Roman Catholicism is the Biggest Christian Tent of All

A seminar at the University of Notre Dame over the weekend reminded me of thoughts that went into Still Protesting and my objections to the conversion stories of evangelicals becoming Roman Catholic a decade or so ago. The seminar itself was about a new book about the Claretians (official name: Congregation of Missionaries Sons of the Immaculate Heart of the Blessed Virgin Mary), an order started in mid-19th-century Spain that evolved into an order that evangelized and ministered to Hispanics and Latinos in North America. The gathering of academics also occurred on a campus that Christian Smith, one of the greatest sociologists of religion in the United States, had left roughly nine months earlier.

The reason for connecting a seminar on one of the many religious orders that dot the Roman Catholic landscape and Christian Smith’s departure from Notre Dame is a suspicion that many Protestant converts to Rome do not know what they are getting into. Aside from the twists and turns of the development of doctrine and debates about continuity and discontinuity in the wake of Vatican II (not to mention whether the Eastern or Western churches have a better claim to antiquity), the Roman Catholic Church is a kaleidescope of institutions, many of which with a high degree of autonomy, with the papacy as the tube holding the mirrors, colored fillers, and eyepiece together. Of course, gaining recognition from the Vatican requires some conformity among religious and priests within a specific order. But in the case of the Claretians, they developed their own materials, their own forms of devotion, moved from place to place (sometimes to be banned by the local bishop), and developed a distinct set of allegiances among Spanish-speaking Roman Catholics in Mexico, Texas, and later Chicago that ran in grooves distinct from “the” teaching of the Vatican, or the national parishes (that ministered, for instance, to Poles, Italians, Germans), and other religious orders.

Aside from the institutional configuration of the Claretians’ work — how did the superior coordinate with local bishops or the various agencies of the Vatican? — I had questions about the degree to which the order cultivated a generic Roman Catholic piety or an alternative that nurtured a high degree of attachment to the Claretians specifically. In other words, if a Latino-American wound up moving from a Claretian parish to a place that only had diocesan clergy, would he or she find a home? Or would the Claretian-formed Roman Catholic feel at odds with other Roman Catholics?

These questions are ones that apply to Protestants perhaps as much as Roman Catholics. If someone grows up Baptist, will he make an easy transition to Lutheranism if he moves to a town where (as if) there are no Baptist congregations? And what about the Presbyterian church planter who tries to establish a congregation in a town that already has Methodist, Baptist, Lutheran, and Anglican congregations? Who coordinates among the Protestant communions to decide whether the Presbyterian is allowed to start another Protestant congregation? American Protestants have no umbrella institutional authority to make such calls. Roman Catholics do. It is the papacy.

But here’s the kicker, without the Roman pontiff, Roman Catholicism is as diverse and as entrepreneurial as Protestantism. That may seem like a big difference, as if Rome has a kind of authority that Protestants lack. But often it seems that the pope acts more like a back stop than an actual potentate executing real power over Roman Catholic ministries. Roman Catholics can choose to operate a host of orders and ministries and they can develop all sorts of different kinds of piety and forms of devotion. The one thing that keeps them “united” are the international offices housed in Vatican City.

Maybe that makes Rome superior to Protestantism, but in the welter of modern society with its religious freedoms, the papacy hardly stacks up to be a weight against individualism, relativism, and creative destruction. Rome’s unity is on paper or fills aspirations. It hardly generates a disciplined, uniform, constraining church.

This is where Christian Smith’s departure from Notre Dame deserves mention. He has himself had a long track record of leaving parts of his background loudly. His break with his own academic discipline of sociology and its “sacred project” was as courageous as it was smart:

Sociology’s sacred project champions emancipation, autonomy, equality, justice, inclusion, diversity, open-mindedness, progress, tolerance, and cosmopolitanism. But, whether or not it helps achieve those in the outside world, within sociology itself, and in higher education broadly, in the end that sacred project actually tends to produce sectarian narrowness, exclusion, uniformity, silencing, self-censorship, lack of debate, the negative sanctioning of nonconformists, and the debilitation of rigorous thought. In short, it reproduces in its own image that which it opposes and seeks to transform in the world beyond.

