhere, as he does with, e.g., “calling and faith” (the example you used to undergird the objection) or “justification,” etc. Therefore, though you have made some interesting observations regarding the basic structure of his teaching, it is not surprising that “[t]here is no place in which Turretin says anything along the lines of, ‘Merit is of three-fold usage: The orthodox speak of strict merit, or else of merit pactum according to the terms of the CoW, or else of the demerit of punishment earned under the CoW,’” and indeed it would be strange if he were to do so.
2. You argue: But given that he defines ‘merit’ in his usual pattern Distinction –> Detail –> Use in 17.5, it seems like a risky methodology to first ignore his own distinction, then cobble together your own from different sections. Given the evidence, your method seems likely to produce a spurious result.”
But I am not ignoring FT’s distinction in 17.5. In fact, a good deal of my understanding of FT on merit comes from that section, but that is not the only section in which he deals with the subject of merit, and since he nowhere gives a comprehensive account, it is necessary to gather from several sections.
3. To demonstrate that I am not ignoring 17.5, let’s quickly review that data again….
1) FT discusses two senses of merit used in the church fathers, (1) the first is strict and proper, meaning intrinsically worthy of the reward, and (2) the second is broad and improper, meaning, “the consecution of any thing.” Now, as I’ve observed, this broad and improper category is obviously SO BROAD and so improper that we (and FT) would agree that it includes things that are not meritorious in any sense, not even improperly, for example, “Paul merited pardon.”
Regarding the definition, “consecution” literally means “sequence,” though if you want to argue for a closer relationship, that’s fine with me. You cited A.A. Hodge: “What are the different senses which have been applied to the term ‘merit?’ It has been technically used in two different senses: 1. Strictly, to designate the common quality of all services to which a reward is due, ex justicio, on account of their intrinsic value and dignity. 2. Improperly; it was used by the fathers as equivalent to that which results in or attains to a reward or consequent, without specifying the ground or virtue on account of which it is secured.” Notice Hodge says that the ground for the reward is not stated. IOW, the improper merit in view here could just as conceivably be grounded on Christ’s merits (as in the example, “Paul obtained pardon”) as on the merits of whomever (or whatever) it is who “attains to a reward or consequent.” Thus, broad improper merit, meaning consecution (sequence), to gain, to obtain, to attain, etc., attributes merit to someone or something w/o the ground for the reward necessarily being stated.
2) Following FT’s definitions comes his list of five qualifications for intrinsic merit, which is concluded with his incidental observation that not even Adam in the state of innocence could strictly and properly merit. But then FT makes the caveat that “although (through a certain condescension) God promised him by a covenant life under the condition of perfect obedience (which is called meritorious by that covenant in a broader sense because it ought to have been, as it were, the foundation and meritorious cause in view of which God had adjudged life to him).” (Btw, this is in the only place in 17.5 where improper merit can legitimately be connected with FT’s concept of an antecedent condition as a meritorious cause, 12.3.2.) I agree with you that Adam’s broader merit in the CoW is a subset of the patristic broad merit usage (“consecution”) that FT had provided.
3) Now we can make a few key observations:
a) Swimming in that vast ocean constituting the entire set of consecutive things embraced in patristic “broad and improper” merit, there is the subset of things that we agree do not involve merit in any sense (not even improperly). For example, “Paul merited pardon,” but you I both agree that the forgiveness of sins Paul experienced was grounded on the merits of Christ alone and not one iota on Paul’s “merit.” We also know, due to FT’s explanation of how the controversies later developed over congruent and condign merit (when the later scholastics mistook the fathers’ broad merit for strict merit), that the fathers had written to the effect that the unregenerate broadly and improperly merited justification (later developed into the congruent merit idea) and that the regenerate improperly merited eternal life (later developed into condign merit). But of course, neither of these situations involve merit, not even improperly speaking.
b) Included in that same broad and improper merit set is another subset that includes innocent Adam’s possibility of meriting under the terms of the CoW. The distinguishing feature of this subset, and the way in which it contrasts with the one described above, is that Adam’s improper merit would actually have been grounded on his own obedience, “the foundation and meritorious cause in view of which God had adjudged life to him.” IOW (unlike the above examples), his merit actually was (broadly) meritorious.
c) Thus, within the set constituting patristic broad and improper merit, we can delineate at least two subsets, one of which is improper merit indeed (because actually grounded on the obedience of the one meriting), and the other which is not merit at all, not even improperly (because not grounded on the obedience of the one “meriting”).
d) Thus, an unavoidable conclusion is that, the mere fact that a situation fits the patristic definition of broad and improper merit does not entail that merit, even in a broad and improper sense, is actually involved. Therefore we are forced to conclude that not everything embraced by the patristic definition of broad and improper merit would be considered broad and improper merit by FT.
