When You Hear Covenant of Grace Do Your Thoughts Turn to "Ministry of Death"?

(Inspired by a mealtime conversation at OPC HQ.)

If a pastor or elder talked about Moses’ ministry as one of death, he might be the object of a committee investigation. If an inspired author of holy writ says it, we may want to pay heed.

Now if the ministry of death, carved in letters on stone, came with such glory that the Israelites could not gaze at Moses’ face because of its glory, which was being brought to an end, will not the ministry of the Spirit have even more glory? For if there was glory in the ministry of condemnation, the ministry of righteousness must far exceed it in glory. (2 Corinthians 3:7-9 ESV)

Again, no matter what Turretin wrote, Paul’s comparison of the Mosaic Covenant to the gospel is one with which defenders of republication are trying to reckon. As Calvin explains, Paul doesn’t mean that Moses was chopped liver, but that the flattening attempt to render Mosaic administration a gracious development can significantly diminish the epoch-making work of Christ:

In the first place, he calls the law the ministry of death. Secondly, he says, that the doctrine of it was written in letters, and with ink. Thirdly, that it was engraven on stones. Fourthly, that it was not of perpetual duration; but, instead of this, its condition was temporary and fading. And, fifthly, he calls it the ministry of condemnation. To render the antitheses complete, it would have been necessary for him to employ as many corresponding clauses in reference to the gospel; but, he has merely spoken of it as being the ministry of the Spirit, and of righteousness, and as enduring for ever. If you examine the words, the correspondence is not complete, but so far as the matter itself is concerned, what is expressed is sufficient. For he had said that the Spirit giveth life, and farther, that men’s hearts served instead of stones, and disposition, in the place of ink.

Let us now briefly examine those attributes of the law and the gospel. Let us, however, bear in mind, that he is not speaking of the whole of the doctrine that is contained in the law and the Prophets; and farther, that he is not treating of what happened to the fathers under the Old Testament, but merely notices what belongs peculiarly to the ministry of Moses. The law was engraven on stones, and hence it was a literal doctrine. This defect of the law required to be corrected by the gospel, because it could not but be brittle, so long as it was merely engraven on tables of stone. The gospel, therefore, is a holy and inviolable covenant, because it was contracted by the Spirit of God, acting as security. From this, too, it follows, that the law was the ministry of condemnation and of death; for when men are instructed as to their duty, and hear it declared, that all who do not render satisfaction to the justice of God are cursed, (Deuteronomy 27:26,) they are convicted, as under sentence of sin and death. From the law, therefore, they derive nothing but a condemnation of this nature, because God there demands what is due to him, and at the same time confers no power to perform it. The gospel, on the other hand, by which men are regenerated, and are reconciled to God, through the free remission of their sins, is the ministry of righteousness, and, consequently, of life also.

Lo and behold, Calvin even seems to give room for — wait for it — a law-gospel hermeneutic:

. . . although the gospel is an occasion of condemnation to many, it is nevertheless, on good grounds, reckoned the doctrine of life, because it is the instrument of regeneration, and offers to us a free reconciliation with God. The law, on the other hand, as it simply prescribes the rule of a good life, does not renew men’s hearts to the obedience of righteousness, and denounces everlasting death upon transgressors, can do nothing but condemn. 392 Or if you prefer it in another way, the office of the law is to show us the disease, in such a way as to show us, at the same time, no hope of cure: the office of the gospel is, to bring a remedy to those that were past hope. For as the law leaves man to himself, it condemns him, of necessity, to death; while the gospel, bringing him to Christ, opens the gate of life. Thus, in one word, we find that it is an accidental property of the law, that is perpetual and inseparable, that it killeth; for as the Apostle says elsewhere, (Galatians 3:10,)

Inquiring minds are still inquiring, why is this threatening?

228 thoughts on “When You Hear Covenant of Grace Do Your Thoughts Turn to "Ministry of Death"?

  1. II Corinthians 3: 2 You yourselves are our letter of recommendation, written on our[a] hearts, to be known and read by all. 3 And you show that you are a letter from Christ delivered by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts.
    4 Such is the confidence that we have through Christ toward God. 5 Not that we are sufficient in ourselves to claim anything as coming from us, but our sufficiency is from God, 6 who has made us sufficient to be ministers of a new covenant, not of the letter but of the Spirit. For the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life.

    Romans 7:6–(But now we are released from the law, having died to that which held us captive, so that we serve in the new way of the Spirit and not in the old way of the written code).

    Romans 8: 2 For the law of the Spirit of life has set you[b] free in Christ Jesus from the law of sin and death.

    Octavius Winslow– some expositors, the “law of the Spirit of life” is interpreted of the influence or control exerted by the Spirit of God over the minds of the regenerate,supplying them with a new authoritative enactment for their obedience and regulation, as those whose course is guided by the Spirit. “The law of sin and death,” is by the same authority interpreted of the power of sin having its throne in the heart, and from its governing and despotic power, maintaining a supreme and dire sway over the whole moral man. The freedom, therefore, which the law of the Spirit of life confers upon those who are bound by the law of sin and death, is the supremacy of one principle over the force of another principle,

    But the interpretation which we propose is that which regards the “law of the Spirit of life,” as describing the Gospel of Christ, frequently denominated a “law”- and emphatically so in this instance- because of the emancipation which it confers from the Mosaic code, called the “law of sin and death,” as by it is the knowledge of sin, and through it death is threatened as the penalty of its transgression.

    .

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  2. more from Winslow— He looks not to the law for life; he rests not in the law for hope; he renounces the law as a saving covenant, and-in his marriage to Christ- he brings forth fruit unto God. Not a single precept of that law, from whose covenant and curse he is released by this act of freedom, is compromised. All its precepts, embodied and reflected in the life of Christ- whose life is the model of our own- appear more clear and resplendent than ever they appeared before. The obedience of the Lawgiver enhanced the luster of the law, presenting the most impressive illustration of its majesty and holiness that it could possibly receive.

    The instrument to whose agency this exalted liberty is ascribed is the “law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus.” The term law is forensic, frequently used in God’sWord to designate the Gospel of Christ. “Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No;but by the law of faith.” In this sense we hold that the word is used in the text, to designate the Gospel of the blessed God, as the great instrument by which the freedom of which we have spoken is obtained.

    The Gospel is the law which reveals the way of salvation by Christ. It is the development of God’s great expedient of saving man. It speaks of pardon and adoption, of acceptance and sanctification, as all flowing to us through faith in his dear Son…. The Gospel proves a “savor of life unto life,” to all who believe in it

    But John Piper disagrees with Winslow—-Now I want to stop and make sure that you are hearing what I believe the Scripture is saying, because it is not commonly said, but our lives hang on it. There is a real sense in which our justification depends on our sanctification. Whether we are acquitted before God depends on whether the law of the Spirit of life has freed us from the law of sin and death

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  3. Darryl, isn’t it threatening because it wrecks the fundamental unity of the old and the new?–and that’s the heartbeat of covenant theology and the teaching of the WCF. So you have to adopt some way of reading those passages that doesn’t do that. I don’t really have a problem with the republication idea as long as it keeps an element of the Covenant of Grace in the Mosaic Covenant. Everything I’ve read from Kline, Irons, and others does this. But I think that an extreme version of this puts asunder the two administrations of the one Covenant of Grace and leads us to a Dispensational version where old Israel is saved by works and the church is saved by grace. That’s what the critics are concerned about.

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  4. Terry, are you kidding? You’ve read Hebrews, Paul, the OT? How exactly is Christianity like OT Judaism?

    Dispensationalists’ problem (among others) is not paying sufficient attention to the sacrifices. It’s not about works. It’s about payment for sin. You want continuity, look for the blood. One’s a type, the other’s the real deal.

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  5. The answer is that it’s not. Rather, like almost everything else Calvin wrote, it’s consoling. (But then again–to point out the obvious–there’s nothing there about sinners meriting temporal blessings by their imperfect obedience.)

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  6. “But I think that an extreme version of this puts asunder the two administrations of the one Covenant of Grace and leads us to a Dispensational version where old Israel is saved by works and the church is saved by grace. That’s what the critics are concerned about.”

    Terry, could you tell us who does this?

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  7. David R., so you’re willing to write more than three hundred comments simply over the issue of “sinners meriting temporal blessings by their imperfect obedience”? How is that a threat to the gospel? I believe credo baptism is a problem? I think it’s probably more of a problem than telling believers about how they gain temporal blessings. But is it against the gospel?

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  8. Darryl, if there’s a sacrifice for sin then it’s a covenant of grace. Surely you’re not saying that the WCF disagrees with Paul and Hebrews here. The substance of OT Judaism is Christ. Christ, our Passover, is sacrificed for us.

    Joel, I’m not sure anyone does this. That’s why I tend to sympathize with the republication it’s and think this is a tempest in an OPC teapot.

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  9. D.G., but do you acknowledge that “sinners meriting temporal blessings by their imperfect obedience” is a problem?

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  10. Yes, since its a tempest in an OPC teapot it’s not just small, it’s really small. But it still sucks when you’re in the teapot.

    from within the geographical bounds of a very unhappy OPC presbytery

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  11. David,

    The problem is actually in the opposite direction. The problem is not seeing the works/merit principle in the MC and therefore adding works as a condition for the cov. of grace to be fulfilled, thus flattening out the covenants to the point where the new cov. can be broken as the old was, a point that destroys the “better” of the new. If it is okay for the Lord to republish the original cov. of works in the Law of Moses, that upon perfect obedience eternal blessedness is granted to any who can obey every law perfectly, then the Lord certainly can do this on the typological level, since both are hypothetical because sinners can do neither.

    “Zechariah casts his prophecy of Christ and the church in the prophetic idiom, employing the old typological order to depict the new covenant realities. And according to the covenantal constitution for that old order, corporate Israel must earn the continuing enjoyment of the typological kingdom inheritance by their obedience. This works principle is a conspicuous feature of the sanctions section of the Mosaic treaties. [Endnote 32: Cf. e.g., Lev 18:5; Deut 28:1, 9, 13, 15; 30:15–20. As Paul’s appeal to Lev 18:5 shows (Rom 10:5; Gal 3:12), a legal principle of meritorious works was operating in the Torah covenant opposite to the gospel principle of grace.] Expressing things in old covenant terms, Zechariah therefore says that God’s kingdom of glory is the reward for the probationary obedience of the elect corporately. In the light of the total Scriptural revelation, we understand, however, that this act of probationary obedience is performed not by them but by Christ their federal representative—by the one for the many. It is a righteousness of God imputed to the elect by grace through faith …” (Kline, GOM 236-37)

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  12. David R., if someone is affirming that while defending the gospel, I’m not sure what the problem is. I mean, isn’t it the case that Jeff Cagle earns crowns by imperfect obedience? I still don’t know to what you object.

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  13. David R., I’ll answer for Todd. So far the anti-repubs I’ve read are flatteners.

    BTW, repub is not Kline. You and Jeff have not exactly been dissecting Kingdom Prologue.

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  14. David,

    We went over this before, but for clarity will repeat it. If you get the covenant of grace right it doesn’t matter too much if you misunderstand the typology that leads to it. It is a difficult subject after all. It seems you may have come into contact with some over-eager Klineans who suggested Kline’s view was a standard view of the fathers, or that only Klineans get the gospel or are truly reformed. That is not me. But as Darryl said, it is some who are opposing Kline and the works principle in the MC who are dangerously close to adding works to grace in the new covenant. A good antidote for that is to see the works principle between God and Israel contrasted with the grace principle of the gospel. Another good antidote is to know your systematic theology. Which is why I have said when Murray explains justification I am in full agreement; I just do not think he is fully consistent in positively comparing the MC with the COG, but C’est la vie.

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  15. D.G., I am quite sure you know exactly what I object to. And you also know that repub is not found in Calvin or Turretin, which explains your strange bedfellows when it comes to this particular issue.

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  16. David R., I don’t know your objection other than that you have some personal thing with Kline. You’re the guy who responded to this post about ministry of death by wondering about imperfect merits for temporal blessings. Well, how big a deal is that? You still haven’t — get this — answered my question.

    BTW, on the matter of biblicism, it is a different matter to appeal to the confession of the church than to a single theologian. But I’m not sure you can tell the difference if you’re following Frame.

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  17. Not standing in the Klinean tradition (I feel the need to state that…all about me) there are other repbulication options. Readers paying close attention to both the commencement (Ex 19) and conclusion (Ex 24) will see the multifaceted character of the Mosaic economy. It begins with smoke and fear and concludes with grace and fellowship. The former serves the latter.

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  18. D.G., the point is that the controversy isn’t about whether or not the law is a ministry of death. Maybe you can do another post asking what’s so threatening about sinners meriting temporal blessings by imperfect obedience.

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  19. Matt: Not standing in the Klinean tradition (I feel the need to state that…all about me) there are other republication options.

    Right. The real dividing line seems to be “simple repub” or “three-fold repub”: Is the CoW republished only in the sense of the Decalogue, or does the entirety of the moral, ceremonial, and civil reflect a works-principle in addition to (alongside of) a grace-principle?

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  20. DR: Maybe you can do another post asking what’s so threatening about sinners meriting temporal blessings by imperfect obedience.

    Go.

    It would help to lay out the definition of “merit” you’re working from, then explain why it is a problem to say that sinners merit temporal blessings by imperfect obedience. Three sentences, maybe?

    Then, since you agree that Israel stayed in the land on condition of their imperfect obedience, explain how this is different from “meriting”, by your definition. Again, three sentences or so.

    And then wrap up by explaining how non-believers in Israel obtained those temporal blessings. I’m guessing five sentences?

    All that would help to advance the state of the question mightily.

    Best,

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  21. It would be sadly ironic if the OPC, which wrote probably the best paper against the Federal Vision, committed the same errors as the Federal Vision in adding works to grace in the new covenant. It would show that, while theological errors can be battled against, they never fully go away.

    We always want to think that our being good people has something to do with our salvation.

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  22. David – “Maybe you can do another post asking what’s so threatening about sinners meriting temporal blessings by imperfect obedience.”

    How imperfect? Very imperfect or kinda sorta imperfect?

    We also have to ask why imperfect obedience or even really good obedience can often lead to no temporal blessing. Like when an obedient Christian dies of cancer at age 25.

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  23. Jeff, since you and I already have our hands full, I should really pass. But let me give it a shot:

    It would help to lay out the definition of “merit” you’re working from, then explain why it is a problem to say that sinners merit temporal blessings by imperfect obedience. Three sentences, maybe?

    For my answer, I will simply quote A.A. Hodge (sorry, there will be a few additional sentences):

    (1.) The word “merit,” in the strict sense of the term, means that common quality of all actions or services to which a reward is due, in strict justice, on account of their intrinsic value or worthiness. It is evident that, in this strict sense, no work of any creature can in itself merit any reward from God; because — (a.) All the faculties he possesses were originally granted and are continuously sustained by God, so that he is already so far in debt to God that he can never bring God in debt to him. (b.) Nothing the creature can do can be a just equivalent for the incomparable favour of God and its consequences.

    (2.) There is another sense of the word, however, in which it may be affirmed that if Adam had in his original probation yielded the obedience required, he would have “merited” the reward conditioned upon it, not because of the intrinsic value of that obedience, but because of the terms of the covenant which God had graciously condescended to form with him. By nature, the creature owed the Creator obedience, while the Creator owed the creature nothing. But by covenant the Creator voluntarily bound himself to owe the creature eternal life, upon the condition of perfect obedience.