This critique did not mean he stopped teaching sociology or writing. It did, though, signal his own repudiation of his guild’s orthodoxy.

What he did with sociology, he also applied to his own evangelical Protestant faith. In two books, Smith explained why he left Protestantism for Rome. One was The Bible Made Impossible: Why Biblicism Is Not a Truly Evangelical Reading of Scripture (2011). In the other, How To Go From Being A Good Evangelical To A Committed Catholic In Ninety-Five Difficult Steps (2011), Smith walked through and deconstructed Protestant objections to Roman Catholicism, such as a wooden and literalistic hermeneutic:

For Protestants, the words are the truth. That is why one must get them exactly right. For Catholics, by contrast, words formulate expressions of truth. There is not in Catholicism, a literal, exact univocal correspondence or identity between words and truth. Much of truth, especially truth that directly concerns God, is in Catholicism a mystery. Ultimately the truth is God. And God is not words.

That objection, in some ways, makes his departure from Notre Dame surprising. Smith’s reason for leaving (and retiring with a bang!) has the earmarks of a Protestant expecting a Roman Catholic institution to adhere to the words it professes. Instead of words, Smith faulted Notre Dame for neglecting books (which is adjacent to Protestant logocentrism):

A Catholic university is Catholic only insofar as its scholars, however diverse their frameworks and methods, maintain a serious engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition. The central and animating question should be: What do the Catholic tradition and the many scholarly disciplines have to say to one another?

Smith judged that Notre Dame talked a good game but did not carry out its academic mission in light of Rome’s intellectual tradition (which would likely be a set of authors, texts, and theological themes).

It’s not just that the university hasn’t reached its potential, it’s that it hasn’t seriously tried. Sustained engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition happens in pockets, but leaders avoid the institutional efforts that would make this engagement consistent and integrated.

What might such efforts look like? . . . Notre Dame should advance its Catholic mission by means of standards and programs that involve truth-in-advertising, judicious hiring, incentives for faculty to learn about the Catholic intellectual tradition, and accountability for the expectation that faculty contribute to the Catholic mission. 

Smith was clearly not expecting a university to have the same kind of uniformity as the church. He was not advocating for hiring only Roman Catholics (otherwise Notre Dame would not have hired him before his conversion). He had hoped that Notre Dame’s faculty would teach or conduct their scholarship in light of the Roman Catholic intellectual tradition even if they did not themselves belong to the church. But if Smith had this kind of standard for a university, imagine what he must have found when he encountered the variety of Roman Catholic options within the church itself, from its clergy to the laity, from the German bishops to the folk piety of the faithful in Central America.

An irony of Smith’s departure from Notre Dame is that his reason for leaving has on it the fingerprints of his education as an undergraduate at Gordon College. When he graduated from the evangelical college on Boston’s North Shore, Gordon had almost three decades of practice with integrating faith and learning. Whether it came from the inspiration of Neo-Calvinists at Calvin College or emerged more organically among evangelical faculty in philosophy who tried to implement a curriculum in which students thought about the arts and sciences from a Christian perspective, Smith’s undergraduate education undoubtedly planted the seeds of conducting the work of a Christian college or university in ways that reinforced Christian conviction among professors, students, and maybe even student-athletes (at least before Name, Image, and Likeness).

As it turns out, the integration of faith and learning is a lot harder to do than either Gordon faculty or Notre Dame administrators imagined. Academic subjects may line up with Christian truths only some of the time (the history of the Civil War does not automatically reinforce the Great Commission or Presbyterian polity). Christian faculty themselves may apply Christian teaching differently (the Good Samaritan supports open borders but Pauline teaching on the magistrate leads to defending ICE).