4. This question regarding FT (and Reformed covenant theology in general) on merit is a “big picture” sort of question which can be answered fairly easily by simply looking at the various covenants and their parties, for example: (1) We agree that according to FT, man cannot properly and strictly merit in any state, even that of innocence. (2) We agree that FT says that in the CoW, God condescended, allowing Adam to merit (more broadly) eternal life by perfect obedience. (3) We agree that sinners merit eternal condemnation. (4) We agree that the merits of Christ, properly and strictly speaking, purchased salvation for the elect.
I would think we basically agree on all of the above; where we would differ is that, whereas I believe this pretty much covers it; you think that additionally, under the Mosaic covenant, Israel/Israelites, whether believers or not, could merit things by imperfect obedience to the ceremonial/judicial law.
But my point is that taking a bird’s eye view of the big picture and observing obvious relationships is not the same thing as “cobbling” something together, especially if I am also paying attention to the details, which I believe I am.
To address this objection, you need to first show why you can safely ignore 17.5, which explicitly follows the “category format”, and then further show why you are justified in piecing together your own distinction and calling it his.
I believe I’ve met this qualification. I’m not ignoring 17.5, and I’m justified in piecing together a big picture account because FT does not give a comprehensive account of “merit” anywhere (since it is not an article of faith and only discussed as related to particular controversies), and thus if he refers to merit in other sections (which he does), I am justified in making use of those to supplement.
Next, objection (O2)….
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David,
Thanks for posting this. To check for understanding, your defense is
* That Turretin in 17.5 is not giving a comprehensive and Reformed understanding of merit, but an account of how the term is used in the patristics. In particular, “merit” is not an article of (symbol of?) faith, so that he is not concerned to define it in an orthodox way.
* Therefore it is legitimate to piece together a big-picture account.
* That account is not ignoring 17.5, but supplementing it.
Your position as articulated is that
* Turretin puts forward two ways in which “merit” is used in the patristics: strict and broad.
* Strict is according to the five characteristics.
* Broad is a very broad category encompassing anything in sequence.
* That category is so broad that includes instances that FT himself does not believe qualify as “merit.” This is one subset.
* It also includes at least one instance, Adam’s merit, that FT himself does believe qualifies as “merit.”
* Hence, not everything that would be considered “broad merit” by patristic usage would also be considered “broad merit” by FT.
Is this complete and correct? Do you also want comments at this time, or later, or never?
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Jeff,
Yes, that’s pretty much it. My point was that merit is not a doctrine of the Christian faith (i.e., to be believed by Christians), but is a merely concept that comes up in relation to the doctrine of good works; thus it doesn’t require a comprehensive treatment. And as you recently pointed out I think, the purpose of FT’s introduction to the patristic discussions of broad merit is to later demolish the scholastic perversions of it.
Nevertheless, I am realizing that he at least touches in 17.5 on all the categories I labeled, as follows:
1. Man can’t properly merit, no matter his state (17.5.7).
2. According to the CoW, Adam could improperly merit by pactum (17.5.7).
3. Sinners merit only condemnation. “… and the temporal delights of sinners are most worthy of eternal punishment…. The sins of the wicked are also rightly said to deserve an infinite punishment on account of the infinity of the offended majesty …” (17.5. 22).
4. Christ properly merited life and salvation for the elect: “Christ fully merited life and salvation for us; hence there can be no room for our merits” (17.5.18).
Finally, to nitpick a little, wrt your sentence, “It also includes at least one instance, Adam’s merit, that FT himself does believe qualifies as ‘merit,'” I would qualify that as improper merit, though I’m sure that’s what you meant.
But yes, I think you’ve got the basic idea. And yes, I’m always glad to hear your comments in response.