    It is evident that in this life the works of God’s people can have no merit in either of the senses above noticed. They can have no merit intrinsically, because they are all imperfect, and therefore themselves worthy of punishment rather than of reward. They can have no merit by covenant concession on God’s part, because we are not now standing in God’s sight in the covenant of works, but of grace, and the righteousness of Christ, received by faith alone, constitutes the sole meritorious ground upon which our salvation, in all of its stages, rests. See chapter. xi., on Justification. (Westminster Confession Commentary, chapter 16, sections 4-6)

    Then, since you agree that Israel stayed in the land on condition of their imperfect obedience, explain how this is different from “meriting”, by your definition. Again, three sentences or so.

    The answer should be clear from the above Hodge citation.

    And then wrap up by explaining how non-believers in Israel obtained those temporal blessings. I’m guessing five sentences?

    As is also clear from the Hodge citation, they did not obtain them by merit. Maybe the principle is similar (or identical) to that whereby Ishmael and Esau obtained temporal blessings?

    So glad I could help mightily advance the state of the question….

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  24. Brandon,

    I’m with you. I think those two men did a great job on republication. As far as Kline agreeing with older writers, I see it as development more than exact representation, at least with guys like Owen, Hodge, etc., but developing ideas that had not been developed before. Sorta like Vos. When you read Vos you see some insights and read some things phrased in ways you never have seen before. I think Kline stood on the shoulders of Vos and continued to develop OT biblical theology into clearer explanations and distinctions. It is not enough to simply say the older writers did not use phrases like typological merit; one must show how a certain view was rejected by them all, though often they were answering questions on merit not even raised by Kline. And IMHO, a charitable reading of Kline, even by those who disagree, would see that what he means by Israel’s typological merit does not threaten the Bible’s teaching on grace or original sin.

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  25. DG…I’m affirming the legal requirement of Sinai which was unattainable…hence smoke and fear. If one used Sinai to achieve life it most certainly was a ministry of death. Law always requires perfect obedience never relative obedience. The unnatanability of it drives us to the grave of the Mosaic Cov.

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  26. @ David R: Good, thanks.

    Your argument is logically clear up through the first two points, and I agree with the logic of the argument: IF we are restricted to the two senses of merit you present, THEN it follows that “obtaining temporal blessings by meriting obedience” would either be ludicrous (under strict merit) or else would be blasphemous (under “meriting by the CoW”). So far, so good.

    But then you stumble and have no answer in the third point — “maybe like Ishmael?”

    And this is the key point. For neither Ishmael nor Esau were under the legal economy, so “maybe like Ishmael” is already wrong. So we have this puzzle: what was happening in the legal economy? How were temporal blessings, such as external ceremonial cleanliness, obtained in the legal economy?

    Let’s see if we can rescue this situation in eleven sentences or less.

    Let’s take a third definition of merit, one attested to by Turretin, AA Hodge, and Colquhoun: To merit (in the broad sense) is to obtain by meeting an antecedent condition. To demerit is to be punished for failing to meet an antecedent condition.

    Under this definition, the legal economy (in the civil and ceremonial law only) required meriting of external, temporal blessings by meeting the condition of external obedience, while of course the moral law required hypothetically the meriting of eternal life by perfect, perpetual obedience.

    It is clear that this account does not threaten the integrity of the covenant of grace, as can be clearly seen by comparing to AA Hodge above. Rather, it emphasizes that “that dispensation was carnal, whereas this dispensation is spiritual” (Hodge, Comm WCF, Chap 7; compare also Turretin and Colquhoun, not to mention Witsius …).

    The prize in stating it like this is to emphasize, over against Fuller et al, that there are two types of conditions: antecedent and consequent. All of the blessings obtained in the new covenant are obtained consequently; the blessings and curses threatened in the legal economy were obtained antecedently.

    This now provides a clear answer to the question “What about unbelieving Israelites?” that does not pose a threat in the slightest to the integrity of the covenant of grace.

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  27. By contrast, btw, to say that the external blessings were obtained under the CoG does pose a threat to the integrity of the CoG.

    For unbelievers are unable to obtain, except inasmuch as they are federally related. Yet in the legal economy, unbelievers obtained outward blessings every bit as much as believers, on condition of providing the correct sacrifices, etc.

    Likewise, believers are unable to finally fall away or be destroyed, yet in the legal economy, believers were subject to the same curses as unbelievers, on condition of disobedience.

    So to oppose the account above would, it seems to me, “flatten” the state of believers and unbelievers within the covenant of grace (as opposed to “within the legal economy”).

    That’s why I fight so hard on this point.

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  28. All the Republicationists that I know hold to the position because they are convinced that Paul teaches it. Our frustration (speaking as one) is that, though Paul teaches it, he gets lost in the intra-Reformed dialogue–usually by being buried under an avalanche of Reformed theologians who do not share his interpretation of redemptive history. As Repubs see it: Paul’s so-called difficult statements about the Law (cf. II Corinthians 3 cited above) are really not all that difficult–unless you’re reading them from a Westminster-inspired perspective, which has a tough time accounting for them. From his vantage-point at the end of redemptive history, Paul looks back and surveys the terrain from Creation to Jesus’ resurrection. He also reinterprets the function of the Sinai Covenant (= the Law) in light of Abraham and Jesus. Some of his conclusions on this subject rub Westminster Confession folk the wrong way because Paul doesn’t teach what they teach–indeed, Paul doesn’t always share their categories for their understanding of the Law. For those of an anti-Repub bent, please, please read Doug Moo’s (now ancient) article on the meaning of Nomos: http://djmoo.com/articles/lawandlegalism.pdf. And if you haven’t read it, please, pretty-please read T. David Gordon’s article “Abraham and Sinai Contrasted” (which is his chapter from TLNF): http://www.tdgordon.net/theology/abraham_and_sinai_contraste.pdf. Pretend that he never mentions John Murray in the article so that, if you’re a Murray fan, you won’t be distracted from the main point (which is convincing). We tend to line up our theologians like European soldiers on 18th century battlefields. Oddly, sometimes those theologians are facing each other! Repubs love the old theologians, but they hold the repub position, not because Kline taught it, but because they believe Saint Paul teaches it. I would love to confine the discussion within the boundaries of the New Testament.

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  29. Jeff, so your answer to your question, “How did non-believers in Israel obtain temporal blessings?” is … what? (You never stated it.) They merited them? And they did so under the covenant of grace? If you think that notion “does not pose a threat in the slightest to the integrity of the covenant of grace,” then I’m not sure what to tell you.

    But regarding your “third definition of merit, one attested to by Turretin, AA Hodge, and Colquhoun,” as I think I have adequately demonstrated in the other thread, you have (1) clearly misunderstood their definition (I still await your response), (2) applied your misunderstanding to the ceremonial and civil law only (in abstraction from the moral), and (3) ignored the places where Turretin, Hodge, and Colquhoun clearly contradict your conclusions. That’s a lot of “interpolating,” isn’t it?

    No thanks, I think I’ll stick with Reformed theology.

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  30. David R: “How did non-believers in Israel obtain temporal blessings?” is … what? (You never stated it.) They merited them? And they did so under the covenant of grace?

    Slow down. Your question was answered directly above.

    David R: But regarding your “third definition of merit, one attested to by Turretin, AA Hodge, and Colquhoun,” as I think I have adequately demonstrated in the other thread, you have (1) clearly misunderstood their definition (I still await your response)

    No, you have my response. Objections O1 and O2 are very clear (and are as of yet unanswered), and you have provided no evidence of “contradictions” to Turretin. You of course provide plenty of contradictions to R, David, but I think we agree that that’s not the same thing.

    But we’re just going to bang our heads against a wall here, so perhaps this one question should be the point of focus:

    If, hypothetically, you were to accept the third sense of “meriting” as given above, would you agree that the rest is logically correct and consistent with Reformed Theology in general? If not, indicate where (without referring to the two senses of “merit” that you have defined above).

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  31. Jeff,

    But then you stumble and have no answer in the third point — “maybe like Ishmael?”

    And this is the key point. For neither Ishmael nor Esau were under the legal economy, so “maybe like Ishmael” is already wrong.

    The point is that the enjoyment of temporal blessings was nothing more than what God had also promised to Ishmael, Esau, and Moab. Believing Israelites recognized that their true inheritance was a heavenly one, and therefore, they did not put too much stock in temporal blessings, nor did they despair over the loss of them. For them, their ultimate inheritance in the heavenly kingdom was guaranteed by grace through faith; whereas unbelievers would just as certainly be ultimately purged from the inheritance (no matter their temporary enjoyment of material blessings).

    I think this account is far preferable to the notion that unbelievers merited temporal blessings.

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  32. Jeff,

    No, you have my response. Objections O1 and O2 are very clear (and are as of yet unanswered), and you have provided no evidence of “contradictions” to Turretin.

    And you have my response. Your objections O1 and O2 (as well as your other three) both hinge on your misreading of Turretin on merit. Again, here is R.L. Dabney:

    To clear up this matter, let us observe that the word merit is used in two senses, the one strict or proper, the other loose. Strictly speaking, a meritorious work is that to which, on account of its own intrinsic value and dignity, the reward is justly due from commutative justice. But when men use the word loosely, they include works deserving of approval, and works to which a reward is anyhow attached as a consequence. Now, in these latter senses, no one denies that the works of the regenerate are meritorious. They are praiseworthy, in a sense. They are followed by a recompense. But in the strict sense, of righteously bringing God in the doer’s debt, by their own intrinsic moral value, no human works are meritorious. The chief confusion of thought, then, which is to be cleared away, is that between the approvable and the meritorious. An act is not meritorious, only because it is morally approvable.

    So in which sense did unbelievers “merit” temporal blessings? Was it a matter of the intrinsic value of their work, or was it in the same sense that the regenerate “merit” eternal blessings?

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  33. David R., “I think this account is far preferable to the notion that unbelievers merited temporal blessings.”

    Why? Children of believers inherit temporal blessings all the time whether or not they profess true faith.

    And don’t forget about the so-called common grace phenomenon. Hard work, self-denial, paying taxes gets unbelievers all sorts of temporal blessings. Just ask Erik. And do remember our friend Patrick Ramsey who compares Israel’s temporal blessings to all the crowns Jeff has merited in being patient with you.

    Up which tree are you barking?

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  34. Why? Children of believers inherit temporal blessings all the time whether or not they profess true faith.

    And don’t forget about the so-called common grace phenomenon. Hard work, self-denial, paying taxes gets unbelievers all sorts of temporal blessings.

    Exactly.

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  35. If, hypothetically, you were to accept the third sense of “meriting” as given above, would you agree that the rest is logically correct and consistent with Reformed Theology in general? If not, indicate where (without referring to the two senses of “merit” that you have defined above).

    The problem with your definition is in the ambiguous term “antecedent.” If by that term, you mean something like “meritorious cause,” then first of all, you didn’t get this definition from Turretin, Hodge or Dabney; and secondly, you are begging the question by applying your definition to unbelieving Israelites offering sacrifices. But if otoh, you simply mean something that comes first, in keeping with Turretin’s “the consecution of any thing” (and Dabney’s explanation), which entails the notion that believers “merit” eternal life, then I would hope the problem is obvious.

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  36. Hi Dr. Hart,

    Thanks for this post. It’s the best one I have ever read on Old Life.

    The title of the post says it all.

    In all the hoopla that is occurring these days, I am amazed that so few simply point out how the NT tells us to interpret Moses. Your post did just that.

    It seems that God’s Word – viz., the New Testament – gets lost in the midst of the quote wars.

    Anyway… Thank you.

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  37. From the fake sovereign grace publisher Crossway (2001) The God of Promise and the Life of Faith
    In footnote 6 on p 244, Hafemann writes: “ The position I am advocating is based on a reassessment of the traditional Lutheran, Calvinistic and dispensational view of the relationship between the Law and the Gospel. The traditional view saw a conflict between the two, with the law viewed narrowly as God’s demand for sinless obedience as the ground of our salvation, while the gospel called for faith In God’s grace in Christ.”

    Hafemann does not understand correctly the antithesis he is opposing. Yes, the law is the divine demand for perfection (and also for satisfaction for sins). But he is wrong to focus on a demand for perfection being replaced by a demand for faith. The solution to the divine law is not a faith that God gives us but the object of our faith, which is righteousness merited by Christ at one and them imputed by God at various times to various individuals.

    There can be a revelation of law without a revelation of gospel grace. Thus a “ministry of death”. But there can be no revelation of gospel grace apart from a revelation of the divine law because the gospel tells how Christ satisfied the divine law. The law is why Christ had to die for the sins of the elect.

    We were all born condemned. Condemnation therefore is not a result of sinners having heard about gospel grace or about sinners having rejected gospel grace.

    Romans 1: 32 Though they know God’s righteous decree that those who practice such things deserve to die, they not only do them but give approval to those who practice them.

    Romans 2: 15 They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them 16 on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus

    John 1: 9 The true light, which gives light to everyone, was coming into the world. 10 He was in the world, and the world was made through him, yet the world did not know him.

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  38. D.G.,

    David R., but all we hear from the anti-repubs is that the Mosaic Covenant is gracious. So how is grace a ministry of death?

    You posted about Calvin, but you know he thought the MC was gracious and you also know he thought the LAW was a ministry of death. Don’t you ever tire of this game?

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  39. Slow down. Your question was answered directly above.

    Fair enough. You had said that “the legal economy (in the civil and ceremonial law only) required meriting of external, temporal blessings by meeting the condition of external obedience …” But again, how that notion can be construed as bearing any relationship whatsoever to the above quotes from Calvin is beyond me.

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  40. Romans 10:5, Calvin writes…

    The law has a twofold meaning; it sometimes includes the whole of what has been taught by Moses, and sometimes that part only which was peculiar to his ministration, which consisted of precepts, rewards, and punishments… But as evangelic promises are only found scattered in the writings of Moses, and these also somewhat obscure, and as the precepts and rewards, allotted to the observers of the law, frequently occur, it rightly appertained to Moses as his own and peculiar office, to teach what is the real righteousness of works, and then to show what remuneration awaits the observance of it, and what punishment awaits those who come short of it. For this reason Moses is by John compared with Christ, when it is said, ‘That the law was given by Moses, but that grace and truth came by Christ’ (John 1:17). And whenever the word law is thus strictly taken, Moses is by implication opposed to Christ.

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  41. Exodus 24: 7 Then he took the Book of the Covenant and read it in the hearing of the people. And they said, “All that the Lord has spoken we will do, and we will be obedient

    Jeremiah 34: 17 “Therefore, thus says the Lord: You have not obeyed me by proclaiming liberty, every one to his brother and to his neighbor; behold, I proclaim to you liberty to the sword, to pestilence, and to famine, declares the Lord. I will make you a horror to all the kingdoms of the earth. 18 And the men who transgressed my covenant and did not keep the terms of the covenant that they made before me, I will make them like the calf that they cut in two and passed between its parts— 19 the officials of Judah, the officials of Jerusalem, the eunuchs, the priests, and all the people of the land who passed between the parts of the calf. 20 And I will give them into the hand of their enemies and into the hand of those who seek their lives. Their dead bodies shall be food for the birds of the air and the beasts of the earth.

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  42. JRC: If, hypothetically, you were to accept the third sense of “meriting” as given above, would you agree that the rest is logically correct and consistent with Reformed Theology in general? If not, indicate where (without referring to the two senses of “merit” that you have defined above).

    DR: The problem with your definition is in the ambiguous term “antecedent.” If by that term, you mean something like “meritorious cause,” then first of all, you didn’t get this definition from Turretin…

    I would like to see a direct answer to the question. There is nothing ambiguous about the term “antecedent condition.” It is a condition that is required to be fulfilled as the ground for the reward.

    Please answer the question, rather than attacking the definition.