You might have thought a sociologist would have been alert to the diversity of the Roman Catholic Church and to differences among university faculty even at a confessional institution. A sociologist might have also detected that like the Claretians, Notre Dame has its own piety, one broad enough to include the reflections of Alisdair MacIntyre and the strategy of Knute Rockne.

What Kind of Christian is John Fea?

John Fea responds to my post that wondered about his ongoing criticism of David Barton, Donald Trump, and the evangelicals who support the POTUS. As convenient as social media is (are?) for carrying on discussions, this one may be bordering on excess.

The nub of the disagreement seems to be the degree to which Christianity should inform judgments about secular politics (I sure hope John agrees that the U.S. is a secular government — it sure isn’t Throne and Altar Christendom). But even behind this question is one about Christianity itself. What kind of religion is Christianity and what are its political aspects?

John’s own religious convictions seem to veer. In one case, he objects to my raising the question of virtue signaling, that by opposing the “right” kinds of bad things, he shows he is not that “kind” of evangelical.

Hart implies that my convictions are not really convictions, but a clever ploy to show people that I am “not that kind of evangelical.” I will try not to be offended. And yes, Hart is correct. Indeed, some of my evangelical readers do understand the difference between Messiah College and Liberty University or David Barton U. I also think that many of my non-evangelical readers and non-Christian readers who may not have understood the difference between these schools have learned from reading The Way of Improvement Leads Home that the world of evangelical higher education is more diverse than they originally assumed. But I also get new readers every day. If my experience is any indication, many folks out there still don’t understand the difference between Messiah College and Liberty University or David Barton University. I hope my blog will teach people that evangelicals are not all the same when it comes to their approach to higher education or politics.

If John has to try not to be offended, I must have offended. My bad. But don’t Christians generally worry about posturing, pride, self-righteousness? Not much these days. And that could be a problem with a certain kind of Christianity, no matter how right in its public interventions, that comes across and being more moral than others. Jesus warned about public piety in the Sermon on the Mount. As a self-acknowledged Christian, should not John be thankful for someone who warns him about the dangers of moral preening?

But John retaliates kind of by locating me in the religious backwaters of Reformed Protestantism:

I should also add that The Way of Improvement Leads Home is not a Reformed Christian blog, a paleo-conservative blog, or a denominational (Orthodox Presbyterian Church) blog. In this sense, it is different than Old Life.

He is broad while Old Life is narrow. But then, even though I am narrowly Reformed (agreed), he faults me also for being secular.

I realize that the kind of approach to government I am espousing here is different from the kind of secularism Hart has written about in his book A Secular Faith: Christianity Favors the Separation of Church and State. According to one synopsis of the book, Hart believes that “the only role of government is to ensure that the laws do not injure faith and its practices.” (This, I might add, is the same kind of thinking put forth by court evangelicals such as Robert Jeffress).

In the end, I think Hart’s warning about mixing church and state is important. You should read A Secular Faith. I read it, enjoyed it, and learned much from it. I also agreed with much of it. I just don’t go as far as Hart in my secularism. This apparently makes me a Christian nationalist.

John does not try to make sense of being narrowly Reformed in church life and broadly secular in politics. His Christianity simply faults me for either being too narrow on religion or too secular on politics. This makes me wonder if John has thought much about two-kingdom theology, whether from Lutheran, Reformed, or Roman Catholic sources. If he had 2k in his tool kit, he might understand that his own evangelical approach to national politics very much follows the play book of neo-evangelical leaders from the 1940s, who followed the national politics (though with revivals thrown in) of the mainline churches. In both cases, ecumenicity, not being narrow in religion, was a way to build coalitions across denominations that would preserve or build (depending on the timing) a Christian America. Now of course, America is a good thing. But to look at the church or Christianity through the lens of its capacity to help the nation is one more instance of immanentizing the eschaton. In other words, you make Christianity (a global faith) narrow on nationalist grounds.