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(1) Good job. I think you’ve satisfied this objection, in the main.
Two things particularly helped. You rearticulated the position. Formerly, I understood you to be saying that there are two kinds of merit, strict and CoW. Now, you seem to be saying there are two kinds of merit, strict and broad, with CoW-merit being a species of broad. This brings everything into the framework he lays out.
I assume you will argue from here that CoW-merit is sui generis, the only species of broad. But that will be O2.
Another rearticulation is that you now express your view as starting with 17.5 and then supplementing from other passages.
With those two, I feel comfortable with your general method.
(2) Just to observe: The patristics come into play after the “used in two ways, broadly or strictly” sentence. That is, he does not limit his focus to the patristics.
(3) I agree with (3d) and yet I feel uncomfortable with it. I think both you and I have not quite got the exact sense of FT here. For we are arguing that he is saying, “there is broad merit, as evidenced by some things that are obviously not broadly meritorious.” And that seems not quite right, especially for FT, for it would be on its face contradictory.
I would propose that we need to think more carefully on this.
Rather than say that the extreme examples (or “abuse” — also in the Latin) are “not meritorious”, I think FT is presenting them to show how broad (i.e., specifically, NOT STRICT, Bellarmine!) the usage can be.
(4) As a followup to that: One way to understand the very broad usage is that “merit” in the broad sense is really not that big of a deal unless we are specifying what the specific condition and reward are.
So for example, to say that Israelites merited external expiation under the ceremonial law doesn’t carry the same freight as saying they merited eternal life under the moral law (which they didn’t).
(5) I’m going to argue that “consecution” be understood as a logical relation of antecedent to consequence, X because Y and not merely Y after X. Reasons:
(a) That is its strict meaning, (here)
(b) It is also the strict meaning of the Latin consecutione translated as consecution here.
(c) All of his FT’s examples are ones of logical antecedent to consequent, even the extreme examples.
(d) Hence also Hodge: reward and consequent are the consequence; ground or virtue are the antecedent; and those are logical, not merely temporal, relationships. By saying that the ground is not specified, Hodge is not saying “there is no ground”, but that it is not mentioned in usage:
He merited an ice-cream.
On what ground? It wasn’t said.
I know this doctor who commonly says (in jest), “He just earned a trip to the emergency room…” That’s a consecution: X because Y.
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Jeff, (1) thanks, (2) good observation, (3) I’m still pondering, but I think I agree that the point is the broad usage, (4) I don’t think I quite follow you yet (though I’m sure we’ll discuss it further), and (5) yes, I think that makes sense.
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Correction! “Y because X, not Y after X”
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Jeff,
I’m realizing I don’t quite understand your objection (O2). I’m not sure why you think that FT’s distinction between meritorious and concomitant conditions appears to falsify my view. You mind elaborating a bit?
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Certainly.
As I understand Turretin (and relying on Colquhoun for confirmation), he lays out two classes of conditions, which cover the two possible ways that things X with Y following after (in time) could be conditioned.
The one way is logically antecedent: Y because X, or “If X then Y.” These conditions have the force of meritorious causes (at least in terms of covenants, though I think he’s speaking more generally).
The other way is logically concomitant: Y because it always goes with X, or “Y only if X also.” These have the relation of means and disposition.
Your position, as I have understood it, is that the only “merit” possible for man in any condition, even in a broad sense, is CoW-merit.
But you have also agreed that the ceremonial law required antecedent conditions, upon which ground was given external expiation, to both believers and non-believers.
And since antecedent conditions are, for FT, meritorious causes, then at least one of the following would have to obtain:
* The ceremonial law requirement was a CoW requirement — impossible since believers were under the requirements also, yet we agree they were not under the CoW; or
* The ceremonial law requirement was (contrary to our previous agreement) actually concomitant and not antecedent (hence a CoG requirement) — impossible since unbelievers were not under the CoG; or
* Your view is falsified, since we have an antecedent hence meritorious condition that is not a CoW condition (but rather a part of the “intolerable yoke” that came with the reproclamation of the moral law).
That’s the objection. To attack it, I think you would have to show that there is a third class of condition, antecedent but not meritorious. But to do so plays right into O3, so be careful…
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Thanks, got it.