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  43. on Romans 10:5, Calvin —..what is said here of the righteousness of the law, must be applied, not to the whole office of Moses, but to that part which was in a manner peculiarly committed to him… The passage is taken from Leviticus 18: 5, where the Lord promises eternal life to those who would keep his law; for in this sense, as you see, Paul has taken the passage, and not only of temporal life, as some think. Paul indeed thus reasons,—”Since no man can attain the righteousness prescribed in the law, except he fulfills strictly every part of it, and since of this perfection all men have always come far short, it is in vain for any one to strive in this way for salvation: Israel then were very foolish, who expected to attain the righteousness of the law, from which we are all excluded.

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  44. Jeff, I did answer your question (and I didn’t “attack” anything). I hope you’re planning to answer mine, and in your answer, I hope you’ll either concede that I’m correct about the definition of merit, or show me one shred of evidence that those Reformed theologians thought that anyone could merit anything by offering sacrifices.

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  45. Jeff, please explain how you make the leap from “the consecution of any thing,” to “a condition that is required to be fulfilled as the ground for the reward.” Thank you.

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  46. It would also help if you explain how Turretin’s citation from Augustine, “The sinner ought not to despair of himself because Paul obtained [merited] pardon,” figures into your definition.

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  47. Calvin—But since God promises life to the doers of the law, why does Paul affirm that they are not righteous? The reply to this objection is easy. There are none righteous by the works of the law, because there are none who do those works. We admit that the doers of the law, if there were any such, are righteous; but since that is a conditional agreement, all are excluded from life, because no man performs that righteousness which he ought. We must bear in memory what I have already stated, that to do the law is not to obey it in part, but to fulfill everything which belongs to righteousness; and all are at the greatest distance from such perfection.

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  48. No, this interaction is not profitable. I don’t think we are communicating. For instance:

    JRC: If, hypothetically, you were to accept the third sense of “meriting” as given above, …

    DR: The problem with your definition is in the ambiguous term “antecedent.”

    DR: I didn’t “attack” [your definition]

    To answer my question, you would have had to actually accept, hypothetically, the definition as given. You didn’t … so you didn’t.

    We need to give this a rest.

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  49. Jeff, I needed you to explain what you meant by “antecedent.” The term by itself does not necessarily signify “meritorious cause,” and I’m not a mind reader.

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  50. Jeff,

    I believe I answered you above, but now that you’ve clarified your definition, I’ll clarify my response.

    You had said: To merit (in the broad sense) is to obtain by meeting an antecedent condition. To demerit is to be punished for failing to meet an antecedent condition.

    Then you clarified: There is nothing ambiguous about the term “antecedent condition.” It is a condition that is required to be fulfilled as the ground for the reward.

    Okay, you know I disagree, but let’s assume for the sake of argument that I accept your definition.

    Under this definition, the legal economy (in the civil and ceremonial law only) required meriting of external, temporal blessings by meeting the condition of external obedience, while of course the moral law required hypothetically the meriting of eternal life by perfect, perpetual obedience.

    I disagree. The fact that a sacrifice is required does not entail that offering a sacrifice is the meritorious ground of something. IOW, you still have to prove that anything less than perfect obedience can be meritorious. (And sorry, I don’t see how I am confusing law and gospel by saying this.)

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  51. David R., again, what grade level did you pass for reading comprehension. You may think Calvin said MC was gracious. But then you read something else like I quoted and you say the same? Hey, are you my wife?

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  52. D.G.,

    Since my reading comprehension is so bad, could you please explain Calvin’s comments on Jeremiah 31:31? Thanks much in advance.

    Now, as to the new covenant, it is not so called, because it is contrary to the first covenant; for God is never inconsistent with himself, nor is he unlike himself, he then who once made a covenant with his chosen people, had not changed his purpose, as though he had forgotten his faithfulness. It then follows, that the first covenant was inviolable; besides, he had already made his covenant with Abraham, and the Law was a confirmation of that covenant. As then the Law depended on that covenant which God made with his servant Abraham, it follows that God could never have made a new, that is, a contrary or a different covenant. For whence do we derive our hope of salvation, except from that blessed seed promised to Abraham? Further, why are we called the children of Abraham, except on account of the common bond of faith? Why are the faithful said to be gathered into the bosom of Abraham? Why does Christ say, that some will come from the east and the west, and sit down in the kingdom of heaven with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob? (Luke 16:22; Matthew 8:11) These things no doubt sufficiently shew that God has never made any other covenant than that which he made formerly with Abraham, and at length confirmed by the hand of Moses. This subject might be more fully handled; but it is enough briefly to shew, that the covenant which God made at first is perpetual.

    Let us now see why he promises to the people a new covenant. It being new, no doubt refers to what they call the form; and the form, or manner, regards not words only, but first Christ, then the grace of the Holy Spirit, and the whole external way of teaching. But the substance remains the same. By substance I understand the doctrine; for God in the Gospel brings forward nothing but what the Law contains. We hence see that God has so spoken from the beginning, that he has not changed, no not a syllable, with regard to the substance of the doctrine. For he has included in the Law the rule of a perfect life, and has also shewn what is the way of salvation, and by types and figures led the people to Christ, so that the remission of sin is there clearly made manifest, and whatever is necessary to be known.

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  53. D.G.,

    Following is a citation from Turretin in which he uses the term “antecedently” twice within several sentences (in the context of his affirmation of the necessity of good works). Can you please explain for me (1) whether it means the same thing both times and (2) what it means specifically in the second usage (emboldened)? Again, thanks much in advance.

    Works can be considered in three ways: either with reference to justification or sanctification or glorification. They are related to justification not antecedently, efficiently and meritoriously, but consequently and declaratively. They are related to sanctification constitutively because they constitute and promote it. They are related to glorification antecedently and ordinatively because they are related to it as the means to the end; yea, as the beginning to the complement because grace is glory begun, as glory is grace consummated. (Institutes 17.3.14)

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  54. David R., if you affirm republication, you can explain how Calvin wrote both what he did about Jer. 31 and 2 Cor. 3. You still haven’t figure out a way to read both Calvin statements. You either deny the one of flatten Calvin the way you do Scripture.

    Cherry pick away.

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  55. David R., are you serious? Are you now going to tell us that justification is not only simultaneous with sanctification but also glorification?

    Reading comprehension alert AGAIN!!! T says good works do not relate to justification antecedently. This proves Jeff’s points throughout in your Thrilla in Manilla debate. But since glorification isn’t going to happen without justification, it sort of colors what T says about works antecedently.

    Plus, there’s always the thief on the cross.

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  56. Have you been in the same denomination as Gaffin this long and not yet understood the “not yet aspect of justification”? “Union” with the risen Christ is still happening which means that “justification is still happening”. Gratitude for the past is only one motive among many because staying in Christ and having Christ’s presence depends on the efficacy of the Spirit causing you to work. One hundred percent.

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  57. John Calvin: “The proposition that faith without works justifies is true and yet false, according to the different senses that it bears. The proposition that faith without works justifies by itself is false, because faith without works is void. Faith can be no more separated from works than the sun from its heat, yet faith justifies without works, because works form no reason for our justification.” commentary on James 2

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  58. Mark Jones falsely identifies John Cotton teaching imputation before faith with John Cotton teaching justification before faith. In A Faire and Easy to Heaven (1978, p 43), William Stoever quotes Cott0n: “We must be good trees before we can bring forth good fruit. If closing with Christ be a good fruit, we must be good trees before we can bring it forth. And how can we be good trees, before we be engrafted into Christ?”

    Cotton was not teaching that anybody can be justified before or without faith. Cotton was denying that faith is something the elect have before or without God’s imputation of Christ’s death to these elect. The assumption for Jones and Gaffin is that faith is a condition of what they they call “union”. What they call “union” is a condition for their view of “justification”, a view in which justification continues to have “not-yet” aspects, so that final justification is conditioned on continuing works of faith.

    Gaffin and Jones insist on faith before “union”, but if their logic holds, then “union” also has “not-yet aspects”, which are conditioned on the “not yet” aspects of “faith”. Thus they have an incomplete union and an incomplete justification. It gets tricky when you make “union” the main thing, but don’t define “union” one way all the time….

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  59. D.G.,

    Calvin says,

    These things no doubt sufficiently shew that God has never made any other covenant than that which he made formerly with Abraham, and at length confirmed by the hand of Moses.

    Was that ONE COVENANT gracious or not? It’s a rather simple question.

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  60. D.G., quit the silly antics. The point is that “antecedent” does not necessarily mean “meritorious.”

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  61. JRC: If, hypothetically, you were to accept the third sense of “meriting” as given above, would you agree that the rest is logically correct and consistent with Reformed Theology in general? If not, indicate where (without referring to the two senses of “merit” that you have defined above).

    You still have yet to answer this question.

    Let’s be clear on the terms. To answer the question, you must

    Hypothetically and for the sake of argument, accept the following as the meaning of the word “merit in the broad sense”: To merit (in the broad sense) is to obtain by meeting an antecedent condition.

    Here, “antecedent” takes its normal sense of “that which comes before.” For the purposes of this definition, if X condition is required in order to obtain Y, then Y is merited broadly speaking by X.

    This is the definition that you will work with, if you hope to answer the question. I’m not asking for a critique of that definition based on some other definition. If you try to import some other definition, you will not have answered the question.

    So it is off-topic to say “The fact that a sacrifice is required does not entail that offering a sacrifice is the meritorious ground of something.”

    If a sacrifice is required antecedently, then within the framework of this question, it is merited in the broad sense. Simple logic. It is entailed by the meaning of the words “antecedent condition.”

    So the question now is, If you were to hypothetically accept this definition, would you see any problems with saying that external expiation is merited in this broad sense?

    Here’s another way to put that same question: Do you object to saying that sacrifices were an antecedent condition for external expiation?

    A “no” to either of those is logically a “no” to both.

    If you do have a problem with that, then please explain why the sacrifices were *not* an antecedent condition for external expiation.

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  62. To merit (in the broad sense) is to obtain by meeting an antecedent condition.

    Here, “antecedent” takes its normal sense of “that which comes before.” For the purposes of this definition, if X condition is required in order to obtain Y, then Y is merited broadly speaking by X.

    ….

    So the question now is, If you were to hypothetically accept this definition, would you see any problems with saying that external expiation is merited in this broad sense?

    According to your definition, of course, sacrifices merit external expiation, traveling from point “A” merits arriving at point “B,” being hungry merits being full, being young merits being old, and believers’ good works (as well as everything else in the ordo prior to glorification) merit eternal life. Now what?

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  63. D.G., republication does indeed have a long standing tradition among Reformed theologians. But we’re talking about repub.

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  64. You come up with a universal theory about me and OL and piety based on two statements.

    And give an exhaustive statement about Calvin based on a snippet of his works, probably taken totally out of context in the first place.

    Foolish consistency. Small mind meet your hobgoblin.

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  65. D.G.,

    David R., who said it did?

    Jeff said it did: “There is nothing ambiguous about the term ‘antecedent condition.’ It is a condition that is required to be fulfilled as the ground for the reward.”

    And who said that repub means two covenants? Talk about silly.

    So you’re saying there’s just one covenant, and it’s a ministry of death? If not, what are you saying?

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  66. David – “D.G., republication does indeed have a long standing tradition among Reformed theologians. But we’re talking about repub.”

    Sounds like…

    2K does indeed have a long standing tradition among Reformed theologians. But we’re talking about radical 2K”

    We know this mindset well. Warden Norton.

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  67. I wish David would put all his cards on the table. Does this have something to do with coming out of Judaism or being Jewish? If so, what? If not, why is this so obviously important to him? Todd is a Jewish Christian and is taking the opposite position.

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  68. Erik, if you ask, I might tell you. But actually the answer to your question is in my first comment on “Hiding Behind Kilts.”

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  69. I’s the b’y
    Who catches de fish
    And are the perfect embodiment of OL piety

    This’ll wow dem down on de REE-serve north of Superior by way of Chibougamu

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  70. D.G.,

    David R., actually, I asked first. Fun game, huh?

    You asked what first, how to make sense of Calvin? Again, the MC is gracious, but the law, abstracted from the promise of grace, is a ministry of death. Your turn.

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  71. David R.

    Posted July 21, 2014 at 1:18 pm | Permalink

    I think it’s a mistake to categorize this debate as one between Klineans and Murrayites (and thus the issue of psalmody is irrelevant). My impression rather is that those opposed to Klinean covenant theology and its analysis of Moses are so because they believe it entails a reformulation of historic covenant theology that is less than helpful. The reason for their concern (ironically enough) is that they think the Klinean language about merit in the old covenant blurs the historic Reformed distinction between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace (i.e., the distinction between law and gospel, which in spite of some of the rhetoric is agreed on by all parties) rather than clarifying it. In their view, strict merit is impossible due to the Creator/creature divide, but God condescended and pactum merit became a reality in the state of innocence. But after the fall? In the state of sin, no creature can merit anything before God (except condemnation), not in any sense, and if you think the Bible teaches otherwise, you’d better blink and look again, because there is a better explanation.

    On the other hand, the “Klinean side” believes that some of the old categories need some tweaking in the interests of more accurately reflecting Scripture and better preserving law and gospel. They hold that Kline is more than compatible with historic Reformed orthodoxy and that the diverse explanations given by Reformed stalwarts for precisely how the covenant of works was “renewed” or “revived” or “promulgated” or “delivered” proves their case. And since Turretin even spoke of the Mosaic covenant as “clothed with the form of the covenant of works, so how can anyone say that their view is outside the pale? But for them, Kline has come up with the best understanding of Moses thus far, and they see no problem with following him on this particular issue rather than Turretin, Bavinck or Vos.

    A big problem that prevents the debate from being fruitful is that the two sides have not been able to agree on common categories for the sake of discussion. In the seventeenth century, when diverse views of Moses were discussed, all parties agreed about merit before God, they all agreed on what constituted the substance and accidents of covenants, they all defined covenants in terms of parties, promises and conditions, and they all spoke in terms of form, matter and essence. I don’t know if we need to be locked into scholastic categories, but it does help when everyone speaks the same language and it may be better to speak the old one if there isn’t a new one to replace it. So the “anti-Kline side” of the debate (I think) would like it if their opponents would explain their view using language that both sides can clearly understand. The “pro-Kline side” is reluctant to do so however because they feel (I think) that we’ve moved beyond those old scholastic debates and frankly, they don’t really see the point. From their perspective, Kline is really not so difficult, and since we all agree that salvation is by grace alone, why do people get so miffed when they insist that an upper typological stratum of the old covenant operated according to a principle of works (especially when the old theologians also connected the covenant of works to Moses)? After all, this is what “classic covenant theology” teaches and it is only due to Murray’s influence that contemporary Reformed theologians have become blind to it.

    But the anti-Kline side thinks they see problems, and specifically they think that a works principle in the old covenant is incoherent and incompatible with historic Reformed (and Scriptural) ways of speaking. And so we’re at an impasse….

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  72. Here’s what I see the stakes being from a layman’s perspective.

    We need to somehow reconcile God’s dealing with Israel in the OT to God’s dealing with Christians in the NT.

    God made a Covenant with Israel, but then drove them out of the land when they were disobedient. This is disconcerting. Does this mean that God makes a Covenant with us, but that we will lose our salvation if we are disobedient?

    I think we can conclude the answer is no, not necessarily. Israel lost the temporal blessing of the land as a result of disobedience, but not every Israelite necessarily lost eternal salvation.

    Christians today may realize more temporal blessings than others as a result of obeying the law (see also my discussions with John Yeazel about sowing & reaping). Even Christians who stumble, sin, and screw up their temporal lives may still realize salvation, however, since that is not based on their works, but on the righteousness of Christ.