By the way, John’s quote of the synopsis of A Secular Faith — “the only role of government is to ensure that the laws do not injure faith and its practices” — is actually off. The summary of the book from Booklist included this: “That is Augustine’s distinction of the holy city of God from the secular city of man. Christians are perforce citizens of both, but their only specifically Christian obligation concerning secular citizenship is to ensure that the laws do not injure faith and its practices.” John’s quote of the synopsis does allow him to link me to Jeffress. But again, if he knew 2k, he’d be scratching his head over that comparison. Still this tie typifies the way many evangelicals read 2k: if you aren’t with them, you’re on the fringes, either sectarian or secular.

When John moves beyond tit-for-tat, he explains his understanding of government and Christianity’s place in America:

I believe that government has a responsibility to promote the common good. It should, among other things, protect the dignity of human life, encourage families, promote justice, care for the poor, and protect its citizens and their human rights. I also believe in something akin to the Catholic view of subsidiarity. This means that many of these moral responsibilities are best handled locally. This is why I am very sympathetic to “place”-based thinking and find the arguments put forth by James Davison Hunter in his book To Change the World to be compelling.

But when morality fails at the local level, such moral failures must be dealt with by higher governmental authorities. For example, I believe that the intervention of the federal government in the integration of schools during the era of the Civil Rights Movement was absolutely necessary. Local governments and white churches in the South failed on this front. Moral intervention was necessary. I use the term “sin” to explain understand what was going on in these racist Southern communities. Others may not use such theological language and prefer to call it “unAmerican” or simply “immoral.” But whatever we call it, I think we can still agree on the fact that what was happening in the Jim Crow South was morally problematic and the federal government needed to act. I hope Hart feels the same way. If he does, I wonder what set of ideas informs his views on this.

Here John identifies Christianity with morality. Not good. Christianity does point out sin through the moral law. But Christianity actually provides a remedy. Without the remedy, Jesus and the atonement, the moral law is just one big pain in the neck (for the lost, at least). A policy that enacts something that seems like Christian morality is not itself Christian without also including the gospel. This may be the biggest disagreement between John and me. He is willing apparently to regard mere morality as Christian. That means taking to the lost all the imperatives to be righteous without any way to do so. Christian morality, without the gospel, scares the bejeebers out of me (and I don’t think I’m lost), which is another reason for being wary of seeming self-righteous. Who can stand in that great day by appealing to Christian morality? What good is Christianity for America if it doesn’t lead to faith in Christ?

Another larger problem goes with looking to Christianity for moral authority or certainty. This is an old theme at Old Life, but how do you follow the second table of the Ten Commandments — many of which encourage the policies that John thinks government should pursue — without also taking into account those about idolatry, blasphemy, and keeping the Lord’s Day holy. I don’t see how you set yourself up as a follower of Christ while disregarding some of your Lord’s directives?

The kicker is that John admits he could support a president quoting Muslim sources to uphold American ideas:

I think much of what Obama celebrates in Pope Francis’s ideas is compatible with American values. If Obama quoted a Muslim thinker who spoke in a way compatible with American values I would say the same thing.

So is America the norm? Is it Christianity? Or is it John Fea’s moral compass?

John concludes by admitting:

I am opposed to Trump for both Christian and non-Christian reasons and sometimes those reasons converge.

I appreciate the candor but I wonder why John doesn’t see that he here identifies with every other evangelical — from Barton to Jeffress — who merge their political and religions convictions to support a specific political candidate or to argue for their favorite era of U.S. history. Because John converges them in a superior way to Barton and Jeffress, is that what makes his views on politics more Christian, more scholarly, more American?

John is willing to live with the label of Christian nationalist if it preserves him from the greater error of secularism. What I think he should consider is that converging religion and politics is how we got Barton and Jeffress. If John wants to stop that kind of Christian nationalism, he should preferably embrace two-kingdom theology. If not that, at least explain why his version of convergence is better than the court evangelicals, or why he is a better Christian.