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Jeff,
Your objection (O2), as I understand it, goes like this: The ceremonial law granted external expiation on an antecedent condition. All antecedent conditions are meritorious. Ergo …
I can meet your objection easily enough by showing that the minor premise is false.
In order to do this, we can take a look at something by John Flavel, who has a more detailed discussion of conditions than FT (and Colquhoun), though I think they are in harmony. The following is from Vindiciarum Vindex, which I believe is an extended argument that the CoG is conditional. (I think there is more than one edition of the complete works of Flavel, but in my edition, this discussion is found on pp. 306-308.)
Flavel notes:
Flavel continues with a brief explanation of consequent conditions that parallels FT’s, after which he then goes on to discuss antecedent conditions:
Thus, contrary to the minor premise of your argument (as I formulated it above) it is not true that all antecedent conditions are meritorious, and thus your objection is met. (If you want to try reformulating your argument, or correct my formulation of it, I’d be happy to continue on this topic since there is certainly much more to be said about conditions in the CoG. Or we can just move on to objection (O3)….)
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David R., I thought you were debating FT. Now you bring in JF for help? Why not Paul?
No peace, no justice.
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David:
I’m confused by your response. Are you saying that “Flavel says, therefore Turretin is saying…” or that “Flavel says, therefore Turretin should have said…”?
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Jeff, I think that Flavel is clarifying the nature of antecedent conditions. I don’t think FT and JF are at odds.
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No, I don’t think your response disposes of this objection.
(1) The method is problematic.
Flavel is saying one thing
* Two kinds of conditions: Antecedent and Consequent
* Two sub-kinds of antecedent conditions: Those that signify the force of a meritorious cause, and those that do not.
Meanwhile, Turretin is saying another.
* There are two kinds of conditions: antecedent, which have the force of a meritorious cause; and concomitant, which do not.
They aren’t saying the same thing at all.
But could they be harmonized? Perhaps Flavel is simply making an additional distinction? He’s clearly read Turretin, since he cites him at a couple of points.
But not even there. Flavel seems to be carrying on a running gun battle with a Mr. Cary over the propriety of infant baptism. He has landed on the question of whether the CoG is conditional as part of the larger question of whether Abraham was under conditions, which in turn is part of the larger question of whether Abraham was under two covenants, one of works and one of grace.
In this context he states that faith is an “antecedent condition” — not of the meritorious kind, but of the non-meritorious kind. And here, he uses language very similar to FT, so similar that one could believe that he is either trying to reproduce FT or else is drawing from the same sources as FT.
And yet FT’s account is strikingly different.
First, because for FT a condition being “natural or supernatural” is a question separate from being “antecedent or concomitant.” (12.3.2(1 and 2)) For Flavel, being natural is rolled up into the type of antecedence.
Second, FT places the conditions of the covenant as concomitant conditions:
These things being laid sown, we say first, if the condition is taken antecedently and a priori for the meritorious and impulsive cause and for a natural condition, the covenant of grace is rightly denied to be conditioned. It is wholly gratuitous, depending upon the sole good will of God and upon no merit of man…But if it is taken consequently and a posteriori for the instrumental cause, receptive of the promises of the covenant and for the disposition of the subject, admitted into the fellowship of the covenant (which flows from grace itself), it cannot be denied that the covenant is conditional. — FT, Institutes, 12.3.3.
Is faith an antecedent condition? Flavel affirms, Turretin denies.
For Flavel, faith is clearly antecedent to justification, yet non-meritorious because it is of God. It is, in his words to describe antecedent conditions, an act upon which justification is suspended until we perform it.
For Turretin, faith is concomitant because eternal life is already purchased. It is not a work that obtains, but an open hand that receives (Inst 12.3.11e).
It is only when we get to faith in relation to repentance and obedience that Turretin now says that faith is antecedent in comparison to the other two. (Inst 12.3.16).
Flavel is even further from Colquhoun, who says:
Now conditions are of two sorts: antecedent, or consequent:
antecedent, when the condition is the cause of the thing promised, or is that which gives a pactional
title to it… — J Colquhoun, Treatise on Law and Gospel, 76.