    Separating life in the land from eternal salvation appears to be the key point, and my understanding is that Kline has a compelling way to think about that.

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  73. Erik, faculty lounge?

    The argument method against Republication is the same as fundies attacking Calvinism when they pick five words out of a bible verse, out of context, to disprove us

    Wait, that will make us cry and roll on the ground and beg forgiveness

    LOL x 1,000,000

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  74. Erik, but is Kline the first one to have a compelling way to think about that? I’ve become persuaded that historic covenant theology offers a more compelling way to think about it.

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  75. David R., so the law abstracted from the promise of grace is the ministry of death and that leads you to insist innumerable times without qualification that good works are necessary for salvation.

    Still my turn. You don’t make sense.

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  76. Hi Darryl,

    I have always struggled with the idea that the Law is part of the covenant of grace. Does the WCF make this position plain, or does it refer to ‘the time of Law’ as the Old Testament generally? The promises, prophecies, sacrifices, circumcision and paschal lamb are all to be found before the Mosaic Covenant was given. So why is it necessary to identify the Law itself as covenant of grace when, when it is the covenant of death? Why can’t the Abrahamic covenant exist independently of the Law?

    Thanks,
    Martin

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  77. EC, don’t forget the key contribution of Norman Shepherd who blurred justification and sanctification with “obedient faith,” as in you know, the “law is gracious” or “good works are required for salvation.”

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  78. Erik, to your first question, I have nothing further to add to what I’ve already said, but again, it’s in that first paragraph. And no, I’ve got no sympathy for Shepherdism or FV, in fact part of my initial attraction to Kline was that he opposed them.

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  79. David,

    So on a scale of 1 to 10, with one being “I agree with him/them” and 10 being “I am totally opposed to him/them”, where would you rate the teaching of:

    Kline –

    Shepherd –

    The Federal Vision –

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  80. DR: According to your definition, of course, sacrifices merit external expiation, traveling from point “A” merits arriving at point “B,” being hungry merits being full, being young merits being old, and believers’ good works (as well as everything else in the ordo prior to glorification) merit eternal life. Now what?

    Good, thanks. The purpose of that question was to distinguish our disagreement. Do you fundamentally disagree that sacrifices were antecedently required for external expiation, OR do you simply object to calling that situation by the word “merit”?

    I think we would agree that the latter is the case: You don’t want to use the word “merit” for this situation because, in your view, the term “merit” implies some things that don’t belong, such as perfect obedience.

    And we agree, by the way, that those things don’t belong there.

    So what we’re talking about is not a difference in concept, but a difference in terminology. We agree that sacrifices were antecedently required; we are now wrangling over the best way to express that fact.

    That’s helpful to establish.

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  81. Eric, I’ve read tons of Kline, a little Shepherd and almost no FV, so this may not be quite fair, but I count myself totally opposed to Sheperdism/FV (10) in that I understand them to deny the law-gospel distinction in their denial of the doctrine of the CoW. I am sympathetic to Kline’s desire to guard the L-G distinction against Shepherd, Fuller, etc. but I wish he had not felt it necessary to attack some traditional Reformed categories in the process of doing so. I still appreciate much of Kline (as I’ve said several times), and am still processing, but the crux of my disagreement with him is over his modifications of Reformed covenant theology, which I think for the most part got it right. So if you are asking me to rate Kline’s teaching on just this specific issue, well, I view it as a mirror image error of Sheperdism in that Kline also muddles the distinction between the CoW and the CoG, so I would have to say “10” or close to that. I think that the L-G distinction lies pretty close to the heart of the gospel and that errors from either side can potentially cause serious harm.

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  82. From Lee Irons – who knows a thing or two about Kline his use of the word merit:

    Not only does the WCF not use that term very often, even Kline only uses that word once (as far as I can tell) in connection with the Mosaic Covenant. He normally speaks rather of the Mosaic Covenant being governed by the works principle…

    Here is the one place where Kline uses “merit” (the verb) in reference to the Mosaic order: “At the level of the secondary, typological stratum of the Mosaic order, continuance in the election to kingdom blessings was not guaranteed by sovereign grace on the basis of Christ’s meritorious accomplishments. It was rather something to be merited by the Israelites’ works of obedience to the law” (KP 322)…

    And note that, although Kline uses the verb “merited,” he expressly adds the qualifier that this is “at the level of the secondary, typological stratum.” And see his additional qualifier on the next page, where he states that “their election to receive the typological kingdom in the first place was emphatically not based on any merit of theirs (cf. Deut 9:5,6)” (KP 323) but rather was based on God’s promises to Abraham.

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  83. D.G., wrong, I simply quoted Turretin saying it, and you have yet to affirm that good works are necessary in ANY sense.

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  84. D.G.,

    Sure, the law is good and important and it reveals God’s holiness and our own standard for holiness. But any attempt to keep it post-fall will result in God’s wrath and curse …

    Not exactly a ringing endorsement for good works. And I couldn’t help but notice the antinomian twist to your summary of WSC 84, which actually says that “Every sin deserveth God’s wrath and curse,” not that any attempt to keep the law results in God’s wrath and curse.

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  85. DR,

    Inasmuch as our “good works” are wrought by us, they are defiled, and mixed with so much weakness and imperfection, that they cannot endure the severity of God’s judgment. (WCF16.5)

    The ‘ringing endorsement for good works’ are that they are our thankful duty and nothing more. They add nothing (accepted for Christ’s sake only) to our salvation which has been, by grace alone, wrought for us in Christ through His good works alone, passive and active…

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  86. Jack, the more I interact with these folks who so elevate sanctification and obedience in ways that seem to me to detract from Christ’s righteousness, the more I detect a failure to acknowledge the depths of sinful or the heights of God’s holiness. If one little bite from an apple (kumquat?) brings death and judgment not just on you but the entire human race, how are my imperfections working for me?

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  87. D.G., the more you insist that escaping God’s wrath and curse is the sum total of the Christian life, the more you provoke some folks to object that it isn’t, prompting you to then criticize them for “failing” to maintain the same imbalance as you.

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  88. Dave….

    Pathetic straw man to claim we view the entire life as escaping punishment for sin…

    “Provoke some people”??????

    Talk about a glass jaw passive aggressive approach.

    Pack it in, baby, hosted on your own petard…

    Next patient…

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  89. David R., sorry, but after the fall the rest of life is imbalanced. Heidelberg puts it well:

    Question 2. How many things are necessary for thee to know, that thou, enjoying this comfort, mayest live and die happily?
    Answer: Three; the first, how great my sins and miseries are; the second, how I may be delivered from all my sins and miseries; the third, how I shall express my gratitude to God for such deliverance.

    But if you’re so balanced, then why don’t you think about anything other than repub?

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  90. Anyone who has been under the ‘ministration of death’ knows the distinctions – and how beautiful the ‘Good News’ really is, can spot a Semi-Pelagian from 40 miles away (Obedient Faith, SANCTIFICATION EVER ON THE LIPS, etc……….),,,,,,,,

    ……….and will still understand and fully embrace the 3rd use of the Law……and love being conformed to the image of Christ – because of being anchored in the hope of the Gospel, Christ’s Active Obedience, and everything that makes the Good News the Good News.

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  91. Jack, notice that David R. continues his cherry picking hermeneutic, which also explains his reading comprehension deficiencies. Never mind the full answer of what good works are, David goes with what confirms his understanding. Good to have him admit it.

    David R., thanks.

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  92. D.G., read it again and you’ll see that what I was specifically responding to was, “The ‘ringing endorsement for good works’ are that they are our thankful duty and nothing more.” I’m actually quite happy with the full answer on good works.

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  93. DR, nothing I quoted from 16,5 or wrote undermines nor contrdicts 16.2 unless you want to elevate one’s good works to a level of, can I say, merit. So, they are necessary and yet they don’t add one fraction of an inch to our stature of deservings before the law and thus add nothing to our salvation (Eph 2:8-10).

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  94. As to the moral law and our works of obedience in sanctification…

    Q. 97. What special use is there of the moral law to the regenerate?
    A. Although they that are regenerate, and believe in Christ, be delivered from the moral law as a covenant of works, so as thereby they are neither justified nor condemned; yet, besides the general uses thereof common to them with all men, it is of special use, to [1] show them how much they are bound to Christ for his fulfilling it, and enduring the curse thereof in their stead, and for their good; and [2] thereby to provoke them to more thankfulness, and [3] to express the same in their greater care to conform themselves thereunto as the rule of their obedience.

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  95. Jack, David R. will still stick with 16.2. Why bother reading everything in the standards when one paragraph makes you feel righteous and superior? (There goes another crown. I hope Jeff gets it.)

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  96. Jack, you began this pleasant little interaction by lecturing me regarding 16.5, so apparently you “automatically assumed” my denial or contradiction of it? Hopefully you can now accept that I am in full agreement with 16.5, as well as the rest of the chapter.

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  97. D.G.,

    Why bother reading everything in the standards when one paragraph makes you feel righteous and superior?

    How is that constructive or edifying?

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  98. And Jack, just to be completely clear, it was your “nothing more” that threw me, and I hope you can understand why. Here is what you had said: “The ‘ringing endorsement for good works’ are that they are our thankful duty and nothing more. They add nothing (accepted for Christ’s sake only) to our salvation which has been, by grace alone, wrought for us in Christ through His good works alone, passive and active…”

    I fully, wholeheartedly, and with overwhelming gratitude to God, affirm your second sentence. I hope you can accept that. But your “nothing more,” with its apparent denial of any qualification, appeared to me to contradict WCF 16.2, which includes much more than thankfulness in its exposition of the function of good works in the Christian life: “These good works, done in obedience to God’s commandments, are the fruits and evidences of a true and lively faith: and by them believers manifest their thankfulness, strengthen their assurance, edify their brethren, adorn the profession of the Gospel, stop the mouths of the adversaries, and glorify God, whose workmanship they are, created in Christ Jesus thereunto, that, having their fruit unto holiness, they may have the end, eternal life.”

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  99. David,

    for context sake, you quoted Darryl and wrote:

    D.G.,

    Sure, the law is good and important and it reveals God’s holiness and our own standard for holiness. But any attempt to keep it post-fall will result in God’s wrath and curse … [DGH’s quote]

    Not exactly a ringing endorsement for good works. And I couldn’t help but notice the antinomian twist to your summary of WSC 84, which actually says that “Every sin deserveth God’s wrath and curse,” not that any attempt to keep the law results in God’s wrath and curse.

    My response:

    DR,

    Inasmuch as our “good works” are wrought by us, they are defiled, and mixed with so much weakness and imperfection, that they cannot endure the severity of God’s judgment. (WCF16.5)

    The ‘ringing endorsement for good works’ are that they are our thankful duty and nothing more. They add nothing (accepted for Christ’s sake only) to our salvation which has been, by grace alone, wrought for us in Christ through His good works alone, passive and active…

    The ringing endorsement focusing on thankfulness is in response to you imputing “antinomianism” to Darryl’s correct statement. If a sinner attempts to keep the law out of necessity… necessity for what… for salvation (which has been the context)… that can only lead to wrath and curse – Galatians 101.

    Rather than a denial of any qualification, my ‘nothing more’, in that context (salvation), is qualified by the next sentence. In other words, they (works) “add nothing to our salvation.” The context of the discussion wasn’t a full orb listing of all the different effects good works have in the Christian’s life. Obviously good works benefit our neighbor and give evidence of our faith and glorify God. That is why I noted with chagrin you were quick to assume I disagreed with 16.2 as well as you were (and are?) quick to assume Darryl’s statement was antinomian.

    Suffice to say, we apparently agree on WCF 16. The question is and has been defining “necessity” when it comes to Christian obedience and salvation. If its consequent necessity then wouldn’t you agree our obedience adds nothing more to Christ’s finished work of salvation for us?

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  100. Jack,

    I’ll try one more time, since you seem to have entirely missed my point in my comment about what D.G. wrote.

    In his post that he had linked to, D.G. had quoted WSC 84, with its response, “Every sin deserveth God’s wrath and curse, both in this life, and that which is to come.” So far so good. But then he had paraphrased that answer as: “But any attempt to keep [the law] post-fall will result in God’s wrath and curse …” Can you see that this is not what WSC 84 actually teaches? That was my point.

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  101. If its consequent necessity then wouldn’t you agree our obedience adds nothing more to Christ’s finished work of salvation for us?

    Of course, Jack, that was never in question.

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  102. David, indeed and I didn’t expect you that you would say otherwise. Bear with me because I want to understand better, if I can, where your concerns lie.

    So for the elect – who are saved by grace through faith alone in Christ’s finished work alone apart from any works of their own (Eph. 2:4-9) – are their good works necessary for (i.e. obtaining, not losing) salvation? And if so, in what way since we know that in the covenant of grace those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified? That is, God sanctifies and glorifies those whom He has justified. Thanks…

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  103. DG and Patrick..sorry for delay in replying….the OT seems peculiar in the order of fear/distance then shed blood (EX 24) and close communion (Covenant meal) afterwards. The NC is different…for eXample the order is reversed ; not to mention the internalisalion of law on the heart as part of the NC. Patrick , I’m not sure I understand the import of your question. While seeing principal continuity between Mosaic and NC I still want to do justice to the concept of Christ being born under the law which i presume means the Mosaic economy. It required obedience, he rendered it, and granted us life. Thsts why Ex 19 and 24 are both so important.

    And i have no problem situating the Mosaic cov under thecic of grace.;)

    Hope all is well Patrick.

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  104. Jack,

    David, indeed and I didn’t expect you that you would say otherwise. Bear with me because I want to understand better, if I can, where your concerns lie.

    I do sincerely appreciate this question over concerns. You remind me that this is always a great one to ask in the event of conflict over doctrinal issues, especially where there’s some tendency toward suspicion operating on both sides.

    So for the elect – who are saved by grace through faith alone in Christ’s finished work alone apart from any works of their own (Eph. 2:4-9) – are their good works necessary for (i.e. obtaining, not losing) salvation? And if so, in what way since we know that in the covenant of grace those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified? That is, God sanctifies and glorifies those whom He has justified. Thanks…

    First of all let me say that my concern over the relationship between good works and rewards/inheritance is a secondary one, and is mostly of interest to me as it relates to my primary concerns over repub (pasted by Erik earlier in the thread). I only started in on this issue again when I allowed myself to be provoked by D.G. in his series of recent responses to me (beginning with the one he posted October 9, 2014 at 6:51 pm).

    Secondly, I believe I hear your concerns expressed above, and I want to assure you that I stand with you completely in your insistence that, however we talk about the necessity of good works, we need to be abundantly clear that they are in no sense a cause of our salvation (which, from start to finish is grounded on the merits of Christ alone) and are in fact a part of our salvation (a fruit of it), such that “we are indebted to God for the good works we do, and not he to us, since it is he who ‘works in us both to will and do according to his good pleasure'” (Belgic article 24). I don’t think there is anything more important, as we speak about these things, than being careful lest we inadvertently (or otherwise) turn the covenant of grace into a covenant of works.

    Third, I don’t have the time right now to give to this unfortunately, and I will try to say more later, but the direction I would go in answering your question would follow Calvin in the Institutes, book 3, chapters 17 (“The Promises of the Law and Gospel Reconciled”) and 18 (“The Righteousness of Works Improperly Inferred from Rewards”). If you’re able to check those out, I’d be interested in your thoughts, and I’ll plan to say more when I have a moment….