(He then goes on to argue that the obedience of the Israelites was a consequential and not antecedent condition to land inheritance, which was guaranteed in title through the covenant with Abraham)
By contrast, Flavel says of a non-meritorious antecedent condition that it according to the constitution of the covenant, is required of us, in order to the blessings consequent thereupon, by virtue of the promise. And, consequently, the benefits and mercies granted in the promise, in this order, are, and must be, suspended by the donor or disposer of them, until it be performed.
That is, those non-meritorious antecedent conditions give pactional title to the blessings.
But when Colquhoun comes to faith as a condition, he says,
– ibid, 123 -125.
So on the face of it, this method is really messy. It is not at all obvious that Flavel is clarifying FT; nor that he is even trying to say the same thing as FT. I will grant: Flavel has clearly read FT. But he seems to be adding his own material to the mix.
I ask you: Are you comfortable with saying that “We are justified because of our faith, given by God”? That’s what Flavel is saying.
I’m not accusing him of heterodoxy per se or in general (!), but I think here that he is trying to reshuffle the classification of conditions in a way that is not Turretinic. And also … in a way that is problematic.
(2) But let’s suppose for a moment that Flavel and FT are on exactly the same page. In other words, let’s momentarily assume for the sake of argument that FT would have allowed antecedent, non-meritorious conditions.
Would this have helped your analysis of obedience to the ceremonial law?
Why … no.
For obedience to the ceremonial law, according to FT, gave external expiation without regard to faith. In other words, it was of natural strength for the non-believer at least.
And antecedent conditions that are of natural strength are, even for Flavel, meritorious: Such antecedent conditions which have the force of a meritorious and impulsive cause, which being performed by the proper strength of nature, or, at most, by the help of common, assisting grace, do give a man a right to the reward or blessings of the covenant.
So Flavel would give you non-meritorious antecedent causes if he were agreeing with Turretin (though he isn’t). But with regard to the specific question of the ceremonial law, he makes your life harder, because obedience to the ceremonial law is not one of those.
The basic dilemma for you seems to be this: If we make external expiation a benefit of the CoG, then you have a hard time explaining how it was available without regard to faith. If we make it a benefit of the CoW proper, then you have a hard time explaining its existence at all, much less how it could be available to unbelievers.
The only solution is that external expiation belonged to the external, legal administration of the CoG, whose benefits were dispensed legally rather than graciously.
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Jeff,
I understood your objection (O2) to be that FT says that all antecedent conditions are meritorious, and therefore offering sacrifices is meritorious because antecedent. But the fact is that, for FT as well as Flavel, antecedent is a relative term (I tried to explain this earlier), which requires one to ask the question, “Antecedent relative to what?” Is it antecedent to obtaining the benefits of the covenant, or is it antecedent to the covenant’s first application to the believer, or is it antecedent to the covenant’s perfect consummation, or is it antecedent to something else? FT uses the term in all these ways, and I cited Flavel as additional confirmation for this usage. (I think that FT and JF are easily harmonizable.) My point is that you cannot simply say, “External expiation required offering sacrifices as an antecedent condition, therefore the offerer merited external expiation by sacrificing.” IOW, contrary to your claim, FT’s discussion of conditions in the CoG is not in fact a “strong falsifier” for my view, because, contrary to your claim, not all antecedent conditions are meritorious.
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Is faith an antecedent or concomitant condition, according to Turretin?
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Relative to what? Relative to the institution of the covenant, it’s a concomitant condition, but relative to the application of the covenant it’s an antecedent one.
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Jeff, the solution to your conundrum is that when FT references a meritorious condition, he does not just say generically, “antecedent condition, but rather he specifies “which has the force of a meritorious and impulsive cause” (or something akin to that).
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David R., what? The solution isn’t Flavel?
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DR: Relative to what? Relative to the institution of the covenant, it’s a concomitant condition, but relative to the application of the covenant it’s an antecedent one.
That’s close, but that is not what he says. His actual words, please. (Partial credit for getting “both”, though)
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I don’t have a conundrum. I am very clear about what Turretin says, and pretty clear about what Flavel says, and about the similarities and differences between them.
I don’t feel a compulsion to make them be in harmony because, unlike Scripture, they are not infallible nor inspired and carried along by a common Author. Hence, it is proper to represent each man on his own terms, without trying to force one man into the other’s shoes.
And that’s why I’m rejecting your answer. For though it gets close, it interpolates your own mental structure which is not one that Turretin puts forth.
He doesn’t say anywhere that “we must first ask relative to what.” He doesn’t say that “faith is concomitant relative to … but antecedent relative to …” Importantly, he doesn’t say that “faith is antecedent in one sense, but concomitant in another.” And he certainly does not say that there are more than two kinds of conditions.
—
DR: he does not just say generically, “antecedent condition, but rather he specifies “which has the force of a meritorious and impulsive cause” (or something akin to that).
I know that you’ve been reading it like that, but that, also, is not what he says.
The text is plain enough:
* Two kinds of conditions
* ‘Antecedent’ is used for this kind
* ‘Concomitant’ is used for that kind.
So yes, he does use ‘antecedent’ generically, in the literal sense of that word: It denotes a particular genus of condition.
—
But as I pointed out in the response, none of your response helps you. For even if you carry the day and prove without a doubt that Flavel *is* the best representative of Reformed thought on the obscure topic of “classification of conditions” — still and all, obedience to the ceremonial law by unbelievers to obtain external expiation falls under the category of “by natural strength” and therefore is the wrong kind of antecedent for your cause.
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Jeff, maybe Wolfgang Musculus can help (kidding).
I do admire this discussion at some level, and stand in awe of your patience (and knowledge) but as you put it:
And so far, the majority of objections to repub have been historical (and most of the people objecting aren’t licensed to do history).
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Just for fun, and also because one might get the impression from this interaction that Turretin makes only one distinction regarding conditions in the covenant of grace, following is an overview of his analysis. (Note: I was able to do this without recourse to the term “antecedent,” because that term is not essential to the analysis.)
Distinctions:
1. meritorious/concomitant. The term “condition” is used either:
1.1. for that which has the force of a meritorious cause to obtain the benefits of the covenant (the performance of which gives a man a right to the reward), or
1.2. for that which has the relation of means or disposition in the subject, required in the covenanted.
2. natural/gracious. A condition is either:
2.1. natural, flowing from the strength of nature, or
2.2. supernatural and divine, depending on grace.
3. concerning the end/concerning the means. The federal promise of the CoG (i.e., what is granted by divine grace) is twofold, either:
3.1. concerning the end, i.e., salvation, or
3.2. concerning the means, i.e., faith and repentance.
4. in relation to: institution/application/consummation. The covenant can be considered either:
4.1. in relation to its institution by God, or
4.2. in relation to its first application to the believer, or
4.3. in relation to its perfect consummation.
Given the above distinctions, Turretin explains in what senses the CoG is unconditional and conditional:
In what senses is the covenant of grace unconditional?
1. Wrt 1.1 (meritorious cause) and 2.1 (natural condition), the CoG is unconditional, because its sole meritorious cause is the righteousness of Christ, and it depends entirely on the grace of God.
2. Wrt 3.2 (the means), the CoG is unconditional, because otherwise there would be an infinite regress (i.e., condition depending on condition, etc.)
3. Wrt 4.1 (its institution), the CoG is unconditional (in keeping with distinction #1).
In what senses is the covenant of grace conditional?
1. Wrt 1.2 (concomitant condition) and 2.2 (supernatural condition), the CoG is conditional, in that it is conditioned on faith (as the instrumental cause) and repentance/obedience (the disposition of the subject), both of which are supernatural gifts of divine grace.
2. Wrt 3.1 (the end, i.e., salvation), the CoG is conditioned on faith/repentance.
3. Wrt 4.2 (its application), the CoG is conditioned on faith, and wrt 4.3 (its consummation), it is conditioned on repentance/new obedience.
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And that’s why I’m rejecting your answer. For though it gets close, it interpolates your own mental structure which is not one that Turretin puts forth.
This is ironic, since your notions of merit in the Mosaic covenant are your own interpolations (as you admitted) into Turretin. If I were using your criteria, I would reject this entire conversation. But I do believe I’ve provided ample evidence that “antecedent” does not mean what you think it means.
He doesn’t say anywhere that “we must first ask relative to what.”
See distinction #4, above.
He doesn’t say that “faith is concomitant relative to … but antecedent relative to …” Importantly, he doesn’t say that “faith is antecedent in one sense, but concomitant in another.”
Not in those exact words, but I pretty clearly demonstrated that he does say those things.