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  105. Machen, Notes on Galatians, p 228– It is rather difficult to make out of the writer of Galatians 2 and 3 a complacent believer in the religion of modem naturalism, who uses the term “justification” to designate the mere acceptance by God of a lower goodness than that which His law requires, and who regards faith itself as a meritorious work. With regard to the religion of modem liberalism
    as with regard to the teaching of the Judaizers in Galatia, the real Paul would have said:
    “I do not make void the grace of God: for if righteousness is through the law, then Christ
    died for nothing” (Gal. 2:21).

    “But it is useless to quote individual verses to Professor Burton, no matter how plain they may seem. The ingenuity of our commentator is equal to any task. Thus the verse just quoted, the key verse of the Epistle, coming though it does after a glorious passage where even one who is unprepared to accept the gospel of Paul might be expected to understand something of what it meant to him, our commentator actually makes ‘the grace of God’ refer to the giving of the law to Israel.”

    “Paul, says Burton, is answering an attack of the opponents to the effect that he was making
    of no account “the special grace of God to Israel in giving them the law.” In the presence
    of such exegesis the reader may well stand aghast.”

    Notes on Galatians, p 228

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  106. Machen—It is true, Professor Burton repudiates the ‘law in the legalistic sense,’ and believes that Paul repudiated it. But Burton believes that there is a higher sense of the word ‘law,’ in accordance with which it designates a complete expression of the will of God including mercy, and that Paul maintained the law when it is so considered. The meaning seems to be that Paul supposed God to look with complacency upon the transgressions to which all men are subject if only there be a true effort on man’s part to obey God’s will. In other words, God is content with a relative goodness, and the mistake of the Judaizers was to suppose that he dealt with men on the basis of strict justice.

    Machen: There could be no greater error. As a matter of fact, the whole of Paulinism is founded not upon a lax interpretation of the law of God, but upon a strict interpretation. The demands of the Law could not be set aside in the interests of practical religion. And all were under the curse. But Christ took the curse upon Himself, and paid the Law’s penalty for us. Such is the teaching of Paul. The Pauline doctrine of justification is absolutely unintelligible except upon the basis of a strict view of law; it is absolutely unintelligible upon the basis of ‘liberalism.’ It is because Paul was not a liberal Jew that he could be the apostle of Christian liberty. notes on Galatians p 228

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  107. Calvin on II Corinthians 3—..there is, notwithstanding of this, a great difference between the law and the gospel; for although the gospel is an occasion of condemnation to many, it is nevertheless, on good grounds, reckoned the doctrine of life, because it is the instrument of regeneration, and gives to us a free reconciliation with God. The law, on the other hand, as it simply prescribes the rule of a good life, does not renew men’s hearts to the obedience of righteousness, and denounces everlasting death upon transgressors, can do nothing but condemn. Or if you prefer it in another way, the office of the law is to show us the disease, in such a way as to show us, at the same time, no hope of cure: the office of the gospel is, to bring a remedy to those that were past hope.
    For as the law leaves man to himself, it condemns him, of necessity, to death; while the gospel, bringing him to Christ, opens the gate of life. Thus, in one word we find that it is an accidental property of the law, that is perpetual and inseparable, that it kills; for as the Apostle says elsewhere, (Galatians 3:10,) All that remain under the law are subject to the curse.

    It does, not, on the other hand, invariably happen to the gospel, that it kills, for in it is revealed the
    righteousness of God from faith to faith, and therefore it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believes. (Romans 1: 17, 18.) The Apostle says, that the law was but for a time, and required to be abolished, but that the gospel, on the other hand, remains for ever. There are various reasons why the ministry of Moses is pronounced transient, for it was necessary that the shadows should vanish at the coming of Christ, and that statement—The law and the Prophets were until John—(Matthew 11: 13)—applies to more than the mere shadows.

    For it intimates, that Christ has put an end to the ministry of Moses, which was peculiar to him, and is distinguished from the gospel. Finally, the Lord declares by Jeremiah, that the weakness of the Old Testament arose from this—that it was not engraven on men’s hearts. (Jeremiah 31: 32, 33.) For my part, I understand that abolition of the law, of which mention is here made, as referring to the whole of the Old Testament, in so far as it is opposed to the gospel, so that it corresponds with the statement—The law and the Prophets were until John. For the context requires this. For Paul is not reasoning here as to mere ceremonies, but shows how much more powerfully the Spirit of God exercises his power in the gospel….

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  108. Lane Tipton:

    “The problem with Israel is not that it violated a republished covenant of works that was given to Adam; nor was it that Israel violated a covenantal arrangement totally devoid of grace at the national level. The problem lies in the fact that Israel re-enacts the sin and fall and exile of Adam by apostasy from the covenant of grace.”

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  109. Patrick,
    I haven’t listened to Lane’s talk yet (tonight), but isn’t it true that not all Israel was in the covenant of grace (Rom. 9:6b). Only the elect were. And yet the elect Israelites were subject to the same “curses” of exile as the non-elect Israelites….

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  110. Patrick, oh, so you mean that the Covenant of Grace is in some sense a Covenant of Works. Now it makes sense.

    But why don’t you quote all the times that Lane says that Israel recapitulates the sin of Adam and points to the need for Christ? Would that take the sting out of your obedient faith?

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  111. Tipton—-“the transaction of imputation is situated within the broader reality of union by Christ by Spirit-wrought faith.” Notice the use of the word “reality”. Would God’s imputation of Christ’s righteousness not be “real” if it logically resulted in the Spirit’s work?

    If saying that the work of the Holy Spirit is the result of God’s imputation makes imputation to not be not only forensic but transforming (which is the accusation), then what does saying that imputation is situated “within the broader reality of union” mean? Does it beg the question by assuming that “union” is not legal? If union is “transforming” and if God’s imputation is a result of “union”, does that then mean that the imputation result is not only forensic?

    Is the Holy Spirit’s work more in us more “real” than God’s imputation of the merits of Christ’s work? Tipton is begging the question. It’s like assuming that Adam was in something called “the covenant of grace” before Adam sinned.

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  112. Before I give Dr. Tipton an hour+ of time, it would be helpful to know whether he addresses this Scripture:

    “The days are coming,” declares the Lord,
    “when I will make a new covenant
    with the people of Israel
    and with the people of Judah.

    It will not be like the covenant
    I made with their ancestors
    when I took them by the hand
    to lead them out of Egypt,
    because they broke my covenant,
    though I was a husband to them,”
    declares the Lord.

    “This is the covenant I will make with the people of Israel
    after that time,” declares the Lord.
    “I will put my law in their minds
    and write it on their hearts.
    I will be their God,
    and they will be my people.

    No longer will they teach their neighbor,
    or say to one another, ‘Know the Lord,’
    because they will all know me,
    from the least of them to the greatest,”
    declares the Lord.
    “For I will forgive their wickedness
    and will remember their sins no more.”

    — Jer 31.31-34

    If I am to understand you correctly, Patrick, then the covenant that Israel broke was in fact the covenant of grace. That would imply that the covenant they broke provided for the forgiveness of sins *in exactly the same way* that the covenant of grace does.

    And yet Jeremiah says that the new covenant will be *not like* the covenant made at Sinai, it will be *not like* the one that they broke, and that God will forgive and remember their sins no more.

    How can this be?

    I say, this Scripture alone, without even needing the support of Paul, proves that the Mosaic Covenant was different from the New in two important ways:

    * It was breakable (in some sense or other), and
    * It did not provide for forgiveness of sins in the same way that the New does.

    So how can this be, since we all agree that the Mosaic was an administration of the covenant of grace? What was breakable, exactly? In what way were sins not forgiven under the Mosaic as they are in the New? In what way is the law written on the heart now unlike before?

    I know my answer, but that answer has been rejected by Patrick and David R. So let’s have a competing answer on the table.

    If Tipton addresses those questions, or if Patrick or David R could address those questions, that would help to advance the conversation. Right now at 30,000 ft, it looks like you simply wish to overturn Scripture. I would like to believe that is not the case … please help.

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  113. Just to prime the pump:

    He says that the covenant which he will make will not be such as he had made with their fathers Here he clearly distinguishes the new covenant from the Law. — Calv Comm Jer 31.31-32.

    He afterwards says, ‘I will put my Law in their inward parts’ By these words he confirms what we have said, that the newness, which he before mentioned, was not so as to the substance, but as to the form only: for God does not say here, “I will give you another Law,” but I will write my Law, that is, the same Law, which had formerly been delivered to the Fathers. He then does not promise anything different as to the essence of the doctrine, but he makes the difference to be in the form only. ibid, 31.33

    It follows, For I well forgive their sins, and their iniquities will I remember no more The Prophet, no doubt, shews here the foundation of God’s kindness, even that he would receive the people into favor by not imputing to them their sins. If we then seek for the origin of the new covenant, it is the free remission of sins, because God reconciles himself to his people. And we hence conclude, that there is no other cause that we can imagine, why God appeared in his only-begotten Son, and manifested so great a bounty: for the Prophet here reduces to nothing all the glory of the flesh, and lays prostrate all merits, when he says, that God would be so bountiful to his people as to become propitious to them, freely to remit their sins, and not to remember their iniquities. This passage, then, cannot properly be taken as referring to the perpetual remission of sins, though this he included in the general doctrine; but we must bear in mind the design of the Prophet, which was to shew, that God from the beginning, with regard to his Church, was moved by no other cause than a desire to abolish sins.

    The Apostle, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, gives rather a refined interpretation of this passage, for he dwells on the word more, עד, od. He says, that under the New Testament God forgives iniquities, because expiation has been made, so that there is no more need of sacrifices. For he assumes the opposite idea, that God remembered iniquities until he made the new covenant. If he remembered sins, he says, until he made a new covenant, it is no wonder that he then required daily sacrifice to propitiate him: but now under the New Testament he remembers them no more. Then sacrifices cease, because there is now no need of satisfaction when sins are forgiven. He hence concludes, that we have been so expiated by the blood of Christ, and so reconciled to God, that confidence as to our salvation ought to give us an entire rest. But we ought to bear in mind what I have said, that the Prophet here expressly, and in the first place, speaks of the beginning of the mercy and grace which God promises; he therefore declares that God would be so kind and so gracious as not to remember iniquities

    What, then, does the particle more intimate? Even that God had for a time been angry with his people, and visited their sins with judgment. For God is said to call our sins to remembrance, he is said to be angry with us, he is said to be the avenger of our iniquities, when he punishes us, when he gives evidences of his severity and of his vengeance. Whenever then God severely handled his people, he seemed to remember their iniquities; but when he made the new covenant, all iniquities were then buried, and cast, as another Prophet says, into the depths of the sea. (Micah 7:19) Then the Apostle misapplied the testimony of the Prophet: [prob punctuation ‘?’] by no means; for he wisely accommodated it to the subject he was discussing: what God promises, that he would not any more remember iniquities, after having made the new covenant, was accomplished through the coming of Christ. Then Christ alone has effected this — that our iniquities should no more be remembered before God. Hence also we easily learn what the Apostle intended to prove, even that sacrifices cease when sins are expiated. These things indeed harmonize well together, and there is nothing forced or too refined. — ibid, Lecture One-Hundred and Twenty-Fourth

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  114. Jeff, after all the time we’ve spent at this you’re seriously questioning whether you should devote an hour to watch the video? (Can’t you listen while on the treadmill or something?) In response to your question, he definitely gives enough to suggest how he might respond to your objection, though I don’t recall if he deals with that text specifically. You should watch!

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  115. Jeff, I agree with David. It’s worth watching. In the words of Lee Irons, Tipton attempts to square the circle between Gaffin and Kline by shaving some corners off of Kline. I came away thinking Tipton was trying to find an approach that mitigated the division in the republication debate. There are some encouraging aspects, yet I went away with questions regarding passages that weren’t addressed, such as the one from Jer. that you/Calvin comment on above. Maybe I’ll post some specifics tomorrow.

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  116. Mark Karlberg—The ‘covenant of grace’ terminology is an exclusively redemptive-historical category, distinguishing those divine-human covenants subsequent to the Fall. In accord with the traditional Protestant law/gospel contrast the Westminster Standards preserve the distinction between two antithetical principles of inheritance, works and faith.

    Click to access adam_karlberg.pdf

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  117. mcmark—But I disagree with Machen when I deny grace before the fall.

    Machen—“The covenant of works into which God entered with man was a gracious thing. It contained indeed a possibility of death, but it contained also the promise of assured and eternal life. If the temptation was resisted, even the possibility of death would be removed. Now do you think that if Adam had not sinned, the entrance into that higher condition would have been closed to him? Do you think he would have left to an eternal jeopardy in which the dread possibility of his sinning would ever have been before his eyes?” The Christian View of Man, Banner, p 160–

    and Sproul : “Another misunderstanding comes from how we identify the two covenants. Because the first is called ‘the covenant of works’ and the other is called ‘the covenant of grace,’ we tend to think that the first covenant had no grace. – See more at: http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=304#sthash.PXQ1NU9J.dpuf

    Was it “grace” to the non-elect in Israel that kept the nation of Israel from being eliminated before the birth of Christ? I say no. The “obedience” of Israel (united to Christ) is not any part of the mix (no splitting the difference!) in God’s keeping His promise to Abraham that the seed will be born from Israel.

    Was it “grace” to Cain that Cain lived one more minute after Cain killed his brother? I say no.

    Is our obedience to Christ (after we are united to Christ) any part of the reason for our future resurrection, or is “the hope of righteousness” ALL TOGETHER ONLY because of Christ’s finished righteousness obtained outside us by Christ’s obedience outside of us? I say that our obedience is no part of the mix!

    God was not gracious to accept Christ’s obedience. Christ’s obedience was sinless and meritorious.

    God does not accept the obedience of those in union with Christ as any part of the reason those in union with Christ will be raised on the last day. When Tipton brings in the idea of forfeiting blessing by our disobedience, he continues to miss the difference between Adam before the fall and those who have already passed from death to life because of being justified in Christ.

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  118. mcmark –

    So Jack it’s Israel that is apostate from “the covenant of grace”, not Adam, correct? Adam before his first sin had no grace and needed no grace….

    Footnote from T. David Gordon, Abraham and Sinai Contrasted:

    25 With the possible exception of Hosea 6:7: “But like Adam they transgressed the covenant; there they dealt faithlessly with me.” It is worth noting here that Hosea is refering to members of the Sinai covenant: “Ephraim,” “Judah,” the “house of Israel,” and that they transgressed the covenant as Adam did. Does this not at least suggest that the Sinai covenant had a works dimension analogous the original covenant of works? How could one transgress a promissory covenant “like Adam”?

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  119. Tipton wants us to look to the “imperfect active obedience” of Abraham as also part of the mix. so that we can be threatened and encouraged about our own “imperfectly hearing the voice of God” as one factor in our receiving blessings in Christ. Because Abraham was united to Christ when Abraham imperfectly obeyed, Tipton— without denying the finished character of Christ’s death as satisfaction— shifts the attention to our own imperfect obedience is “wrought by the Spirit” in union with Christ,

    Why this change of focus to “the imperfect active obedience”? I am reminded of the interaction of
    Tom Nettles with Andrew Fuller (By His Grace and For His glory, the chapter on Christ Died for our Sins) Those who want to give priority to “union” instead of “justification” also want to give priority to the doctrine of effectual calling (the application of atonement) instead of to the finished atonement itself.. In this trajectory the idea of “definite atonement” comes to be identified not with the finished death of Christ for the elect alone but instead with the idea that the Holy Spirit will only apply Christ’s “active obedience” by calling a definite number of elect to “believe unto union”.

    Nettles—“The error is subtle in nature and involves a shift in the understanding of the sacrificial death. Although Jesus’ death is spoken of as passive obedience–and though the concepts of reconciliation and propitiation are defined as activities accomplished in the Father’s setting forth God the Son…. the emphasis shifts from the Son’s passive obedience to what he actively accomplished by his infinite divine nature.”

    mcmark: and in the case of Tipton, the shift involves to what those united to Christ accomplish by the Spirit in them…..