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David R., here’s prooftext for that: Gal 4:2.
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David,
I did warn you that I was prepared to pound the table on this one. So with the understanding that this is *friendly* table-pounding:
DR:
Just stop right there. The words Turretin uses are ‘antecedent’ and ‘concomitant.’ Now you’re going to throw ‘antecedent’ out and replace with a different term?
That is an absurd method. He said what he said, and if you don’t think he should have said it that way, then man up and say so!
The terms as he distinguishes them are ‘antecedent’ and ‘concomitant.’ Antecedent conditions have the force of meritorious and impulsive causes. Those are his words. You cannot evade that fact by “re-analyzing” through “deleting” the “actual text.”
Your analysis through deletion continues…
DR: In what senses is the covenant of grace unconditional?
1. Wrt 1.1 (meritorious cause) and 2.1 (natural condition), the CoG is unconditional, because its sole meritorious cause is the righteousness of Christ, and it depends entirely on the grace of God.
BUT Turretin says,
Turretin:These things being laid down, we say first, if the condition is taken antecedently and a priori for the meritorious and impulsive cause and for a natural condition, the covenant of grace is rightly denied to be conditioned…But if it is taken consequently and a posteriori for the instrumental cause, receptive of the promises of the covenant … it cannot be denied that the covenant is conditional.
You need to be honest here. He does not say “the condition of the covenant is antecedent yet not meritorious.” He says quite clearly that it IS NOT antecedent, and that it IS consequent.
JRC: And that’s why I’m rejecting your answer. For though it gets close, it interpolates your own mental structure which is not one that Turretin puts forth.
DR: This is ironic, since your notions of merit in the Mosaic covenant are your own interpolations (as you admitted) into Turretin. If I were using your criteria, I would reject this entire conversation.
Mis-reading, again. The issue is not interpolation, but interpolating a structure that overrides the one already present in the text.
I’ll be transparent here. A few pages back, I admitted to you that Turretin does not use the specific word “merit” to describe the process by which Israelites, even non-believers, obtained external expiation through external obedience to the ceremonial law. He says all those latter things, but he doesn’t use the word “merit” to describe it.
Nevertheless, I reasoned that, given the categories he creates, that term is an appropriate way to connect the dots and explain the particular way in which the ceremonial law is legal.
When I admitted this to you, I was trying to model for you the process of being cognizant of text vs. interpretation of text. What the text says is one thing, what we think it means is another. In your posts, you often merge those two things together. They need to be separated, and I was trying to give a small example of how that is done by identifying the difference between what is actually said, and what I think he means.
You didn’t catch on. Instead, you took my admission and have used it several times now as a club against me. I thought you might, but I hoped that you wouldn’t. You did. OK, whatever.
But the point now needs to be made explicit: We all are stuck in a world in which interpolation, connecting the dots, interpreting, whatever you want to call it, is necessary. I don’t begrudge you the fact that you’re trying to understand FT, and not even through the lens of other authors like Flavel (though I think you’d do better to coordinate with 17.5 first). But there is a real difference between our interpretations and what is actually said. And my criterion for rejection was that your particular interpolation was in conflict with what he actually says.
David, I desire for you to become more cognizant of the difference between “what is on the page” and “what you think it means.”
Right now, those two things appear to be a confused mess in your head, which is why you put forward an analysis that removes the very term under discussion.
You seem determined that not all antecedent conditions should be considered meritorious, so you just deny that FT says it.
Until you can admit that what he says is that
then our conversation is stalled out. Maybe you think he’s unclear. Maybe you think he shouldn’t have said it. Maybe you think he’s just wrong. Any of those is a possible move for you. Denying the obvious — there’s no future in that.
Once we get past that point, then we can talk about what he says in 12.3.15-16, which is less than crystal clear, and at that point we will both have to do some interpreting.
</tablepoundmode=”off”>
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If my method is “absurd,” at least I’m in good company.
Geerhardus Vos:
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But there is a real difference between our interpretations and what is actually said. And my criterion for rejection was that your particular interpolation was in conflict with what he actually says.
More irony. My interpretation is an “interpolation,” but yours is “what he actually says.”
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David R., so we interpret Turretin by using the infallible Vos infallibly interpreted by Batzig?
Wow. Jeff should also pound your head.
BTW, Jeff said both of you are interpolating.
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Has it occurred to you guys that any theological point that takes this long to arrive it is probably not worth a damn?
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It’s kind of like when folks go 1,000 comments with a Catholic to reach the conclusion that one guy looks to Scripture while the other guy looks to the Pope. Eureka!
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Antecedent to what? To obtaining the benefits of the covenant. Consequent to what? To obtaining the benefits of the covenant. The terms “antecedent” and “consequent” are relative terms. That’s what Turretin says. Here’s how he outlines the various relations according to which various conditions are “antecedent”:
And now he explains how a non-meritorious condition (i.e., faith) is “antecedent” relative to the second of these phases of the covenant.
Antecedent to what? To the acceptance of the covenant. Subsequent to what? To the acceptance of the covenant. I’m not making this stuff up, folks….
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I largely agree that we are a dumbed down, simpleton population ever heading more that direction as we are inundated with pictures, moving and otherwise, and attention spans rivaling a gnat but this parsing has reached the level of pedantic and irrelevant.
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Sean and Erik, but you have to marvel at Jeff’s patience. It has to rival Flavel’s.
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I didn’t need this exchange to be impressed with Jeff. I also don’t think David R is chopped liver but c’mon already.
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Once more (sorry folks):
Antecedent to what?
What is its relation to obtaining them?
Are there any other kinds of antecedent conditions?
Antecedent to what?
What is its relation to the acceptance of the covenant?
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David,
The point is that your argument is not nearly as tight as you seem to think it is. This is evidenced in your most recent, where you cut and paste from 12.3.2 and 12.3.15, skipping over everything in between.
I’m trying to help you tighten it up. Either you’re right, and you can show that more clearly (and we all benefit), or you’re not, and tightening will help find the error (and we all benefit).
You need to start by simply acknowledging what the text says in 12.3.2.
How many types of conditions are there? What are their names? Their characteristics?
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Jeff is Mister Rogers on Crack.
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Pedantic thread locker:
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@ Erik:
Good morning, boys and girls! Today, we’re going to put Mr. Hamster in the microwave!
Shut the door … set the timer … in ten seconds … Pop goes the weasel!
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Actually, Fred Rogers was quite an admirable guy.
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Jeff,
A few things:
1. First, to answer your question,
How many types of conditions are there? What are their names? Their characteristics?
There are three types of conditions (actually three conditions). They are: (1) the righteousness of Christ, (2) faith, and (3) repentance/new obedience. Their characteristics (or rather, their relations) are, respectively: (1) the meritorious cause (of obtaining the benefits of the covenant), (2) the instrumental cause (of receiving the benefits of the covenant), and (3) the way we go forward (to the consummation of the covenant).
(It really amounts to the same thing whether we: (1) class the first condition only as antecedent and the other two as consequent, or (2) if we class the first two as antecedent [albeit in different relations] and the last one as consequent.)
2. But actually, our debate regarding antecedent conditions is academic because your major premise (of your argument supporting objection (O2)) is just as false as the minor. The fact of the matter is that offering sacrifices is not an antecedent condition at all, but rather a concomitant one. How so? Well, because offering sacrifices is an act of obedience, and obedience in the covenant of grace is a concomitant condition (condition #3 above).
That there was a capital penalty for disobedience doesn’t alter the foundational reality that obedience was non-meritorious (i.e., concomitant). Nor does the fact that someone offering hypocritical (and therefore unacceptable) obedience could get off scot-free (but only temporally). Nor does the fact that a disobedient believer would also be subject to the (temporal) penalty. (And since essentially the same principle was operative in the retention of the land, our debate should be ended….)
I expect a chorus of accusations of “flattening” and “muddying” and other horrible hermeneutical no-nos, but the din of the out-of-tune singing won’t be able to drown out Colquhoun’s (and yes, FT’s) affirmation of agreement with (not about) me….
3. You accuse me of contradicting FT’s explicit statements with my interpolations. But I can accuse you of the same, since you continue to insist that the legal condition is imperfect obedience even though FT says time and time again that the legal condition is perfect obedience (and even though you agreed with me that the only time he apparently says “imperfect” is in a mistranslation).
So, on to objection (O3) (assuming you still object)?
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