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  120. Jack, to use your language, I was only saying that Adam was in “the covenant of the works” not in “the covenant of grace”.

    Tipton—“The problem lies in the fact that Israel re-enacts the sin and fall and exile of Adam by apostasy from the covenant of grace.”

    Tipton—“The problem was not that Israel was under a national covenant devoid of grace.”

    Tipton—“Some of the offspring of Israel do not walk as the offspring of Israel.”

    mcmark: Why does Tipton want to get grace into the “national covenant”?

    I think the answer is not that difficult. Tipton wants to say that “some of the offspring of Israel DO walk as the offspring of Israel.”. I myself would say that only one seed of Israel HAS WALKED as the seed of Israel. Our walking is no part of our hope, because we walk by faith in the gospel of what Christ HAS DONE.

    Romans 6: For one who HAS DIED has been set justified from sin. 8 Now if we HAVE DIED with Christ, we believe that we will also live with him. 9 We know that Christ, being raised from the dead, will never die again; death no longer has dominion over him. 10 For the DEATH HE DIED TO SIN , once for all, but the life he lives he lives to God. 11 So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus.

    Romans 7: 4 you also HAVE DIED to the law through the body of Christ, so that you belong to another, to him who has been raised from the dead, in order that we may bear fruit for God.

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  121. Mark Karlberg, Engaging Westminster Calvinism, 2013, p 28—Snodgrass holds that “justification excludes legalistic works done to earn salvation but includes an evaluation of imperfect non-meritorious works as instrumental in final salvation. Lane Tipton’s “Union with Christ and Justification” attempts to amalgamate opposing formulations. His staunch advocacy of the theology of New Westminster is unaffected by occasional evasive disclaimers. (see Justified in Christ, p 233-40, Mentor, 2007)

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  122. Some initial stream of consciousness thoughts as I took notes when listening last night. Quotes are either exact or paraphrases of Tipton. My thoughts in brackets or parentheses…
    ________________________________________

    [Flattening… Emphatically equating God redeeming the nation of Israel out of Egypt with Christ redeeming the elect. But isn’t the first (Israel as son) simply pointing to the second (Christ the Son) and not an Old Testament “replicative C of G dry run” of the Second?]

    “Israel, the typological son … is redeemed by the blood of the eschatological Son… as that blood is typified in the Passover.”

    “God does not deal with them according to strict justice… ” (true, but…)

    “Hence, God relates to Israel as the Redeemer Lord…” (only??)

    “Israel, as a nation, is redeemed, bought by blood. ” (Flattening?)

    “Israel’s obedience must be construed as the obedience of the redeemed…” ( Doesn’t establish that from Scripture.)

    “And if Israel is redeemed, it can only be understood in terms of union with the Redeemer…” (flattening again?)

    “Israel (as a nation) is united to the promised Messiah…” (why union with Christ brought in now?)

    Is Israel a replica of heaven or of Eden?? Tipton says heaven.

    “The premise going forward is that Israel is redeemed and therefore their experience as a nation is to viewed as that of redeemed people… ” (Not established from Scripture)

    Tipton’s lens rejects any possibility of any significant discontinuity, outward or otherwise, between the Old covenant and New. (1 Cor. 3, Galatians, Hebrews 8-10)

    Tipton interprets WCF 16.2 as speaking of the experience of the nation of Israel, not just the elect Israelites. So the nation’s (what about the Kings?) imperfect obedience is accepted on the basis of union with the promised Messiah… (Flatlands…)

    WCF 16.6…. the “persons of believers”…

    His rationale for this is so that we don’t blur the distinction between the Redeemer and the redeemed. His typology emphasizes Israel as son contrasted with Christ the Son. What about Israel compared to Adam (Hos. 6:7; Lev. 18.5; Gal. 3:12b)?

    He explains 16.6 and then applies it to Israel as a nation. He says there’s only two types of merit… perfect obedience that is meritorious in and of itself and “believer obedience” which is imperfect yet accepted in Christ. Does this adequately describe the covenantal obedience required in Israel’s Sinai covenant with God?

    The nation of Israel’s imperfect obedience is accepted only for the sake of Christ in Spirit forged union</b? with the promised Messiah… (Flatten – friggin – ing… Not proven by Scripture, rather applying WCF 16.)

    (Totally equates the nation of Israel with redeemed believers.)

    “Abraham’s imperfect obedience[?] in union with Christ brings salvation to the nations, the many… type of Christ. (Don’t we need to unpack that?)

    (Is it “grace” as in redemptive grace or is it simply God’s forbearance and sovereign timing that keeps Israel in the land despite their disobedience. And for that matter, it <b.was their outright disobedience, not just “imperfect obedience.”)

    “Modus operandi is the sovereign free grace of God ” in all of this… (No works principle operating in any sense?)
    _______________________________________
    _______________________________________

    Later it seems Tipton does bring in a works principle of sorts from Kline. It was getting late and I was just listening and not taking notes. But it seemed that this was the point where he was trying to square the circle between Murray/Gaffin and Kline. I give him credit for that. I don’t know that he accomplished it though…

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  123. Read a letter to the editor in “Christian Renewal” today in which the letter writer suggested that the CanRC and the URCNA should unite on the basis of the Westminster Standards as opposed to the Three Forms of Unity, since then they can agree on covenant theology. As if…

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  124. David Gordon—John Murray (and his followers) implicitly believe that the only relation God sustains to people is that of Redeemer (which, by my light, is not a relation but an office, but I won’t quibble). I would argue, by contrast, that God was just as surely Israel’s God when He cursed the nation as when He blessed it.

    God’s pledge to be Israel’s God, via the terms of the Sinai administration, committed Him to curse Israel for disobedience just as much as to bless her for obedience. In being Israel’s “God,” He sustained the relation of covenant Suzerain to her; He did not bless-or-curse any other nation for its covenant fidelity or infidelity. In this sense, He was not the God of other nations as He was the God of Israel. Murray’s (unargued and unarguable) assumption that “I shall be their God” implies gracious redemption, election, or union with Christ, is entirely unmerited (should I say “unwarranted?”) by the biblical evidence.

    The first generation of those to whom the Sinai covenant was given died in the wilderness, in a situation that they perceived as being worse than their situation in Egypt. Why? Because Yahweh was not their God? No; because Yahweh was their God (i.e. Covenant Lord); and because, as such, He was committed to imposing the sanctions of the Sinai covenant upon them. I suppose one could strain language here, and say that it was “gracious” of Yahweh to impose curse-sanctions upon the Israelites (but not upon the nations); but I certainly would take no comfort in God’s “grace,” if it entailed such.

    [DOC]Reflections on the Auburn Theology – T. David’s Page
    http://www.tdgordon.net/theology/auburntheology.doc

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  125. More thoughts and a number of questions.

    Why the exclusive one to one comparison/equating between Israel as a nation and the new covenant church and “Israel as son” and “Christ as The Son?” What about the first Adam and the C of W? The WCF says the C of G was administered “differently” in the time of the law. All I’m hearing about are the similarities and one to one comparsions. What about Lev. 18:5, Hos. 6:7, the Jer. passage that Jeff highlights? Which leads to not addressing how Israel can break the covenant of grace which as we know was inaugurated by the pre-incarnate Christ walking between the animal pieces in Abe’s dream. Christ made the covenant and Christ promised securing it by taking on himself its curses and its required obedience thus guaranteeing it for us! If no principle of works in the Mosaic covenant then doesn’t the law-gospel antithesis, in which the law condemns and the gospel fulfills, dissipate? When you get down to it seemsmore about Israel’s and our “gospel obedience” than that of Jesus — Israel’s obedience “Spirit forged in union with the promised Messiah” (Tipton’s description of Israel nation’s obedience. Even to the point where he states that “Abraham’s imperfect obedience in union with Christ brings salvation to the nations”… Maybe I’m missing the nuances that he kept referring to.

    All about us as co-pilots of the the big ship C o G? I know that’s not what he wants to be saying (I hope) but that, imo, is what may be sneaking in the back door.

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  126. @ David: Apparently, I cannot escape.

    I’ll make a deal with you. Earlier, I gave you five substantial objections to your view. Three had to do with your methodology, one provided direct contrary evidence to your view, and one showed that your view undermines the law/gospel distinction as explained by Coulquhoun.

    In response, you gave one objection to my objections. That was it.

    Then, here, you crowed

    …as I think I have adequately demonstrated in the other thread, you have (1) clearly misunderstood their definition (I still await your response)…

    and snarkily followed up with

    No thanks, I think I’ll stick with Reformed theology.

    That doesn’t show a lot of serious reflective thought. In fact, I’m not even sure that you bothered to read the objections carefully, or my responses to your objections, given that you continue to repeat the same questions that I’ve already answered.

    So here’s the deal: If you produce a substantial response to the previous objections, paying attention to what I’ve laid out as the ways to overcome those objections, then I’ll listen to Tipton.

    Keep in mind that from my point of view, you have abandoned historic Reformed theology by abandoning the basic category of conditions: a priori are meritorious, a posteriori are not. Turretin, Colquhoun, Hodge, and yes even Calvin are clear that conditioning the covenant of grace on something that we must first produce is to make it a matter of works. Hence, the covenant of grace is about conditions that are given as promises.

    In your view, the legal economy of the Mosaic Covenant was at one and the same time “gracious” and also required a priori conditions for dispensing the benefits. That directly attacks (by confusion) a pillar of the Reformed faith.

    If you want a hearing, you need to show why this is not the case.

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  127. Jeff,

    I’m not making deals. I haven’t forgotten your five objections and I intend to continue to interact with you; it’s just that I can’t sustain the volume that we have over the past weeks while continuing to live a normal life. I do appreciate and commend the amount of work you put into elaborating those five objections.

    However, I am interested in hearing your response to the objection I raised, which if sustained, I think will remove most, if not all of your support. I thought you had gotten a good start on an answer in one of your most recent comments and I was interested to see where you would go next. I will certainly understand if you would rather hold off on writing more, since you have indeed written much more than I have recently.

    In your view, the legal economy of the Mosaic Covenant was at one and the same time “gracious” and also required a priori conditions for dispensing the benefits. That directly attacks (by confusion) a pillar of the Reformed faith.

    I have no idea where on earth you got the idea that this is my view. It most certainly is not. My view is that the legal economy is legal, that is, that the moral, ceremonial and judicial law require perfect obedience and promise no blessings without it.

    On the contrary, your view of the legal economy is that the ceremonial law and judicial law require only imperfect obedience, whereby even non-believers can merit blessings. (But then you also possibly affirm that believers merit eternal life?) My mind boggles over how someone with your intelligence can think that this is actually what Calvin, Turretin, Hodge, Vos, Berkhof, etc. teach. But otoh, it has not been so long since I was repub that I can’t remember what it was like to read my pet doctrine into classic Reformed theology.

    You don’t wanna watch Tipton, don’t watch Tipton; it’s just that it’s hard for me to imagine why you wouldn’t.

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  128. I don’t object to watching Dr. Tipton per se. He’s well-regarded.

    It’s the asymmetry that’s a problem. I view you as asking me for yet more labor to make clear my view … and I’m asking you for some labor to carefully interact with what I’ve done so far.

    But if this helps, I’ll address your objection …

    DR: If we could review 17.5.2 once again, Turretin distinguishes two uses of the term, “merit.” Here he is not giving an orthodox definition (after all, “merit” is not an article of the faith), but simply explaining how the term is used in the patristic literature. The definition he provides for the church fathers’ “broad and improper” usage of the term is, “the consecution of any thing.” … Now, if anything is obvious, it is that this is an equivocal usage of the term that does not actually signify “merit” in any meaningful sense.

    That’s not obvious to me at all, for the following reasons:

    (1) If the “broad” sense of merit did not signify “merit” in any meaningful sense, then Turretin would not have used that same broad sense to signify “merit” in the sense of the CoW:

    Thus Adam himself, if he had persevered, would not have merited life in strict justice, although (through a certain condescension) God promised him by a covenant life under the condition of perfect obedience (which is called meritorious from that covenant in a broader sense because it ought to have been, as it were, the foundation and meritorious cause in view of which God had adjudged life to him) (17.5.3)

    Right there, Turretin uses the broad sense of “merit” to mean “merit” in a meaningful sense. And, as advertised, he uses it to mean a “consecution of a thing”: Why was Adam’s perfect obedience meritorious? Because it was the foundation and meritorious cause. There was a condition, upon which was suspended the reward.

    It wasn’t meritorious because it was perfect, or because it was obedience. It was meritorious because it was the foundation and meritorious cause. Compare immediately to 12.3.2.

    (2) With regard to Dabney, I view him as a witness hostile to your cause. He clearly restates the same category that you resist:

    To clear up this matter, let us observe that the word merit is used in two senses, the one strict or proper, the other loose…But when men use the word loosely, they include works deserving of approval, and works to which a reward is anyhow attached as a consequence.

    Dabney is actually broader than Turretin. Whereas both agree to “works to which a reward is anyhow attached as a consequence”, Dabney adds “works worthy of approval.” He then goes on to distinguish “worthy of approval” and “merit” — meaning, in context, “strict merit”, which of course goes to the Catholic claim (as with Turretin).

    Shouldn’t that end the debate? You keep having people tell you that “merit in the broad (or loose) sense” means exactly what I said it does — and you keep reply, “That isn’t merit.”

    So why do so many Reformed writers go out of their way to mention it?!

    But in any event, even once we agree to define “broad merit” in the way consistent with Turretin, Hodge, Dabney, etc, we might still possibly disagree about how to classify specific conditions and rewards.

    So Dabney says that in the loose sense, the good works of believers earn a reward (not eternal life, as you glossed it). And he goes on to explain:

    It only remains, on this head, to explain the relation between the good works of the justified believer and his heavenly reward. It is explained by the distinction between an intrinsic and original merit of reward [that is, strict] , and the hypothetical merit granted by promise. If the slave fulfills his master’s orders, he does not bring the latter in his debt. “He is an unprofitable servant; he has only done what was his duty to do.” But if the master chooses, in mere generosity, to promise freedom and an inheritance of a thousand talents for some slight service, cheerfully performed, then the service must be followed by the reward. The master owes it not to the intrinsic value of the slave’s acts, (the actual pecuniary addition made thereby to the master’s wealth may be little or nothing,) but to his own word. Now, in this sense, the blessings of heaven bear the relation of a “free reward” to the believer’s service. It contributes nothing essential to earning the inheritance; in that point of view it is as wholly gratuitous to the believer, as though he had been all the time asleep. The essential merit that earned it is Christ’s. Yet it is related to the loving obedience of the believer, as appointed consequence. Thus it appears how all the defects in his evangelical obedience (defects which, were he under a legal covenant, would procure the curse, and not blessing,) are covered by the Savior’s righteousness; so that, through Him, the inadequate works receive a recompense. Moreover, it is clearly taught that God has seen fit, in apportioning degrees of blessedness to different justified persons, to measure them by the amount of their good works. See (Matt. 16:27); (1 Cor. 3:8), or which Turrettin remarks, that the reward is “according to,” but not “on account of” the works. See also, (2 Cor. 9:6); (Luke 19:17, 18).

    And right there, he reveals little bit of daylight between himself and Turretin on this particular classification — for Turretin is clearly marking the rewards as given for meeting a concomitant (“means to the end”), not an a priori (“causal”) condition (hence the language that Dabney notes, “according to, not on account of” language). FT makes that clear in 17.3.14. So they would disagree on the classification of rewards of believers. Dabney’s addition of “works deserving of approval” is pushing him further than Turretin goes.

    Likewise Colquhoun treats the land promise as concomitant because he reads it as an absolute promise given to Abraham under the CoG, rather than seeing that promise as a type, administered legally in the MC. So he and I would disagree about the proper classification of the land promise — but not about the category that we are using to classify.

    OK, so there is some disagreement about how best to classify. That doesn’t in the least throw out the category, or somehow mean that when Turretin says

    (FT): “there are two ways in which the word ‘merit’ is used: strict and broad”, that what he really means is

    (NOT FT): “There is one type of merit (which is strict), and this other thing that the fathers said was merit, but isn’t, and I’m going to put absurd examples out there to prove that it isn’t. And then I’m going to tell you that Adam had that second type of merit that isn’t actually merit.”

    The broad sense of merit is too well-attested in the Reformed literature for you to be able to say that it doesn’t actually qualify as merit. Especially since Adam merited in the broad sense!

    So I’m sorry that your objection did not clear away support for my objections. It would be nice, wouldn’t it, for one of us to have a slam-dunk killer argument?

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  129. Jeff,

    Do we agree that FT discusses differing senses of the term “merit” (in 17.5) roughly as follows:

    1. merit strictly and properly, meaning intrinsic value, which is impossible for humans to attain to, even in the state of innocence, even by perfect obedience.

    2. merit broadly and improperly, meaning consecution or sequence, according to which my above examples apply (e.g., youth merits old age, life merits death, new obedience merits eternal life, etc.).

    3. merit from the covenant of works (pactum merit), whereby, due to God’s condescension, Adam’s obedience, had he persevered, would have been the meritorious cause (but not strictly) of his obtaining of eternal life.

    If you do not agree, what would you change?

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  130. Good question. I would make #3 to be a species of “broad merit”, for the following reasons

    (1) He clearly states that there are two, not three senses of “merit” in 17.5.2.
    (2) He identifies Adam’s merit pactum as “not strictly speaking, but in a broader sense” in 17.5.6, using the word “broad” to signal his previous category (Turretin’s textual pattern).
    (3) In 17.5.6 he gives a reason for taking Adam’s merit to be “in a broader sense.” That reason is the exact same logical structure as “broad merit”: An antecedent condition met. This is also true in 8.5.17.
    (4) This is coherent with his “two types of conditions” paragraph in 12.3.2.

    What reasons would you give for discerning three types here?

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  131. David R., “merit strictly and properly, meaning intrinsic value, which is impossible for humans to attain to, even in the state of innocence, even by perfect obedience.”

    There goes the active obedience of Christ. Plenty of hope without it.

    4. This office the Lord Jesus did most willingly undertake; which that he might discharge, he was made under the law, and did perfectly fulfill it; endured most grievous torments immediately in his soul, and most painful sufferings in his body; was crucified, and died, was buried, and remained under the power of death, yet saw no corruption. On the third day he arose from the dead, with the same body in which he suffered, with which also he ascended into heaven, and there sitteth at the right hand of his Father, making intercession, and shall return, to judge men and angels, at the end of the world.

    5. The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience, and sacrifice of himself, which he, through the eternal Spirit, once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father; and purchased, not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him. . . .

    7. Christ, in the work of mediation, acts according to both natures, by each nature doing that which is proper to itself; yet, by reason of the unity of the person, that which is proper to one nature is sometimes in Scripture attributed to the person denominated by the other nature.

    Now you want to make the plane places rough?

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  132. One of the things that troubles you about 17.5.2 is that FT gives several examples of “broad merit”, some of which don’t seem meritorious at all to us. Paul “merited” (obtained) pardon. Our misery “merited” obtained mercy. You and I would agree that these are extreme examples. So why does he present these extreme examples?

    You have speculated that he does this to show that “broad merit” is no merit at all. Since the examples he gives here are extreme, is he simply suggesting that this type of merit is *always* extreme, therefore ridiculous? In a vacuum, this might work.

    But he doesn’t actually say this, so we have to admit that such an interpretation is speculative. Where is he going with this “broad merit”?

    Then the chapter unfolds, and he attacks strict merit as an impossibility … and now, the other shoe drops: Adam merited in a broad, not a strict sense. Aha! So not *all* broad merit is extreme.

    So that forces the question again: Why the extreme examples?

    And I speculate (since he doesn’t tell us) that his examples have to do with his polemical purpose in this chapter. What is his aim? To show that neither congruent nor condign merit is a possibility. What objections must he overcome? That the fathers talk frequently of meriting (which is true!). That Adam was required to merit in the Garden (also true!).

    So how does he overcome it? In true Turretin fashion, he overcomes the problem by introducing a distinction: There is strict merit, and there is broad merit. There is strict merit; but not every example of “merit” in the fathers is strict.

    Now we have an answer: The point of the extreme examples is to show clearly and unambiguously that not every example of merit in the fathers refers to strict merit. The extreme examples do not deny “broad merit” as a category (if this were so, why mention it?), but establish “broad merit” as an option for reading the church fathers, hence to overcome the objection “that the fathers speak of our meriting, so they must mean congruent or condign.”

    To parse closely: Just because Turretin gives extreme examples of “broad merit”, does not mean that all “broad merit” is extreme. The most that we can logically conclude is that “broad merit” includes extreme examples. But it also includes Adam’s merit, as he says later.

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  133. Jeff,

    I would make #3 to be a species of “broad merit”, for the following reasons

    I agree with you (though I will likely need clarification on your (4)). If we have strict merit on the one hand and everything else is broad, then yes, Adam’s is a subspecies of broad. However, a few observations:

    1. According to the patristic usage, what the later scholastics referred to as condign merit should have been categorized as broad merit. Would you agree? However, when Turretin formulates the state of the question in his refutation of condign merit (and as you know he is generally rather thorough), he never says anything like: “The question is not Do works merit broadly and improperly? For we do not deny that they do. Rather the question is …” This may not be conclusive, but I think it suggests that he would prefer to dispense with (much of) the broad patristic usage. What do you think?

    2. I’m pretty sure you would not want to say that Adam was required to merit eternal life in the same sense that believer’s merit eternal life, would you (or would FT)?

    3. FT says: “As to works, they were required in the first [i.e., the CoW] as an antecedent condition by way of a cause for acquiring life; but in the second [i.e., the CoG] they are only the subsequent condition as the fruit and effect of the life acquired” (12.4.7). How would you relate this statement to the two senses of merit (strict and broad)?

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  134. D.G., we all agree that Christ, as a divine Person can (and did) merit strictly and properly. I realize you haven’t tracked this discussion closely, but we’ve covered this.

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  135. To parse closely: Just because Turretin gives extreme examples of “broad merit”, does not mean that all “broad merit” is extreme. The most that we can logically conclude is that “broad merit” includes extreme examples. But it also includes Adam’s merit, as he says later.

    I never knowingly denied this, and I think we agree, (1) that there’s broad merit and strict merit, (2) that there were extreme examples of broad merit in the church fathers, and (3) that Adam’s merit was in the broad category. So where does that leave us? I think you would want to argue that FT teaches other examples of broad (pactum) merit, in addition to Adam’s, right? Whereas I would argue that the only situation in which there is pactum merit, according to FT, is Adam’s obedience.

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  136. David R., but Christ was human and the confession says he satisfied God’s justice in both natures. How can you say that Christ knew our temptations and weakness if his ability to keep the law was wrapped up in his divinity.

    Seems to me you have both a flawed Christology and anthropology. Sinless man can keep God’s law. Otherwise, God’s injunction to Adam came with crossed fingers.

    But I’ve already covered this.

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  137. DR: 3. FT says: “As to works, they were required in the first [i.e., the CoW] as an antecedent condition by way of a cause for acquiring life; but in the second [i.e., the CoG] they are only the subsequent condition as the fruit and effect of the life acquired” (12.4.7). How would you relate this statement to the two senses of merit (strict and broad)?

    Good. I would say that FT is thereby putting the CoG outside the realm of meriting altogether — by design.

    Since broad merit is obtaining by meeting an antecedent condition, and since our good works are a subsequent (or concomitant) condition rather than antecedent, it follows that our good works do not merit eternal life in either a strict or broad sense.

    This would take care of your question 2. also, right?

    “… if the condition is taken antecedently and a priori for the meritorious and impulsive cause and for a natural condition, the covenant of grace is rightly denied to be conditioned … but if it is taken consequently and a posteriori for the instrumental cause, receptive of the promises of the covenant … it cannot be denied that the covenant is conditional.” (12.3.3).

    There are conditions to the CoG, but they are not antecedent, hence not meritorious.

    DR: 1. According to the patristic usage, what the later scholastics referred to as condign merit should have been categorized as broad merit. Would you agree? However, when Turretin formulates the state of the question in his refutation of condign merit (and as you know he is generally rather thorough), he never says anything like: “The question is not Do works merit broadly and improperly? For we do not deny that they do. Rather the question is …” This may not be conclusive, but I think it suggests that he would prefer to dispense with (much of) the broad patristic usage. What do you think?

    Well, I have to admit that I was challenged by Turretin’s classifying condign and congruent merits as species of strict merit. He clearly does (7.5.3-7) on the grounds that both require the work to have virtue of itself. I would not have naturally classified them both in this way. Yet his reasoning is persuasive. It may be that a Catholic would actually disagree with FT here.

    But you raise a good point that he does not then go on to ask here in these words, Do our works merit broadly? — Though of course he does raise this question wrt Adam.

    I would say, however, that he does ask a very similar question, Do our good works merit rewards? further in the text: 17.5.22ff. Which kind of merit is he talking about?

    Certainly 17.5.31 is talking about strict merit; however, 17.5.27 and 33 broaden the argument so as to reject broad merit also.

    I think you would agree that FT considers our good works to be of grace because God gives them to us by promise (17.5.25). They also are not meritorious because they lack … well, true goodness (17.5.26). There are thus *two* causes he gives for rejecting merit in our works.

    The key to the whole thing is this: “But our works can have no meritorious worth either as to substance or as to mode” (17.5.22).

    The substance is their actual goodness, their proportion of worth to reward; their mode is their relation to the reward.

    * With regard to substance, our best works are corrupt
    * With regard to mode, our good works are subsequent conditions, holding the relation of means. They are not antecedent, holding the relation of cause.

    Hence, our good works neither merit strictly nor broadly, but are simply suitable for the reward we receive.

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  138. D.G., we’re not talking about sinless man’s ability to keep the law. We’re talking about FT’s categories for merit, and specifically that innocent Adam was not capable of intrinsic merit before God even if he had persevered.

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  139. Since broad merit is obtaining by meeting an antecedent condition, and since our good works are a subsequent (or concomitant) condition rather than antecedent, it follows that our good works do not merit eternal life in either a strict or broad sense.

    I’m confused. I thought we had agreed that according to the broad usage (“consecution of any thing”), good works merit eternal life. Can you help?

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  140. Subsequent or concomitant conditions are not antecedent conditions.

    The conditions of faith, repentance, and obedience are very clearly marked out by FT as concomitant conditions for the CoG over against antecedent ones. 12.2.30, 12.3.3, 12.3.6(3), 12.3.11, 12.3.12, 12.4.7.

    So there is no consecution and thus no problem. God does not say, “On condition of you giving me faith, I will bring you into the covenant of grace.” He says rather, “It is time for you to come in – here is faith, and following, repentance and obedience.”

    Now, you are probably getting yourself worked up over 12.3.15-16. Before you go there, spend some time dwelling on 12.3.11. Keyword: relative.

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  141. @ Joel: Venema does a nicely even-handed laying out of both Calvin and of Turretin. My two complaints would be

    (1) He doesn’t seem to understand what is meant by “republication of the covenant of works.” He says,

    Though I will have occasion in what follows to consider further Turretin’s view of the role of the law in the Mosaic economy, it does not appear from my summary thus far that Turretin understands it to function at some level as a covenant of works. To be sure, Turretin affirms that the law, narrowly considered, reminds Israel of the requirements and consequences of obedience, and thereby closes the door to justification and life by the works of the law. In this respect, the law reiterates the demands of the covenant of works and shows why the promise of life and blessing cannot be obtained through the law. However, in doing so the law serves the gospel of God’s grace in Christ, demonstrating that the covenant of works has been wholly abrogated as an instrument for obtaining life. Part of God’s purpose in giving the law within the broad framework of the Mosaic economy was to point Israel to Christ who alone fulfills all the obligations of the law on behalf of his people. To view the law as though it were given covenantally as a means for obtaining the blessing of life and justification would be to “abstract” the law from the promises of grace that are an integral part of the Mosaic economy. Indeed, such an abstraction of the law from its divinely-intended place within the Mosaic economy is the error of the legalists whom the apostle Paul opposes in his letter to the Galatians. Though the Mosaic administration may include a formal republication of the law’s obligations, together with the consequences that follow in the instance of obedience or disobedience to its requirements, it does not thereby reinstitute at some level the pre-fall covenant of works.

    That just isn’t the view. Republication is not reinstitution. At least, I’ve never heard anyone express that view, and I would be mightily alarmed if I did! (He repeats this understanding of republication on p.75, although he states Kline’s view more correctly on 89-90)

    He has similar difficulty with points 4 and 6 on p.57. I can’t speak for the authors of TNLF, but I would hold that Paul *is* responding to a misuse of the law by explaining the proper nature of the law, in contrast to the nature of the gospel. And that the works principle functions to teach inability, not ability.

    So I would say that he does a good job when he’s explaining just Turretin (and Calvin) but drops off quickly when relating FT to the republication thesis. The view that he attributes to FT is what I would describe as republication.

    When I learned Kline, I understood him at all points to be teaching the MC to be an administration of the CoG.

    This para crystallizes CV’s difficulty: However, when the apostle Paul draws a contrast or speaks of an antithesis between the “law” and the “gospel,” he is not teaching that the Mosaic administration in some sense republished the covenant of works and is, in this respect, contrary to the gospel. Rather, the apostle is opposing a kind of “legalism” that appeals to the “law” as an instrument for pursuing righteousness and justification before God upon the basis of works of the law. p. 79

    That’s a false choice. Of course Paul is opposing legalism! On what ground? That righteousness does not come through the law, because the law is not of faith. Both are true: Paul opposes legalism, because the law, strictly considered, repeats the demands of the CoW. That’s straight-up Turretin – and Venema says as much (p 67) but misses the connection because he’s arguing against a republication that doesn’t exist.

    That said, he makes two good points on pp 85-88 and then again 88-91.

    (1) There *are* other understandings of Galatians 3/Lev 18.5 besides Gordon’s.
    (2) the typology needs sorting out. If we hold (as I do) that Israel’s required obedience fell under the legal economy, then what does this say typologically? I would argue that the requirements themselves placed on Israel as a nation were typical of the requirements that Christ would have to fulfill.

    But that’s just one possible answer of many, and I think Venema is right to point out that it won’t do to understand a parallel “Israel had to inherit by the law; therefore, so do we!”

    Does that answer your question?

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  142. David R., so when you say “merit strictly and properly, meaning intrinsic value, which is impossible for humans to attain to, even in the state of innocence, even by perfect obedience” this is what FT says? When you speak FT speaks? Or is it that your assertion is debatable? Which I say that it is because it throws off the real flattening that Paul makes between Adam and Christ. I don’t get why you are so quick to flatten the law and grace, but so refuse to see the real likeness of sinless Adam and Christ in the covenant of works.

    As I say, your view of intrinsic merit, which is hardly a standard theological category, has dangerous implications for Christology and anthropology. But other than that, it’s great.

    Have a nice day.

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  143. David R., so when you say “merit strictly and properly, meaning intrinsic value, which is impossible for humans to attain to, even in the state of innocence, even by perfect obedience” this is what FT says?

    Yes.

    I don’t get why you are so quick to flatten the law and grace, but so refuse to see the real likeness of sinless Adam and Christ in the covenant of works.

    I will just assume you’re talking to someone else.

    As I say, your view of intrinsic merit, which is hardly a standard theological category, has dangerous implications for Christology and anthropology.

    “… hardly a standard theological category”? You’re joking, right? If not, take it up with “Calvin and the Puritans.”

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  144. @ DGH:

    In David’s defense, he’s pretty much quoting FT, who makes a fine distinction: Adam (says FT) could not merit strictly and properly because his works were not proportional, worthy in themselves, of eternal life.

    Rather, God by His condescension made a covenant with Adam within which his works had the agreed-upon value (or assigned value!) of eternal life.

    So the merit was not strict but rather “according to the pact.” But it was merit, because it was a required antecedent comdition.

    Now comes Christ, whose works not only fulfill the pact, but are actually strictly meritorious, so that there’s not merely a second Adam, but a greater Adam.

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  145. Jeff,

    When I gave the following as FT’s explanation of broad merit, you appeared to agree.

    2. merit broadly and improperly, meaning consecution or sequence, according to which my above examples apply (e.g., youth merits old age, life merits death, new obedience merits eternal life, etc.).

    But now you say,

    Since broad merit is obtaining by meeting an antecedent condition, and since our good works are a subsequent (or concomitant) condition rather than antecedent, it follows that our good works do not merit eternal life in either a strict or broad sense.

    Which is it?

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  146. Jeff,

    Thanks, but I’m not sure how FT could come up with that. The texts for prefall Adam are pretty thin, not to mention that all the texts come in a postfall environment. If you take the goodness of creation seriously, I don’t know why you (FT) have to demean Adam’s estate.

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  147. Jeff, so how does TF account for the fact that Adam’s disobedience was proportional to eternal death? In other words, why in the pre-lapsarian state does Adam perfectly and strictly earn hell but there has to be another “according to the pact” program created for heaven?

    I get how his scheme wants to say the Christ earns something greater, but isn’t that greater-ness proportional to what Adam had in the garden, as in the garden was great but more awaited upon earning (this is what pushes back against neo-Calvinist notions of getting back to the garden), as opposed to contrasting the first Adam’s and the second Adam’s merit? I mean, is it not the case that had Adam obeyed we’d all been ushered into the great reward beyond Eden?

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  148. DGH, Zrim,

    I’m sympathetic to all of those concerns — that we don’t know much about Adam by direct teaching; that man was created good in his natural condition. I’ve just been trying to represent FT here.

    Our discussion hasn’t gone into the parallels between conditions and covenants, but if it did, I would argue that merit pactum is related to the nature of the covenant that Adam is in. Adam is created, hence under natural law; Adam is additionally covenanted, hence under the condition of the covenant. (This distinction, btw, between natural law and moral law, both having the same content but different functions, is reminiscent of van Drunen).

    Because Adam is under natural law, he merits death by disobedience according to nature. Because he is additionally in the covenant, he merits life by obedience according to the terms of the covenant.

    That covenant is not a strict one, between equals, but one in which God condescends and binds Himself to His creation (compare WCoF 7). If it were strict, God would have been in man’s debt; because it is “improper”, God is in debt only to His own faithfulness.

    So I think there are two factors at stake for FT.

    The first is to account for the covenant in a way that makes clear that God was not in Adam’s debt but rather condescended to make an agreement (“condescension” is far preferable to “grace in the garden”, yes?)

    The second is that he is preparing, all the way in Topics 16 and 17, to cut the legs out entirely from the Catholic notion of meriting justification. Both condign and congruent merit (as FT reads them) rest on the idea that our actions are meritorious of themselves. FT says in effect, “Even if we were re-made as righteous as Adam, we still could not perform actions meritorious of ourselves, but only meritorious wrt a covenanted promise from God.”

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  149. Jeff, just an FYI, I’m preparing responses to your five objections and will post them as I’m able. But in anticipation of that, I will say again that, in general, all your objections appear to flow from what I conceive as your conflation of FT’s two concepts of: (1) consecution, as in the patristic use of the term “merit,” which includes anything that comes logically or chronologically prior to anything else, and (2) antecedent a priori conditions having the force of meritorious causes, which he limits to the two Adams alone. If you think you are not conflating these two ideas, then I’m interested in hearing your explanation. (I acknowledge that (2) is a subset of (1), but you appear to me to be saying that they are the same thing.)

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  150. David R: When I gave the following as FT’s explanation of broad merit, you appeared to agree.

    2. merit broadly and improperly, meaning consecution or sequence, according to which my above examples apply (e.g., youth merits old age, life merits death, new obedience merits eternal life, etc.).

    I’m sorry if I gave the impression that I was agreeing to all of #2. I thought you glossed a bit by adding “sequence”, and I thought you relied on Dabney rather than Turretin to say that “new obedience merits eternal life.” (and anyway, doesn’t Dabney say “reward” instead of “eternal life”?) Rather than nitpick those points, I rolled with it. My bad.

    I understand FT to be saying that “broad merit is the consecution of any things.” Consecution does not mean sequence in general, but a specific logical relation, that of antecedent to consequent. So

    “I went to the store, then I went to get a bite to eat” is a sequence, but not a consecution. There is no logical dependency; either event could occur in any order, or without one or the other.

    “my sin merits pardon” is a consecution in the broadest of broad senses. Pardon presupposes sin as a prior, necessary condition. This is, we would agree, one of Turretin’s extreme examples.

    So I have said,

    Since broad merit is obtaining by meeting an antecedent condition

    It should be clear now that this is, by definition, a consecution of two things.

    So the answer to your question, “Which is it?” is, “It is what Turretin said it was: a consecution. Which is not a synonym for sequence.”

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  151. Correction: (2) is a subset of (1) only wrt Adam’s obedience (not Christ’s, which is instrinsically meritorious).

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  152. Jeff, I know you’re only the messenger and I appreciate your postage rates. But I still don’t like the conception of God that FT seems to teach — God creates but is under no obligation to his creation, that’s why if he rewards Adam it’s condescending. I know there are limits to this analogy, but do we say the same thing about earthly fathers, as if they can procreate but it’s gracious if they voluntarily condescend to provide for their offspring (or bestow upon them inheritance).

    I’m not speaking up for man. I’m speaking up for God and his goodness toward the pinnacle of his creation.

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  153. I understand FT to be saying that “broad merit is the consecution of any things.” Consecution does not mean sequence in general, but a specific logical relation, that of antecedent to consequent.

    I think this may be a distinction without a difference, but I will grant the distinction you make since it does not affect the argument on either side.

    A question: In your view, how does one determine whether a specific example of broad merit is “extreme” or not?

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  154. Jeff, what Darryl said. I understand the guard against impiety, but if the analogy works (and I think it does), I’ve no problem saying I am indebted to my children when after making a pact in which they perform and I reward they come through. I’d prefer it being framed in terms of gratitude on their part, but isn’t a deal a deal?

    And if FT is in effect saying that “Even if we were re-made as righteous as Adam, we still could not perform actions meritorious of ourselves, but only meritorious wrt a covenanted promise from God,” what of the Belgic 14 which says in part: “We believe that God created human beings from the dust of the earth and made and formed them in his image and likeness—good, just, and holy; able by their will to conform in all things to the will of God.” That sure sounds like a straight forward affirmation of what God’s good creatures can do, don’t you think?

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  155. DGH, Zrim,

    I’m probably not giving you a clear version of FT on this point. He’s careful, whereas I’m being sloppy and working from memory at the moment. For instance, one of his major points is that merited actions should be undue; yet man, because created, already owes God all obedience. But I didn’t even raise that issue above.

    Meanwhile, wouldn’t ‘intrinsic value’ go beyond simple goodness and imply that man provides something that God actually needs?

    Here’s the major point: The distance between God and the creature is so great, that although reasonable creatures do owe obedience unto Him as their Creator, yet they could never have any fruition of Him as their blessedness and reward, but by some voluntary condescension on God’s part, which He has been pleased to express by way of covenant.

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  156. Jeff, thanks for trying. I have no trouble with exalting God or his transcendence. I do, as I’ve said, have trouble with a diminished view of creation or man who is created in God’s image. Why it takes away from God’s glory to estimate man the way Psalm 8 does, I do not know.

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  157. DR: Jeff, just an FYI, I’m preparing responses to your five objections and will post them as I’m able.

    Thank you. That is significant, and I appreciate it.

    But in anticipation of that, I will say again that, in general, all your objections appear to flow from what I conceive as your conflation of FT’s two concepts of…

    O2 and O4 definitely flow from my understanding of condition and merit. However, O1, O3, and O5 do not. You will not be able to meet them by simply alleging conflation as an error on my part.

    If you want to undermine O2, I would say that you are attacking the right point: Does in fact Turretin mean it when he says “conditions are of two kinds”? Or are there still other kinds of conditions?

    I think if you can establish that there are other kinds of conditions than just two, then you can take down O2. But be forewarned — I’m prepared to pound the table a bit on that one!

    O4 is interesting because it may well turn out to be a matter of axiom. In my world, there is always a distinction between form and substance, so of course we would distinguish the logical form

    If you do X, I will give you Y (meriting)

    from the substance, X = “perfectly obey”, Y = “eternal life.” (meriting under the CoW)

    In your world, the form and substance merge into one thing called “merit.” I think you’ll have to work really hard to show that this is the proper way to think about these things, because it seems like this is an axiom for you: That “merit” is synonymous with “meriting under the CoW.”

    If you think you are not conflating these two ideas, then I’m interested in hearing your explanation.

    (1) From the text, I’m reading FT’s words as he gives them, and paying close attention to textual clues. What he says is that there are two kinds of conditions. Apparently, what you hope he means is something other than this. 😛

    (2) From an analytical point of view, I’m distinguishing (not conflating!) logical form and the substance or particulars in that form. I see enough encouragement in Coulquhoun and Hodge to think that I’m on the right track.

    Hope that helps. Just remember that attacking my “presupposition” is not equivalent to meeting all of the objections.

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  158. Jeff, no worries, it’s not a test, just food for thought.

    But when you further summarize FT and say “…merited actions should be undue; yet man, because created, already owes God all obedience,” it sounds a lot like Alexander’s past reasoning in related threads that was intended to prop up pre-lapsarian grace. Naturally I bristle. I don’t understand the point. To seemingly remove or ignore the quid pro quo force inherent to man’s creation (man just owes God a sit-down-and-shut-up obedience) seems to render God not much more than a pagan deity. But didn’t God create man with an inherent and relational need for reward? Isn’t that what it means to be made human? Yes, the distance between God and man is great, but is it so great that in emphasizing that gulf we begin to lose our image and likeness and become mere drones?

    Some may worry that God is being impiously portrayed as “indebted to God” or implying that God is somehow lacking and in need of something from us. Fair enough. But others might worry that in emphasizing a bare doctrine of creaturely obedience – indeed to the point of even denying man in his pre-lapsarian state could even pull it off, thus enter grace – the covenantal nature of things is getting lost and with it both the goodness of God and the dignity of man.

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  159. Jeff, thanks. But just to make sure my above question didn’t get lost: In your view, how does one distinguish between FT’s “extreme” examples of broad merit (e.g., happy guilt meriting a Redeemer, or saved sinners meriting eternal life), and his non-extreme ones (e.g., innocent Adam meriting eternal life by perfect obedience)?

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  160. To shift the focus (for this one comment box) to the last Adam. Strict justice demands that Christ be satisfied with the salvation of His elect people.

    Romans 4:4 “Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due”. The salvation of the elect (with all its blessings) has been earned by Christ. Christ’s death has satisfied God’s law and brought in that righteousness which demands the salvation of all for whom Christ died. It is not grace from God the Trinity to give Christ the salvation of elect sinners..

    This does not mean we can say without qualification that the elect are entitled to salvation. Salvation is by grace to elect sinners. This sovereign salvation is also justice to the last Adam.. Christ “has it coming”. God the Trinity’s just character makes it necessary that this salvation one day be given to all the elect.

    We need to avoid a nominalism or occasionalism in which God is only sovereign but not necessarily just in His actions. God is both just and justifier of the ungodly.The death of the last Adam was not merely one possible way (along with other ways) God “could have” saved the elect. Salvation apart from the last Adam was not an “option” for God.

    Now that.Christ has died and risen from death, God cannot NOT save all those for whom Christ died. This is not about the infinity of Christ’s person (both divine and human). This is not only about paying for imputed sins by death. This is also about Christ obtaining life for all His elect. Christ has earned by his obedience ( even unto death!) all future blessings for the elect (access, adoption, resurrection).

    Counting is involved in this justice. 1. Christ’s death was offered only for the elect and will count only for the elect. 2. But the death did not count for the elect all at one time. it is imputed by God (not by the sinner, not by the church) to individuals one at a time, both before and after the death. This view (see John Owen in Death of Death) best fits the evidence which says that the elect are both loved and also born under the wrath of God. It fits the evidence that Abraham was not simply tolerated but justified (before his circumcision!)

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  161. @David: you ask an interesting question, but it is one that FT ultimately does not consider or answer. I can put a ceiling and a floor on the answer, and I can speculate on the principle that lies in between, but no more.

    Floor: It seems clear that the quote from Gregory about “guilt meriting a Redeemer” is considered “an abuse.”

    But how far (ie, into how many sentences) the term “abuse” applies is left unclear. And the specific reason *why* these sentences are “abuse” is also left unclear. I can think of three viable possibilities off the top (see below)

    Ceiling: At least within the context of a covenant, it is clear that FT holds that antecedent conditions have the force of meritorious causes. In other words, if a condition of the covenant is antecedent, then obtaining the benefit is “meriting.”

    Trusses: it is absolutely clear that Adam’s required merit is a legitimate use of “broad merit.”

    Those are bedrock boundaries. Everything else is unclear.

    One possibility for understanding “abuse”, the one most favorable to my understanding, would be that antecedent conditions that are not actually levied by people do not really count as merit except as an abuse of “broad merit”. So guilt is the logical antecedent to a Redeemer, but no-one required that of us (“If you want a Redeemer, you must first be guilty”!?!). So we didn’t merit from anyone, since no-one laid that condition on us. It was just a fact of the universe, so to speak. If this is the correct principle, then “abuse” also covers water meriting to be a sacrament.

    Another possibility is that “guilt meriting a Redeemer” is abuse because it is actually ironic. I don’t know the hymn in question, so I can’t pursue that thought.

    A third possibility is that the term translated “abuse” here is simply meant as a synonym for “improper.” Keep in mind that “improper” for FT does not mean “wrong” – after all, all covenants with God are classed as “improper” by him. Rather, it denotes that the word is used not according to its strict meaning. These days, we might say “by extension.”

    If this is the case, and it might well be, then FT has a very broad meaning of merit in mind. In this case, my floor falls through. He certainly doesn’t spend any effort trying to deny the validity of “broad merit”, does he?

    And that brings us to a fourth possibility, which is sadly nonviable: that “abuse” is intended to cover all instances of “broad merit” to signify that the entire class is not actually merit. The ceiling and trusses rule this out. But also, there’s no supporting evidence in the text. The affirmative quote from Vega calls for the retention, not rejection, of “broad merit.” FT affirms that this is the most common use of “merit” in the patristics.

    So this possibility has very little to recommend itself.

    Conclusion: I don’t know, precisely. The most likely answer is that if a condition is required by an actual person as the antecedent ground of reward – then that’s certainly a legitimate use of “broad merit.”

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